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God may or may not be dead, but Ronald McDonald 
surely is immortal. There will be burgers forever! 
Jon Carroll 
Ronald Revisited: The World of Ronald McDonald 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
His appearance on a Saturday afternoon drew 5,000 
excitable visitors in a mere two hours. The audience was 
fidgety and noisy. The manager called them a mob. It took 
six police to keep the crowd under control. Teenagers at a 
rock concert? No, merely a visit by Ronald McDonald to one 
of the more than 11,000 restaurants operated or franchised 
out by the McDonald's Corporation. 1 Since 1948, when 
brothers Richard and Maurice McDonald unveiled their fast-
food prototype in San Bernardino, California, McDonald's has 
been selling Americans on the cleanliness of its kitchens, 
the speed and efficiency of its service, and the 
wholesomeness of its image. 2 America's children heard none 
of these entreaties. A likable, carrot-haired clown invited 
them to visit "his house" and have fun. That they heard, 
and they came by the millions. 
Even McDonald's was surprised at Ronald's popularity. 
111 McDonald's Newsletter" 
Corporation Archives, Elk Grove 
specific visit occurred on April 
Delaware. 
(May 1967), McDonald's 
Village, Illinois. This 
28, 1967, in Wilmington, 
2 In referring to the marketing, financial, or operational 
functions of the corporation as a whole, the third person 
singular 11 it 11 is used. The third person plural, "they, them, 
their," is used in cases where the reference is to individual 
units or licensees, rather than to the overall corporation. 
originally created in 1963 as a regional, short-term 
advertising gimmick, the literally colorful clown has even 
overshadowed the equally colorful character of Ray Kroc. 
Kroc became the guiding hand of McDonald's after he signed 
on as the McDonald brothers' exclusive licensing agent in 
1954. That Ronald is so popular, however, is strong 
testimony to a dramatic shift in child consumption patterns 
in the years following World War II. Children as young as 
three and four, mere preschoolers, began to participate in 
2 
everyday purchasing decisions for the family. They whined--
or begged, bargained, or cajoled--to go to McDonald's and 
their parents, overworked and attracted by the new 
convenience and ease of eating out, acquiesced. 
Children constituted a significant consumer niche in 
three ways. First, they directly purchased items 
themselves; a function that increased as the children 
matured. Second, they influenced parental purchases, either 
through active requests or by their natural liking or 
disliking of certain products. Most importantly, however, 
children eventually matured into full-fledged consumers 
whose brand loyalties, advertisers hoped, continued into 
adulthood. 3 
McDonald's marketing message reached children at all 
three levels. The message took such root that parents drove 
3 charles Hull Wolfe, Modern Radio Advertising (New York: 
Funk & Wagnalls and Printers' Ink, 1949), 175. 
out of their way to avoid passing the local McDonald's. 4 
By the late 1960s, children became McDonald's prime 
marketing target as the corporation battled against 
competitors Burger King, Burger Chef, and newcomer Wendy's. 
To insure its success, McDonald's developed a three-
fold marketing program based on an image of McDonald's as 
fun, an image of Ronald as friend, and an image of the 
corporation as wholesome and benevolent. While Ronald 
attracted the children, the perception of McDonald's as 
wholesome reassured parents. 
In an era characterized by fears of teenage crime, 
3 
communists, and the atom bomb, drive-in restaurants bore the 
stigma of delinquency. In contrast, McDonald's prohibited 
teenage rowdiness and aggressively positioned itself as a 
safe and sanctioned outlet for young children. Like Walt 
Disney, whose animated fairy tales sanitized film 
consumption for youngsters (nickelodeons were notoriously 
uneven in their appropriateness for young audiences), Ray 
Kroc made McDonald's culturally ''safe" for children. 
Most importantly, McDonald's actively and consciously 
pushed down the age at which children assumed a significant 
consumer function. Before Ronald McDonald, a three-year-old 
was simply not considered a consumer. Children that young, 
4Dictaphone memo from 
1957), reprinted in The 
transcript (Oak Brook, IL: 
17. 
Dick McDonald to Ray Kroc (October 
Legacy Series, dictaphone tape 
McDonald's Corporation, 1988), 16-
4 
little more than babies, were thought incapable of the 
discrimination necessary to developing brand loyalty, a pre-
requisite to the consumer socialization process. 5 Food 
products, especially cereals and candies, and toy gadgets 
sold via radio and comic book advertising, targeted 
youngsters aged seven and older. Comic books, by 
definition, required a literate audience. And children's 
radio serials extended beyond the attention span of restless 
and visually-oriented toddlers and preschoolers. But 
McDonald's succeeded in encouraging a friendship between 
Ronald McDonald and youngsters using the medium most suited 
for very young children, television. 
Television perfectly met McDonald's marketing needs. 
As analyzed by Vance Packard, television became the most 
modern medium for the creation and fulfillment of the desire 
5Exactly how children develop consumerization skills is 
still debated. The most convincing theory posits that a 
child's processing of consumer information is dependent upon 
his/her cognitive level, with a child reaching substantive 
consumer awareness skills by ages eight or nine. Scott Ward, 
Daniel B. Wackman, and Ellen Wartella, How Children Learn to 
Buy: The Development of Consumer Information-Processing 
Skills (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1977), 23, 
178. Texas A & M marketing professor James McNeal, however, 
suggests that parents' modelling of their own purchasing 
habits, rather than the child's cognitive level per se, 
enables a child to evaluate and differentiate between 
products. Still, McNeal's thesis tacitly parallels Ward, et 
al.'s findings in concluding that a child does not possess 
legitimate independent purchasing power until age seven with 
the acquisition of more mature discrimination skills. James 
Utah McNeal, "The Development of Consumer Behavior Patterns in 
Childhood" (Ph.D. diss., University of Texas-Austin, 1964), 
8, 61, 86. 
5 
for consumer goods. 6 Children were especially vulnerable 
to the carefree images of what was thought to constitute the 
"good life" for the post-World War II family. In 1969, for 
example, Ronald McDonald reached nearly 5.5 million children 
aged two through eleven through the family television set, 
via network advertising on Saturday mornings. 7 McDonald's 
not only saturated children's television air-time with 
Ronald commercials, but scored points with parents by 
sponsoring educational and family prime-time programming. 
To the chagrin of its competitors, McDonald's, through 
television, parlayed children's personal love and friendship 
for a fantasy character into a psychologically abstract, yet 
unshakable loyalty toward a corporation. 
Television alone, however, does not explain the 
phenomenal success of McDonald's. The McDonald brothers, 
who had tripped their way through a series of odd jobs 
during the Depression and World War II, provided McDonald's 
with its operational formula for success: a limited menu 
with low prices delivered through an assembly-line system. 
Ray Kroc, with his often garish sales skills, then developed 
an innovative franchising program that nurtured 
6vance Packard, The Hidden Persuaders (New York: David 
McKay, Inc., 1957), 31. Packard's sinister description of 
children being covertly observed by motivational researchers 
who recorded the youngsters' "happy or scornful" reactions to 
television programs and commercials makes McDonald's early 
emphasis on philanthropy seem almost innocent by comparison. 
711 McDonald's Newsletter" (November 1969), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. 
6 
entrepreneurship while protecting the corporation's need for 
control. And historical timing also played a crucial role. 
Fast service restaurants were not totally novel in the 
late 1940s; some stands were already two decades old, a 
product of earlier interest in recreational motoring. But 
automobile ownership skyrocketed after World War II and 
McDonald's became one of hundreds of small, upstart 
businesses across the country that greeted American families 
as they made their way across the burgeoning interstate 
system. 
The $26 billion interstate highway system linked the 
fast sprouting suburbs to each other and to the cities they 
encircled. 8 Without the phenomenal pace of suburbanization 
in the 1950s and 1960s, the McDonald brothers' unique fast-
food assembly line would have been stillborn. Church 
steeples, manicured lawns, bicycles in the driveways, and 
station wagons were what McDonald's looked for when 
surveying sites for early McDonald's franchises. With 90% 
of its business coming from the child-centered "family 
trade," McDonald's tapped into one of the statistically and 
culturally most significant phenomena of the twentieth 
8The $26 billion represents monies appropriated in the 
Interstate Highway Act of 1956. Historically, federal aid for 
highways dates back to the end of World War I. Mark Rose, 
Interstate: Express Highway Politics, 1939-1989, rev. ed. 
(Knoxville, TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1990), 8. 
7 
century: the Baby Boom. 9 
over 82 million children were born between 1945 and 
1965, a demographic bulge that reversed a steadying decline 
in the birth rate since 1900. Looking for growing room and 
eager to unwind after the tense years of Depression and war, 
American families flocked to the suburbs, creating 
communities geared, almost exclusively, to the raising of 
children. Postwar Americans confidently pointed to a 
bustling domestic economy and eagerly embraced the newest 
consumer goods, many of which catered to the needs of Baby 
Boom youngsters. 
As a corporation that found its niche catering to 
America's youngest consumers, McDonald's reflected the 
changes endemic to American society after World War II. 
McDonald's solicitousness toward children mimicked the 
doting behavior of their own parents. Its wholesome image 
netted almost instantaneous popularity and attested to 
American families' dual needs for convenience and security. 
Dubbing its hamburger, fries, and shake the "All-American 
Meal," McDonald's capitalized on the patriotic boosterism of 
the Cold War years. Serving millions of meals annually in a 
"patty-to-patron production line," McDonald's and its sleek 
stainless steel interiors epitomized what Alfred Chandler 
911 McDonald's: Supplement to 1965 Annual Report," 
publicity brochure, 9, McDonald's Corporation Archives; Ray 
Kroc, "Appealing to a Mass Market, " interview by Nation's 
Business 56, no. 7 (July 1968): 73. 
labelled the "modern business enterprise." 1° Finally, Ray 
Kroc's hybrid franchising system successfully merged both 
small-scale entrepreneurship and corporate conformity, 
proving that the two polarities could be harmonized. Thus, 
a study of McDonald's becomes a prism both to analyze the 
disparate social changes of the postwar decades and to view 
their convergence under the golden arches. 
Chapter 2 of this study examines the corporate history 
of McDonald's, especially the contributions of the McDonald 
brothers who delivered to Ray Kroc in 1955 a unique food 
concept in its infancy. Kroc "raised" McDonald's, even 
protectively referred to it as "my baby," and instilled in 
it his own unshakable belief in the American capitalist 
system. 11 
Chapter 3 takes a step back, analyzing McDonald's 
precursors both in the convenience food industry and in the 
marketing of consumer products to children. McDonald's 
corporate success drew upon the licensing experiences of 
earlier roadside eateries, particularly that of Howard 
8 
10Max Boas and Steve Chain, Big Mac: The Unauthorized 
Story of McDonald's (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1976), 23; Alfred 
D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand: The Managerial 
Revolution in American Business (Cambridge, MA: Belknap 
Press, 1977). McDonald's exceeded Chandler's definition by 
vertically integrating not only production and distribution, 
but consumption as well, highlighting the importance of the 
consumer whom Chandler glosses over. 
11Ray Kroc, "I'm the Hamburger Man," interview by Julie 
Woodman and Judy Shoen, Institutions: Volume Feeding 
Management 71 (15 September 1972): 73. 
9 
Johnson's. Similarly, McDonald's co-opted a host of proven 
child marketing strategies developed by periodical and radio 
advertisers since the 1890s. Unlike the earlier child 
marketers, however, McDonald's targeted an unprecedentedly 
young audience for its products. Thus, children aged three 
to sixteen provide the focal point for this analysis of 
child consumerism, with the major emphasis on the youngest 
of these children. 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 analyze McDonald's relationship to 
children during the 1950s and 1960s. Chapter 4 examines the 
dominant social and cultural trends of these immediate 
postwar decades and firmly situates McDonald's within the 
context of an increasingly populous and suburban, yet 
psychologically insecure consumer society. McDonald's 
marketing strategy from 1955 to 1963, that is, the years 
prior to the creation of Ronald McDonald, forms the focus 
for Chapter 5. These years marked the emergence of 
philanthropy as a marketing tool, at first on a small scale 
and later expanding to a largess of billions of dollars. 
Chapter 6 focuses on Ronald McDonald, who created an image 
of McDonald's as fun and solidified McDonald's leadership in 
the children's market. 
The wholesome image of McDonald's, so carefully 
nurtured by Ray Kroc since 1955, had, by 1980, become almost 
irreparably sullied. Chapter 7 examines the changing social 
and political climate surrounding McDonald's during the 
10 
1970s and 1980s when a plunging birthrate forced McDonald's 
to question its marketing commitment to children. Chapter 8 
details McDonald's recommitment to the children's market, 
marked by a program of aggressive television advertising 
that incurred the wrath of children's advocacy groups. 
Finally, Chapter 9 offers some concluding analysis on 
the role of McDonald's in the growing consumerism of 
children, including children worldwide, and updates the 
study to the present time. This chapter looks at beginnings 
as well. It plants the seeds for further research and 
offers an answer to the critics who decry child consumerism 
as immoral or unethical. 
Comments on Sources 
In the past forty years, McDonald's has deliberately 
molded an image of itself as a cultural institution, in the 
vein of Sears, Roebuck earlier in this century. Conscious 
of its own history, McDonald's has developed an extensive 
archival collection; it is this original source material 
that forms the research core of this analysis. 
Notable among the vast array of archival documents 
examined are McDonald's monthly newsletters to all licensees 
and the on-going editions of its "Marketing Manual." The 
"McDonald's Newsletter" clearly charts the corporation's 
increasing interest in children from both a consumer and 
philanthropic point of view. Reflecting McDonald's own 
evolution, the earliest years of the "Newsletter" stressed 
11 
basic operational concerns (equipment maintenance and food 
supply and preparation) while the later years' issues 
focused on advertising, public relations, and protecting the 
image of McDonald's. The various "Marketing Manuals," 
updated irregularly, hone the use of corporate philanthropy 
as a marketing tool. Together, the "Newsletters" and the 
"Marketing Manuals" reveal how the evolving persona of 
Ronald McDonald, from gimmick to friend, mirrored the 
corporation's own increasingly complex commitment to 
children. 
Complementing the documentary archival material are the 
dozens of McDonald's commercials collected by McDonald's 
Archives. These commercials aired on network television 
from the late 1960s, when McDonald's intensified its efforts 
at securing the children's market, to 1985--the terminus of 
this study. Primarily one-minute spots, these commercials 
provide the mental meeting place for the dialogue between 
Ronald McDonald and American youngsters. It is here that 
children are told that McDonald's is fun, that they and 
their parents "deserve a break," and that all that 
McDonald's does is done "for you." Thus, they are an 
important means of communication for both clown and 
corporation. 
Secondary source material included books and articles 
specifically about McDonald's and more general works which 
examined the expanding consumer function of children. In 
1983, Bowling Green University Popular Press published 
Ronald Revisited: The World of Ronald McDonald, updated 
from the 1978 version and both edited by Marshall 
Fishwick. 12 An eclectic anthology, the essays examined 
McDonald's primarily from a material culture perspective, 
with anthropological and ethnographic themes predominant 
over historical ones. Although Fishwick supplied an 
introductory essay on the origins of clowning and Ronald 
McDonald graces both title and cover of the work, there is 
very little analysis of Ronald and, surprisingly, almost 
nothing on children. 
An analysis of McDonald's operations and corporate 
history is John F. Love's McDonald's Behind the Arches. 13 
Drawing upon the hundreds of interviews he conducted with 
McDonald's corporate employees, suppliers, and licensees, 
Love, a former editor of BusinessWeek, credited Ray Kroc 
with creating a new form of franchising that minimizes 
investors' risk. 
Ray Kroc's own 1977 autobiography, Grinding It Out: 
The Making of McDonald's, portrayed a salesman in a life-
long quest to fulfill the American capitalist promise of 
12 
12Marshall Fishwick, ed., Ronald Revisited: The World of 
Ronald McDonald, rev. ed. (Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green 
University Popular Press, 1983). 
13John F. Love, McDonald's: Behind the Arches (New York: 
Bantam Books, 1986). 
13 
becoming a self-made millionaire. 14 While occasionally 
self-promoting, Kroc offered an insider's vision of 
McDonald's place on the American cultural landscape, a 
vision that continues to guide the corporation ten years 
after Kroc's death. 
McDonald's has changed the way Americans share their 
traditional family meals. John and Karen Hess' The Taste of 
America provided insight into the nutritional debate 
surrounding McDonald's in the 1970s and 1980s, though it 
glossed over McDonald's broader social import. 15 
Conversely, Joanne Finkelstein, in Dining Out: A Sociology 
of Modern Manners, correctly sensed that what McDonald's was 
peddling was not only hamburgers and convenience but, more 
important psychologically, a "sense of family unity. 1116 
It was a unity that was cemented by the children, who 
comprised the chief target audience for McDonald's 
commercials. 
Children all too often are seen as the recipients of 
historical change, rather than as its agents. Their 
marginal power status dilutes their real significance and, 
in the case of McDonald's, is deceptive. Although 
14Ray Kroc with Robert Anderson, Grinding It out: The 
Making of McDonald's (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1977; 
reprint, Chicago: St. Martin's Paperbacks, 1987). 
15John L. 
(Greensboro, SC: 
and Karen Hess, The Taste of America 
University of South Carolina Press, 1989). 
16Joanne Finkelstein, Dining Out: A Sociology of Modern 
Manners (New York: New York University Press, 1989), 4. 
14 
McDonald's directed its earliest advertising at parents 
through focused images of the restaurants' cleanliness, 
convenience, and value, it simultaneously equated McDonald's 
with "fun." By the late 1960s, advertising primarily to 
parents gave way as McDonald's went full throttle after the 
children's market. 
The filtering down of consumer behavior to a 
preschooler level requires the child to prematurely assume 
adult behavior patterns. Psychologist Joshua Meyrowitz, in 
Growing Up in America: Historical Experiences, examined the 
maturation process of post-World War II children and 
concluded that television, McDonald's primary advertising 
medium, has substantially flattened out the social 
differences between adults and children. By exposing 
children to adult situations, including consumerism, 
television has diminished the reality of childhood as 
distinctively innocent. 17 Looking at an earlier 
generation of children, Small Worlds: Children and 
Adolescents in America, 1850-1950, edited by Elliott West 
and Paula Petrik, concluded that consumer behavior by 
youngsters was widespread even before World War rr. 18 
17Joshua Meyrowitz, "The Adultlike Child and the 
Childlike Adult: Socialization in an Electronic Age," in 
Harvey J. Graff, ed. Growing Up in America: Historical 
Experiences (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 
1987): 612-31. 
18Elliott West and Paula Petrik, eds., Small Worlds: 
Children and Adolescents in America, 1850-1950 (Lawrence, KS: 
University Press of Kansas, 1992). 

CHAPTER 2 
AN AMERICAN PHENOMENON 
We're going to mow them down .... Look, it 
is ridiculous to call this an industry. This 
is not. This is rat eat rat, dog eat dog. 
I'll kill 'em, and I'm going to kill 'em 
before they kill me. You're talking about 
the American way of survival of the 
fittest. 1 
Ray Kroc, Institutions: Volume Feeding 
Ray Kroc took his business seriously. Although neither 
he nor the McDonald brothers initially intended to change 
history, Kroc was justified when he told McDonald's 
shareholders in 1966 that "I sincerely believe that what we 
[have] created is an institution. 112 With 1992 sales of 
nearly $21.9 billion dollars, McDonald's Corporation has 
peddled more than 80 billion hamburgers to consumers in the 
United States and in 66 foreign countries, making it one of 
the most recognized brands in this country and in the 
1Ray Kroc, "I'm the Hamburger Man," interview by Julie 
Woodman and Judy Shoen, Institutions: Volume Feeding 71 
(15 September 1972): 73. 
2 Quoted in "McDonald's Newsletter" (June 1966), 
McDonald's Corporation Archives. Kroc frequently used this 
and similar lines in his public speeches and interviews. 
16 
17 
world. 3 
Before it became a "phenomenon" and a force for 
cultural change, however, McDonald's had to distinguish 
itself from the hundreds of eclectic drive-ins that dotted 
post-World War II America. This task required the unique 
and combined contributions first of Richard and Maurice 
McDonald, and, later, of Ray Kroc. The McDonald brothers, 
long fascinated by Henry Ford's streamlining success, 
contributed the technological creativity that allowed 
McDonald's to serve patrons a full meal in two minutes or 
less. Ray Kroc's creativity lay in his marketing skills, 
honed through peddling everything from ribbons, to paper 
cups, to Florida swampland. Though often at odds with each 
other--McDonald's Corporation frequently referred to Kroc as 
its "founder," ignoring the brothers altogether--Kroc drew 
upon Richard and Maurice McDonald's contributions in 
creating what he later called his "personal monument to 
capitalism. 114 
Maurice (Mac) McDonald was born in 1900. His younger 
brother Richard (Dick) arrived in 1908. Like Kroc, they 
were American-born sons of immigrant parents. Their parents 
hailed from Ireland and settled in Manchester, New 
3McDonald's Corporation Annual Report, 1992, McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. Figures are for 1992. 
4Ray Kroc with Robert Anderson, Grinding It Out: 
Making of McDonald's (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 
reprint, Chicago: St. Martin's Paperbacks, 1987), 61. 
references are to the reprint edition. 
The 
1977; 
Page 
18 
Hampshire, where their father worked in a shoe factory. The 
senior Mr. McDonald evidently did quite well for himself as 
both his sons were able to graduate from high school, still 
a rarity for working class youth of the time. The family's 
prosperity did not last long. By 1930, economic hard times 
had taken a toll on Manchester's economy. With his father 
newly unemployed and no future prospects for himself, Mac 
McDonald moved to California and found work in the fledgling 
moving-picture trade in Hollywood. 5 
The 1920s were robust years for the upstart industry 
and even the browbeaten economy of the 1930s proved friendly 
to the movies. Dick McDonald soon joined his brother and 
together they set up the cumbersome lighting and movie sets 
needed on Hollywood's back lots. 6 Whatever their later 
differences with Kroc, the McDonald brothers were equally 
reaching for success, measured for them in owning their own 
business. 7 In less than ten years, the brothers opened and 
shuttered a movie theater, an orange juice stand, and a hot 
dog concession. There was opportunity in California's 
burgeoning numbers--population increased over 87% between 
1920 and 1940--but exactly where to find it eluded them, 
5John F. Love, McDonald's: Behind the Arches (New 
York: Bantam Books, 1986), 10. 
6Ellen Graham, "McDonald's Pickle: He Began Fast Food 
But Gets No Credit," Wall Street Journal, 15 August 1991, 
sec. A, 1; Love, McDonald's Behind the Arches, 10; Kroc 
Grinding It Out, 70. 
7Love, McDonald's: Behind the Arches, 10. 
19 
until 1937. 8 
Then, the brothers teamed up with a local barbecue cook 
and opened a small carhop drive-in restaurant in Arcadia, 
near the Santa Anita racetrack. Their customers, mostly the 
regulars and tourists who visited the track, proved to the 
brothers that the drive-in format had the potential for 
success. 9 Other upstart businessmen were realizing the 
same thing. In 1932, the Pig Stand, recognized widely as 
the first carhop drive-in, had debuted on the corner of 
Sunset and Vermont in Hollywood. 10 By the early 1940s, 
dozens of drive-ins dotted the major car routes on the West 
Coast. While some, like Carpenter's and Herbert's in Los 
Angeles, were elaborate businesses complete with training 
films for carhops, the majority were little more than 
shacks. 11 
In 1940, the brothers secured a· $5,000 loan from the 
Bank of America and unveiled their new, bigger drive-in 
8 Ibid.; J. Kenneth Props, "The Tapes: R.A.K. [Ray 
Allen Kroc] Remembered," 23 January 1984, McDonald's 
Corporation Archives, 2-3. Props is McDonald's informal 
company historian. He started with McDonald's in 1962 as a 
real estate representative and became director of licensing 
in 1970. Although he did not serve under the McDonald 
brothers, his research fills in many of the gaps of 
McDonald's earliest years under the McDonald brothers; U.S. 
Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United 
States, 1946 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1946), table 6, pp. 6-7. 
9Kroc, Grinding It Out, 70. 
10Love, McDonald's: Behind the Arches, 11. 
11Ibid.' 10-11. 
restaurant in San Bernardino. 12 Little more than a desert 
town, San Bernardino was sixty miles east of Los Angeles, 
where much of the earliest drive-in trade centered. The 
McDonalds' new drive-in, an octagonal shaped building, was 
built with stainless steel and glass exterior walls and a 
fully exposed kitchen, in keeping with the "circular 
orthodoxy" of drive-in architectural design. 13 It also 
took full advantage of San Bernardino's location. 
20 
Sitting at the end of Route 66, San Bernardino was the 
gateway to the San Bernardino National Forest, the Death 
Valley National Monument, and Palm Springs. In the 1930s 
and 1940s, it held the world's largest navel orange center 
and was studded with manufacturing, retailing, mining, and 
railroad industries. In 1948, the city was on the verge of 
a massive population growth. Between 1950 and 1960, 
population rose nearly 80% to over 800,000 people. 14 A 
steady increase in suburbanization over the previous two 
decades resulted in more than one-third of San Bernardino's 
12Kroc, Grinding It Out, 70. 
13Harry E. Werner, "Drive-In Restaurants and 
Luncheonettes," Architectural Record 100 (September 1946): 
105; Jeffrey L. Meikle, Twentieth Century Limited: 
Industrial Design in America, 1925-1939 (Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1979), 171-72. 
14u. s. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of 
the United States, 1965 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1965), table 12, pp. 17-18. 
residents living in suburban communities by 1959. 15 In 
1948, these changes were still nascent, however, and 
McDonald's earliest customers were tourists and working-
class laborers. Within a decade, San Bernardino proved 
itself "one of the West's and the country's, least 
ballyhooed and most underrated markets. 1116 
Dick and Mac McDonald had found a winner in their San 
21 
Bernardino restaurant. They featured twenty-five different 
menu items, specializing in ribs barbecued on an open pit in 
the rear lot of the building. By 1948, the drive-in 
registered annual sales of over $200,000 and the brothers 
comfortably split the $50,000 to $75,000 they were clearing 
in profits. But they were still dissatisfied with their 
business. 1 7 
Many of the drive-in's problems centered around their 
female carhops. Decked out in majorette costumes, the girls 
attracted as much attention as did the food. "Oh, what a 
headache they were," Dick McDonald later remembered. "The 
fry cooks were always trying to date the carhops," and if 
they were snubbed, they [the cooks] dallied filling the food 
orders. 18 Customer complaints swelled on weekends when as 
1511Advertisers' Guide to Marketing 
Printers' Ink, 30 October 1959, 187-89. 
16Ibid. 
for 
17Love, McDonald's Behind the Arches, 12-13. 
18Ibid., 12; Graham, "McDonald's Pickle," 1. 
1960," 
many as 125 autos vied for both parking spaces and service 
from the twenty carhops employed by Dick and Mac 
McDonald. 19 The McDonald brothers were not alone in their 
carhop troubles. Other drive-ins were also experimenting 
with eliminating carhops. A 1949 BusinessWeek article 
previewed the opening of the "Motormat" drive-in in Los 
Angeles. Plagued by slow carhops and customer complaints, 
the Motormat used radiating conveyor belts to transport 
meals to its customers, taking on the appearance of an 
unwieldy, mechanical octopus. 20 
Dick and Mac McDonald's solution was equally radical. 
In the autumn of 1948, the brothers shut the door on their 
money-making restaurant. Autumn was typically a slower 
season for drive-ins and the profitable summer season just 
past gave the brothers the necessary capital for the 
22 
conversion they proposed. Three months later, the McDonald 
brothers' San Bernardino drive-in reopened as the first 
modern fast-food restaurant. 
Since the early 1930s when they opened their first food 
stand, Dick and Mac McDonald, like other food entrepreneurs, 
had been looking for a better way to prepare and serve food. 
Even with rising sales, the average carhop could only handle 
six cars simultaneously and it was difficult to extract 
19Graham, "McDonald's Pickle," 1. 
2011 Eating on Assembly Line at California Drive-In," 
BusinessWeek, 23 July 1949, 23. 
profits from low-priced food when coupled with the high 
employee costs. 21 Long fascinated by Henry Ford's 
streamlining of automobile production, the brothers 
deliberately adapted Ford's principles of standardization, 
assembly-line procedures, and division of labor to create 
their own modern experimental restaurant. 22 Applying "a 
manufacturing style of thinking to a people-intensive 
service" business, they modified every phase of their 
operations. 23 
23 
First, they fired all the carhops. That single action 
addressed many of the brothers' frustrations, but created a 
new dilemma of how to serve the food. They found their 
solution in converting the drive-in to a self-service 
format, similar in concept to a cafeteria, with patrons 
placing and picking up their own orders at several counters. 
In three months, the brothers redesigned the kitchen layout 
and equipment and retrained the few male employees they 
needed to service the counters. The most important aspect 
the McDonald brothers redesigned, however, was their menu. 
21werner, "Drive-In Restaurants and Luncheonettes," 
100. 
22By 1940, the word "streamlining" connoted efficiency, 
economy, and order, rather than its more precise definition 
of "bringing distribution in line with production." In 
revamping their San Bernardino unit, the brothers responded 
to both the denotative and connotative meanings of 
"streamlining." Meikle, Twentieth Century Limited, 179-80. 
23Theodore Levitt, "Production-line Approach to 
Service," Harvard Business Review (September-October 1972): 
45; Love, McDonald's Behind the Arches, 13. 
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The brothers chose a limited menu, much as Ford had limited 
the options available on his Model T. The efficiency of 
this streamlined food preparation system resulted in a 
lowering of operating costs for McDonald's and a decrease in 
prices for its customers. The result was a fifteen-cent 
hamburger, an outrageously low price even for the 1940s. 
The new McDonald's opened in December, 1948 to a flurry 
of activity, but their customers were more than a little 
confused. They would "sit out front in their cars and honk 
their horns .... They missed the carhops. 1124 The 
drive-in's teenage patrons especially disliked the new 
system and soon deserted McDonald's in search of the more 
"traditional" carhop format. The McDonald brothers could 
not have been more pleased. Teenage customers had always 
been a second source of headaches for Dick and Mac McDonald. 
Rowdy teenagers hot rodding their cars or motorcycles lent 
an unsavory image to burgeoning drive-ins across the 
country. The teens loitered in the parking lots until late 
in the evening, both attracting the attention of police and 
discouraging families from stopping for a meal. By 1948, 
McDonald's was San Bernardino's "number one teenage hangout" 
and the purchases the teens made simply did not compensate 
for all the trouble necessary to keep them in line. 25 In 
their newly redesigned restaurant, the brothers prohibited 
24Graham, "McDonald's Pickle," 1. 
25 Ibid. 
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loitering and posted private security guards to enforce 
their "no hot rodding" rule. The teens soon left. With the 
teens gone, the McDonald brothers happily welcomed those who 
would become their most loyal consumers, the American 
family. 
In a telling omen of the future, the brothers' first 
customer in their revamped drive-in was a young girl buying 
a sack of hamburgers for the family dinner. 26 For every 
teenage patron they lost, McDonald's gained a mother, 
father, and two or three children. Desiring convenience, 
Mom and Dad found it in McDonald's quick and efficient 
service. Indeed, the real innovation of the brothers' new 
system was to pre-grill the hamburgers based on a general 
knowledge of how many burgers would be needed each hour. 
The vigorous volume of patrons assured that no burger was 
left standing for more than a few minutes. Speed became the 
key word in the revamped drive-in with the goal of filling 
orders in "20 seconds rather than 20 minutes." 27 A small 
hamburger-like man nicknamed "Speedee" became the 
restaurant's new symbol and his smiling face matched the 
26Love, McDonald's: Behind the Arches, 16. Love is 
quoting McDonald's employee Art Bender, who was working the 
counter window that day. Dick McDonald agrees that the 
first customer was a young girl, nine or ten years old, but 
claims she purchased a ten-cent bag of fries. But since 
french fries were first added to the menu in 1949, a year 
after the modified drive-in reopened, Bender's recollection 
is likely more accurate. Graham, "McDonald's Pickle"'" 1. 
27Graham, "McDonald's Pickle," 1. 
brothers' own smiles as they watched their sales rise on a 
cardboard thermometer placed in the window. 28 
26 
Although the fifteen-cent hamburger immediately became 
popular with the family trade, its preposterously low price 
also attracted the competition's attention. The first 
reaction of nearby drive-in managers was disbelief and 
cynicism as they patiently waited for "dreamers" Dick and 
Mac McDonald to go bankrupt operating a restaurant with only 
pennies of profit on each item. But the low price proved a 
strong marketing edge against the other, less efficiently 
operated drive-ins which were charging twice the amount. 
What the cynics failed to account for was the enormous 
volume of burgers sold. Pennies of profit quickly added up 
to thousands of dollars and McDonald's rapidly recouped the 
costs of conversion and racked up solid profits. 
The restaurant's extraordinary success prompted Dick 
and Mac McDonald to join the franchising craze of the post-
World War II years. Between 1945 and 1960, over 100,000 
franchised outlets opened in the United States "selling 
everything from hot dogs to water systems. 1129 Unlike the 
28The McDonald brothers, continually irked over the 
years that their contributions to the corporation's success 
had been overlooked or denied, vehemently claimed authorship 
of the thermometer idea. The Corporation had casually 
attributed the invention to Ray Kroc. Graham, "McDonald's 
Pickle," 1. 
29Thomas S. Dicke, Franchising in America: The 
Development of a Business Method, 1940-1980 (Chapel Hill, 
NC: The University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 126. 
27 
earlier franchise push in the 1920s, typified by automobile 
dealerships, franchising in the 1950s sold rights to an 
entire business format, instead of merely a specific 
product. 30 Thus, what the McDonald brothers pitched was 
their system of efficiency, cost control, and limited menu, 
rather than the specific recipes for their hamburgers and 
fries. Although savvy as fast-food restaurateurs, Dick and 
Mac McDonald were both naive and inept at the franchising 
game. 
The McDonald brothers undermined their own franchising 
efforts by unwittingly helping their competitors who had 
shunned their initial skepticism and raced to duplicate the 
brothers' formula for fast-food success. Dick and Mac 
McDonald graciously offered tours of the octagonal 
restaurant and openly explained the rationale and 
construction of the specially designed grills and fryers. 
The brothers naively revealed their trade secrets before any 
franchising agreements were signed or royalties paid and, 
thus, were victimized by unscrupulous competitors who used 
the brothers' ideas without offering compensation. The 
brothers were excited at their innovative solution to the 
carhop problem, however, and innocently assumed they could 
be equally successful at franchising. After the copycat 
drive-ins appeared, the brothers admitted their franchising 
inexperience and, in 1952, hired agent William Tansey to 
30 rbid. I 7-10 I 119-22. 
28 
spearhead the franchising of McDonald's restaurants. 31 
Even then, their efforts were modest at first, concentrating 
primarily on southern California. 32 
The first major flood of national interest in 
McDonald's resulted from an advertisement Dick McDonald 
penned for the September, 1952 issue of American Restaurant 
Magazine. Ill health had forced Tansey to postpone serious 
work on McDonald's and the brothers themselves continued to 
promote what they dubbed the "McDonald's System." The ad 
boasted "THE NEXT 60 SECONDS MAY ALTER THE COURSE OF YOUR 
ENTIRE LIFE!" In the minute it took to read the copy, the 
entire concept of "the new 'McDonald's Self Service Drive 
In'--The Most Revolutionary Development in the Restaurant 
Industry During the Past 50 Years!" was explained. 
Hyperbole aside, the brothers themselves were skeptical that 
the advertisement would generate interest outside 
California. We wanted "to see if there would be any 
reaction," Dick McDonald later recalled. "There was 
31The McDonald brothers had refused an earlier off er by 
the Carnation Company, their malted milk supplier, to 
finance expansion. The Carnation offer would have forced 
the brothers to both choose locations and licensees and 
arrange for unit construction and equipment purchases. "We 
are going to be on the road all the time, in motels, looking 
for locations, finding managers, " Mac McDonald told his 
brother. "I can see . . a headache if we go into that 
type of chain." Love, McDonald's: Behind the Arches, 23. 
Tansey, however, assumed these duties, while the brothers 
handled operational training. This they had already been 
doing gratis, even for their competition. 
32Props, "R.A.K. Remembered," 3. 
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reaction to spare and we received letters and telegrams from 
all over the country asking for more information. . . . This 
ad was probably the shot that started the entire fast-food 
business. 1133 Whether Ray Kroc saw the September, 1952 
advertisement is unknown, but he had heard other rumblings 
of the McDonald brothers' success and, in his own words, 
"booked my fifty-two-year-old bones onto the red-eye special 
and flew west (to San Bernardino] to meet my future. 1134 
Kroc was no newcomer to the food industry in 1954 when he 
first met Maurice and Richard McDonald. He had been hawking 
kitchen wares since 1922 and, it seemed, was destined from 
the age of three to find his success selling food. 
Ray Allen Kroc was born October 5, 1902 on the 
southwest side of Chicago. His father, Louis Kroc, a native 
of Prague, moved to Chicago in 1888 where he worked as a 
messenger boy for Western Union. The elder Kroc studied 
bookkeeping at a local Y.M.C.A. night school and, at age 
fifteen, found employment with American District Telegraph 
(A.D.T.) as a security guard. Louis Kroc stayed with 
A.D.T., rising in rank to manager in New York, before 
returning to Chicago in 1923. The Kroc family's finances 
were toppled by the crash of 1929. Louis Kroc "seemed to 
have a Midas touch" in his speculations in real estate that 
33Richard J. McDonald, Bedford, New Hampshire, to Fred 
[Turner], McDonald's Corporation Chairman of the Board, 
29 December 1983, McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
34Kroc, Grinding It Out, 68. 
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had increased the family's savings throughout the 1920s. 
But "when the market collapsed," Ray Kroc later wrote, "[my 
father] was crushed beneath a pile of deeds he could not 
sell. 1135 His father's despondency over the family's 
losses contributed to his early death of a cerebral 
hemorrhage in 1930. "On his desk the day he died were two 
pieces of paper--his last paycheck from the telegraph 
company and a garnishment notice for the entire amount of 
his wages. 1136 Louis Kroc's vulnerability left an 
indelible impression on his son, who vowed to achieve the 
financial success that eluded his father. 
Ray Kroc believed that perseverance and determination, 
not education, led to personal and financial success. Thus, 
Kroc, an average student at best, rejected his father's 
admonitions to stay in high school. Looking for adventure, 
Kroc enlisted as a member of the World War I American Red 
Cross Ambulance Corps. But his departure for France was 
abruptly halted by the Armistice, and Kroc relented and 
returned for one more semester of high school. Then he 
began his career as a salesman. 37 
Kroc's future career as a salesman seemed like destiny, 
35 Ibid., 41-42. 
36Ibid., 42. 
37Ibid., 19; Ray Kroc, "Lessons of Leadership: 
Appealing to a Mass Market," interview by Nation's Business 
56, no. 7 (July 1968): 72. This is one of the better 
interviews with Ray Kroc. 
31 
or perhaps it became a self-fulfilling prophecy. He enjoyed 
telling the tale of how, as a toddler, he was taken to a 
phrenologist, Doctor V.G. Lundquist, a practitioner of the 
"science" which believed in determining an individual's 
character by the size, shape, and number of bumps on one's 
head. Lundquist examined three-year-old Ray in October, 
1905, and prophetically announced that the child would 
someday become an important salesman in the food and drink 
industry. "He will make more money," Lundquist wrote in his 
report. "He will be more successful. He will do more good 
to people and to himself. 1138 Other than several stabs at 
the sidewalk juice market, however, Kroc's career as a 
salesman was put on hold until after his discharge from the 
Ambulance Corps. 
In 1922, after a rather lackluster series of salesman 
jobs peddling coffee and dry goods, Kroc settled down with 
the Sanitary Cup and Service Corporation which marketed 
Lily-Tulip paper cups to restaurants, schools, and 
hospitals. 39 A junior salesman, Kroc's major accounts 
were the drugstores, diners, and street pushcart vendors 
whose sales of ice cream or flavored ice were seasonal. In 
3811 Phrenograph by V. G. Lundquist, Doctor of Science," 
October 1905, McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
39Disposable paper 
invention, capitalizing 
disease transmission. 
restaurants, however, 
individual portions of 
milks. Kroc, Grinding 
cups were a relatively recent 
on public health concerns over 
Drugstore soda fountains and 
also used paper cups to serve 
ice cream or, in larger sizes, malted 
It Out, 29, 40, 43. 
the winter months, he supplemented his day job with stints 
playing the piano for local Chicago radio station WGES, 
private parties, and occasionally "speakeasies." In the 
winter of 1925, with a wife and baby daughter to support, 
Kroc even tried his hand at selling Florida marshland, a 
scheme which failed as "muckraking stories in northern 
newspapers . pulled the plug on our big real estate 
boom. . . . What a colossal blow! " 40 
32 
Kroc stayed with Lily-Tulip cups until 1937, when he 
jumped at the opportunity to own his own business. One of 
Kroc's customers, Earl Prince, co-owned a chain of Chicago 
ice cream parlors called Prince Castles and had recently 
invented a new kind of blender for mixing milkshakes. 
Impressed by Kroc's successful record at Lily Tulip--Kroc 
had worked his way up to Midwestern sales manager--Prince 
offered Kroc exclusive distribution rights for the new 
product, dubbed the "Multimixer. 1141 The Multimixer 
provided a unique opportunity for Kroc to finally make his 
mark as a salesman. The shake market was wide open, even 
after the repeal of Prohibition diminished its role as an 
alternative to alcohol, and Kroc had a unique product to 
sell. An impressive stainless steel machine that looked 
like an upright octopus, the Multimixer could blend as many 
40Ibid., 32. 
41Kroc, "Appealing to a Mass Market," 72-73. 
33 
as six milkshakes simultaneously. 42 Kroc lugged the 
product in his oversized sample case to every drugstore and 
restaurant soda fountain in Chicago. The time and labor-
saving implications of simultaneously mixing six shakes 
instead of one were obvious enough, but even Kroc did not 
foresee the popularity of the new machine. By 1950, 
Prince's shake machine had become a permanent fixture in 
thousands of drugstore and restaurant soda fountains across 
the country and Kroc, while pleased with his financial 
success, was eager for a new challenge. The McDonald 
brothers' unique food concept provided that challenge. 
Two of Kroc's best customers were Dick and Mac 
McDonald. The brothers had eight Multimixers simultaneously 
grinding away forty milkshakes in their newly converted San 
Bernardino drive-in. Orders for the shake machine were also 
flooding in from the copycat drive-ins who hoped to 
duplicate the brothers' success. On the heels of a sales 
visit to Los Angeles in 1954, Kroc rented a car and drove 
out to visit the brothers. When Kroc arrived, he saw people 
lined-up the length of the parking lot, patiently waiting 
for the restaurant to open. Kroc later recounted his first 
impressions of the drive-in, "It was a restaurant stripped 
down to the minimum in service and menu. . . . Hamburgers, 
42Prince originally designed the Multimixer as a 
revolving unit with six spindles. The frequent spilling of 
shakes from the turning machine convinced Prince to later 
reconfigure it as a stationary unit and to reduce the number 
of spindles to five. 
fries, and beverages were prepared on an assembly line 
basis, and, to the amazement of everyone . . . the thing 
worked! I felt like some latter-day Newton who'd just had 
an Idaho potato caromed off his skull." 43 
Kroc and the brothers discussed at length the 
34 
"McDonald's System" and their previous, rather half-hearted 
efforts at local franchising. Before ill health forced him 
to relinquish the McDonald's account, agent William Tansey 
had contracted for numerous additional McDonald's licenses, 
only some of which had become operating units. 44 What 
McDonald's lacked was a high-powered salesman who could take 
control of the idea, promote it, and make it successful. "I 
give him credit," Dick McDonald admitted after Kroc's death. 
"He was a dynamic guy, aggressive. Hours meant nothing to 
43Kroc, Grinding It Out, 66. 
44The actual number of licenses Tansey granted versus 
how many actually opened as operating units is unclear. Ken 
Props, McDonald's licensing director, remembers eleven 
licenses sold, resulting in eight actual restaurants. 
Props, "R.A.K. Remembered," 3; "Store Openings By Date and 
Location (As of December 31, 1961)," McDonald's Corporation 
Archives, 1. Ray Kroc recollects only ten licenses, but 
concurs that eight restaurants were operative when he took 
over in 1954. Kroc, Grinding It Out, 79. John Love, 
writing what McDonald's Corporation has called its 
"definitive history," cites fifteen early franchises with 
ten operating units. Love, McDonald's: Behind the Arches, 
22; "McDonald's Chronological History Report," 55. Rounding 
out the confusion is Ellen Graham's interview with Dick 
McDonald which cites twenty-one licenses granted with nine 
becoming operative. Graham, "McDonald's Pickle," 1. 
Regardless of the numbers, a licensee might change his mind 
or have difficulty obtaining financing or locating property; 
thus not all licenses granted resulted in actual 
restaurants. 
him. He was more enthused about the prospects than my 
brother and me [sic]." 45 While they were the great 
innovators behind McDonald's, the brothers had neither the 
desire nor the experience to lead the charge. 
Kroc found the brothers lack of dynamism disturbing; 
neither brother had children, both were financially 
comfortable, and neither McDonald desired the ulcerous 
lifestyle of travelling salesmen. 46 "See that big white 
house," Mac McDonald asked Kroc, pointing to the home that 
overlooked the octagonal restaurant. "We sit out on the 
35 
porch in the evenings and watch the sunset and look down on 
our place here. It's peaceful. We don't need any more 
problems. We are in a position to enjoy life now, and 
that's just what we intend to do." 47 Dick and Mac 
McDonald had accomplished their goal of financial 
independence and preferred to spend their time tinkering 
wi~h improving their existing restaurants rather than with 
developing new franchising contacts. 48 But Kroc wanted 
45 Graham, "McDonald's Pickle," 1. 
46Kroc, Grinding It Out, 12. 
47 Ibid. 
48one of these "tinkerings" produced McDonald's now-
famous golden arches. Dick McDonald designed the twenty-
fi ve foot neon double arches to intersect the width of the 
building, newly shaped as a rectangle with red and white 
"peppermint" tiled walls rather than as a stainless steel 
octagon. McDonald's Corporation scaled down the arches when 
they redesigned the restaurants from drive-ins to full 
service units beginning in 1968. Love, McDonald's: Behind 
the Arches, 21. 
36 
McDonald's. He knew the food industry intimately from his 
dealings with Lily-Tulip and Multimixer customers. The fit 
was perfect and Ray Kroc convinced the McDonalds to contract 
him as the exclusive licensing agent for the "McDonald's 
Speedee System." 
Kroc's early years as agent for the McDonald's brothers 
are documented in a series of dictaphone tapes dated 1957 to 
1959. Short and chatty in his messages, Kroc often fought 
against the constraints written into his ten-year franchise 
agreement with the brothers, amended in 1960 to ninety-nine 
years. 49 "Each license," the agreement read, "shall 
conform to the model franchise . . . no license . shall 
in anyway modify, alter, change, omit, add to or otherwise 
differ from the . . . said model franchise without prior 
written consent. 1150 As written, the contract did not even 
allow Kroc to install a furnace in a unit, an important 
necessity in the northern United States, but unnecessary in 
the temperate San Bernardino climate. The contract further 
mandated that all deviations must be approved in writing. 
Kroc continually fought the brothers for written permission 
to make common-sense modifications to the physical layout of 
the restaurants. The brothers freely offered verbal 
4911Modified Franchise Agreement Between Richard and 
Maurice McDonald and Ray Kroc," 5 February 1960, McDonald's 
Corporation Archives; Kroc, Grinding It Out, 72. 
5011 Franchise Agreement 
McDonald and Ray Kroc, " 
Corporation Archives. 
Between Richard and Maurice 
19 August 1954, McDonald's 
authorization, but withheld written confirmation on the 
advice of their attorney, Frank Cotter, who distrusted 
Kroc's ability and motivations. 51 
37 
While it seemed to Kroc that Dick and Mac McDonald were 
trying to sabotage his success before he even started, the 
brothers had at least one legitimate reason to question 
Kroc's intentions. Kroc told the brothers up front that his 
primary interest in building more McDonald's was to sell his 
Multimixer machines, just as his earliest interest in 
Multimixers was to sell more Lily-Tulip paper cups. "I was 
just carried away," Kroc later remembered, "by the thought 
of McDonald's drive-ins proliferating like rabbits with 
eight Multimixers in each one." 52 While Dick and Mac 
McDonald would benefit from skimming a .5% royalty fee off 
of gross sales, Kroc would benefit from the increased 
Multimixer sales. But the mutual distrust between the 
brothers and Kroc was inevitable. Kroc was hard-driving and 
often abrasive, qualities which irked the more complacent 
brothers who were often indifferent to McDonald's success. 
The relationship worsened and climaxed in a "bloody" buy-out 
of the McDonald brothers' interest in 1961 and the "erasing" 
from the Corporation's official memory many of Dick and Mac 
51Love, McDonald's: Behind the Arches, 192-93. 
52Kroc, Grinding It Out, 71; Kroc, "Appealing to a Mass 
Market," 72. 
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McDonald's contributions to the system. 53 
Undaunted by his awkward relationship with the McDonald 
brothers, Ray Kroc's first task was to open his own 
McDonald's restaurant as a showcase unit for prospective 
licensees. Since he knew the Chicago area best, Kroc chose 
Des Plaines, a small middle-class suburb northwest of the 
city, close to his own home in Arlington Heights and on the 
train line to his Multimixer job in downtown Chicago. 54 
Kroc arrived at the Des Plaines unit early each morning to 
set up, hopped the train to the Loop, put in an eight or ten 
hour day peddling milkshake machines, and returned to the 
restaurant for the evening supper hour rush and for closing. 
Kroc knew the success of McDonald's pivoted on the 
willingness of licensees to pour all their money and energy 
into McDonald's, as he himself was doing. 
53Graham, "McDonald's Pickle," 1. McDonald's 
Corporation Annual Report, 1968 erroneously hailed Kroc as 
the "founder of McDonald's" (p.10). As late as 1989, a two-
part series on McDonald's by Restaurants and Institutions 
magazine mentions merely that in 1961, "Kroc buys the 
McDonald's name from the McDonald brothers. " Lisa 
Bertagnoli, "McDonald's," Restaurants and Institutions, 10 
July 1989, 33. 
54The location of Kroc's first store highlights the 
tension between Kroc and the McDonald brothers. While 
negotiating with Kroc to grant him sole licensing rights 
nationwide, the brothers also conferred exclusive rights 
upon the Frejlich Ice Cream Company for all of Cook County, 
Illinois, in which Des Plaines resided. Kroc had to buy 
back Frejlich's contract, at a time when he was "already in 
debt for all I was worth," before he could legally open his 
Des Plaines unit. After the fiasco, Kroc felt confirmed in 
his belief that the brothers were naive and incompetent 
businessmen. Kroc, Grinding It Out, 79; Love, McDonald's: 
Behind the Arches, 69-71. 
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Although comfortable by the standards of the mid-1950s, 
a stylish suburban home, late-model cars, financial 
independence, Ray Kroc at age fifty-two risked it all on the 
success of a fifteen-cent hamburger. This was not the first 
time that Kroc had staked his family's future on his 
business intuition. In 1937, Kroc's wife Ethel gasped when 
he told her he was abandoning his job at Lily-Tulip to chase 
the future of an octopus-shaped milkshake machine. Ethel 
Kroc's reaction in 1954 to her husband's excited 
announcement that he was sinking their life's savings into a 
hamburger stand was decidedly more vocal. "Ethel was 
incensed by the whole thing," Kroc later wrote. "I had done 
it again, and once too often as far as she was 
concerned. 1155 Their home had been mortgaged and re-
mortgaged before, all to finance Kroc's business schemes, 
but the latest announcement created, in Kroc's words, "a 
veritable Wagnerian opera of strife. 1156 It eventually 
dissolved the marriage. 
Kroc's true love was always the adventure in selling a 
hard prospect, in devising a new way to peddle an old 
product, or, in the case of the Multimixer and the 
McDonald's System, having something entirely new and unique 
to present to the world. By the time he died in 1984, Kroc 
had been married three times and divorced twice. He 
55Kroc, Grinding It Out, 73. 
56 Ibid. 
expected that same self less dedication to the job in his 
earliest employees and licensees, but found, at first, few 
followers. 
Kroc recognized that the same fear of default and 
bankruptcy that worried his wife impeded prospective 
licensees' willingness to risk financial ruin by opening a 
hamburger stand. To help ensure his licensees' success, 
Kroc devised a franchising system that stressed the 
viability of the licensees' individual units over the 
40 
bottom-line profits of the central corporation. In essence, 
Kroc staked his own success not on the royalty payments he 
received from his franchises, the common practice among 
licensing agents, but rather on the long-term sales of each 
restaurant. 
Kroc, whose father had been broken by Wall Street's 
financial indiscretions, committed himself to a franchising 
program that made the licensee an equal partner in the 
corporation's success. Unlike other drive-in chains, even 
unlike the McDonald brothers' earlier franchises, Kroc 
provided ongoing training, negotiated discount pricing from 
food suppliers, and created a management infrastructure 
ready to assist licensees. Howard Johnson's had provided 
many of these same benefits to its own franchisees twenty 
years earlier. 57 But Kroc rejected the large territorial 
57Jack Alexander, "Host of the Highways," Saturday 
Evening Post, 19 July 1958, 16. 
41 
franchises which Howard Johnson's, A & W Root Beer, and 
newcomer Kentucky Fried Chicken were offering. Large 
franchises resulted in indifferent absentee owners who 
tolerated lax operating procedures and poor food quality, 
two items which were eventually reflected on the bottom 
line. Kroc enforced strict operating regulations and 
stringent quality controls. Licensees in violation of 
Kroc's rules received fist-pounding lectures and risked 
forfeiting their unit. In return for being effective on-
site managers and team players, however, the licensees could 
become quite wealthy. 
Kroc's earliest franchises, granted in 1955 with a 
twenty year term, required an initial financed outlay of 
$80,000 (for the physical building, food supplies, and 
equipment) as well as an additional 1.9% of annual gross 
sales and an up front $950 franchise fee. 58 The riskiness 
of the venture became painfully clear to Kroc as he traveled 
across the country seeking his first licensees, officially 
58of Kroc's 1. 9%, however, . 5% was given to Dick and 
Mac McDonald as their royalty payment. J. Kenneth Props, 
"Experiences I Remember" (October 1983), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives, 11-12. Unlike other fast food 
franchises which required up to $250, 000 initial capital, 
McDonald's comparatively inexpensive set-up costs opened up 
ownership to a broader spectrum of middle-class Americans. 
Love, McDonald's: Behind the Arches, 7 2; Paine, Webber, 
Jackson & Curtis, "McDonald's Corporation Prospectus," 20 
April 1965, McDonald's Corporation Archives, 9. 
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known in McDonald's parlance as owner/operators. 59 
In an attempt to "jumpstart" the process, Kroc turned 
to his friends at the Rolling Green Country Club in 
northwest suburban Chicago for some of his earliest 
franchising contacts. He granted eighteen licenses but 
quickly became disillusioned with his friends. They had 
eagerly become owner/operators but refused Kroc's directives 
of uniformity in menu, food preparation, and service. They 
approached their restaurants as merely part-time hobbies and 
tinkered with the formula that, for Kroc, was gospel truth. 
Kroc quickly shifted his licensing focus from established 
businessmen to small-scale entrepreneurs who, he thought, 
would be willing to sacrifice almost anything for the real 
product that Ray Kroc was offering, the American Dream. 
McDonald's succeeded, in part, because Kroc tapped into 
the nineteenth century image of the self-made man. Horatio 
Alger was alive and well in post-World War II America and 
his most recent incarnation was in the person of Ray Kroc, 
whose dynamic success frequented the pages of the food 
industry's trade magazines. As in Alger's rags-to-riches 
tales, Kroc's eventual success in marketing McDonald's 
relied upon hard work, faith in the outcome, and a generous 
terms 
"owner/operator" are 
analysis. 
"franchisee," "licensee, " 
used interchangeably throughout 
and 
this 
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dose of well-earned good luck. 6° Kroc was unwilling to 
admit even the possibility of defeat and coached his team of 
managers and owner/operators to set high goals for 
themselves and their units. 
Even Fortune magazine decried the lack of business 
initiative and risk taking among the postwar generation and 
published Alger-like success stories to "re-enthuse men 
about their chances to go it alone." But their attempt fell 
largely on deaf ears. 61 It was no longer the 1890s or 
even the 1920s, when maverick entrepreneurs leveraged their 
futures with insurmountable debt. Kroc diluted licensees' 
risks by absorbing more of it into the corporation. 
Kroc's franchising program updated the nineteenth 
century tradition of the lone venture capitalist by 
situating entrepreneurialism within a more rigid corporate 
structure. Individual licensees enjoyed substantial local 
autonomy in advertising, product development, and community 
relations and were, in many respects, independent 
businessmen. Food preparation and serving methods, on the 
60Richard Weiss, The American Myth of Success: From 
Horatio Alger to Norman Vincent Peale (New York: Basic 
Books, Inc., 1969), 53. 
61nonald Meyer, The Positive Thinkers: Religion as Pop 
Psychology from Mary Baker Eddy to Oral Roberts, 2d ed. 
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1980), 171-72. Meyer examines 
two Fortune Magazine publications, 100 Stories of Business 
Success (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1954) and The Art of 
Success (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1956) as 
indicative of the literature urging American men into 
entrepreneurial ventures after World War II. 
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other hand, were jealously guarded by Kroc, who believed 
that the key to McDonald's success was the consistency it 
maintained in quality, service, and cleanliness. Kroc made 
Q, S & C McDonald's corporate motto in 1957 and he brazenly 
conducted unannounced inspections and berated negligent 
operators. 
According to the revised ninety-nine year franchise 
agreement between Kroc and the McDonald brothers, all 
restaurant units bearing the name "McDonald's" were to be 
identical in architecture, decor, layout, procedures, and 
menus. 62 This consistency, legally mandated by the 
brothers and religiously adhered to by Kroc, created and 
continuously reinforced the public's expectations of what a 
visit to McDonald's would be like. The same food, the same 
quick service, the same look, and the same feel contributed 
to what McDonald's has more recently labelled "the 
McDonald's Experience. 1163 
The receipts from Kroc's first day of business at the 
Des Plaines unit totalled a modest $366.12. 64 A scant 
62Prices, however, were set by the licensees and were 
dependent upon the profit margin desired, the local 
wholesale costs of food, and what the competition was 
charging. Prices between uni ts, however, usually did not 
fluctuate more than a few pennies. Lisa Bertagnoli, "Inside 
McDonald's," Restaurants and Institutions, 21 August 1989, 
58; Love, McDonald's: Behind the Arches, 75, 145. 
63McDonald's Corporation Annual Report, 1973, 
McDonald's Corporation Archives, 7. 
6411McDonald's Chronological History Report," 12 
December 1990, McDonald's Corporation Archives, 12. 
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eighteen licenses were sold that first year, but more rapid 
development soon followed. By 1959, a total of 145 
individual McDonald's units had sold 100 million hamburgers, 
generating $21 million in systemwide sales (see Figures 1 
and 2). 65 The "system" included both licensed stores as 
well as units directly owned and operated by the 
corporation. The prospect of financial independence lured a 
cross spectrum of Americans to McDonald's and by 1959, 85 
registered applicants were placed on a waiting list. 66 
Ten years after Kroc opened his Des Plaines showcase unit, 
McDonald's boasted system sales of $171 million from 738 
individual units and in 1966 was admitted to the prestigious 
ranks of the New York Stock Exchange, an honor to be 
exceeded only by its 1985 inclusion on the Dow Jones 30 
Industrials list. 67 McDonald's would ultimately join the 
financial powerhouses of General Motors, IBM, Sears, General 
65McDonald's Corporation Annual Report, 1963, 
McDonald's Corporation Archives. McDonald's first Annual 
Report was issued in 1963, two years after the buyout of the 
McDonald brothers. The 1963 report contained figures 
retroactive to 1959. 
66 
"McDonald's Twentieth Anniversary, " commemorative 
brochure (April 1975), McDonald's Corporation Archives, 7. 
67Love, McDonald's: Behind the Arches, 241-42. 
McDonald's became the first fast-food corporation to be 
awarded member status on the Exchange. Its Secretary-
Treasurer, June Martino, was only the second woman allowed 
on the floor of the Exchange (the first was Queen Elizabeth 
I I) . Making the Dow Jones list, an index of America's 
premier corporations, instantly gave McDonald's worldwide 
financial credibility. "McDonald's Chronological History 
Report," 24. 
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Fig. 1. Number of McDonald's Units, 1954-1985. McDonald's 
expanded slowly its first decade, but, by the early 1970s, 
enjoyed a double-digit annual rate of growth. McDonald's 
Corporation Annual Report, 1963-1985; "McDonald's 
Chronological History Report," McDonald's Corporation 
Archives. 
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Fig. 2. McDonald's Systemwide Sales, 1954-1985. McDonald's 
sales rose gradually until the corporation's introduction of 
network advertising in the mid-1960s. Then, sales increased 
dramatically. McDonald's Corporation Annual Report, 1963-
1985; "McDonald's Chronological History Report," McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. 
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Electric, and AT & T as barometers of the nation's economic 
health. 
McDonald's did not rise to the ranks of the financial 
elite solely on the volume of its hamburger sales. Ray Kroc 
may have been a marketing and franchising dynamo, but to him 
the "language of high finance (was] mumbo-jumbo. 1168 And 
in late 1961, Kroc desperately needed big money. He decided 
he had suffered enough from the tortuous limitations of his 
contract with the McDonald brothers. Indeed, from the very 
beginning of the contract he was in legal default since Dick 
and Mac McDonald had never authorized in writing the 
addition of basements to the units Kroc built, nor the 
substitution of gas grills for the more costly electric 
ones. Kroc and Frank Cotter, the brothers' lawyer, were "at 
dagger's point all the time" with Cotter continually 
reminding Kroc of his precarious legal position. 69 Kroc, 
who was virtually "shock-proof" in negotiating a business 
deal, was dazed when Dick McDonald told him the price at 
which he and his brother were willing to sell their 
interest: $2.75 million--cash. "I dropped the phone, my 
teeth, and everything else," Kroc recalled in his 
autobiography. Dick McDonald asked him what the noise was 
and Kroc told him "that was me jumping out of the 20th floor 
68Kroc, Grinding It Out, 157. 
69 Ibid., 120-21. 
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of the LaSalle-Wacker Building." 7° Kroc had no idea how 
to raise that much money--merely raising $65,000 to pay his 
court costs to divorce Ethel seemed insurmountable to him--
but one of the basic components of McDonald's franchising 
program pointed the way. 71 
In May, 1955, Kroc had hired Harry Sonneborn, a former 
vice-president of competitor Tastee Freeze, to handle 
financial operations. Sonneborn made McDonald's a financial 
powerhouse by having McDonald's purchase the real estate on 
which the individually-licensed units sat. Thus, McDonald's 
received not only an up front licensing fee and royalty cut, 
but also rent. 72 Under Sonneborn's plan, McDonald's 
actually made more money through the real estate tie-in than 
through the franchising fees. In 1970, for example, 
McDonald's earned $8.9 million in franchising and service 
fees, while it grossed nearly $28.7 million in rental 
income. While McDonald's was more colloquially identifiable 
as a drive-in restaurant, its unique real estate base gave 
70 Ibid. I 121. 
71 Ibid., 119-20. Kroc eventually came up with the 
divorce settlement money by selling Prince Castle Sales, the 
independent company he started to market the Multimixer. 
72 In 1956, the rental fee was 5% of gross sales, 
compared to the 1.9% franchising service fee. By 1983, the 
service fee had risen to 3% and the rental assessment to 
8.5%. As is obvious, McDonald's made more money through the 
real estate tie-in than through the actual franchising 
contract. J. Kenneth Props, "Experiences I Remember" 
(October 1983), McDonald's Corporation Archives, 14. 

51 
from its location in America's burgeoning suburbs. 
When asked how McDonald's decided where to locate new 
restaurants, Ray Kroc casually replied, "We count church 
steeples." McDonald's licensing director, Ken Props, 
boasted, "You could throw a rock out almost anywhere and the 
[McDonald's] unit would be successful." 76 New York Times 
Magazine quoted another McDonald's official with a more 
precise answer, "Our prime target is a family in which the 
father is 27, the mother is 25, with two children and 
another on the way, making over $10,000 and living in the 
suburb of a major city.n 77 
Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, McDonald's focused its 
efforts on working- and middle-class suburbs and the 
residential neighborhoods of medium-sized cities. Although 
an urban "downtowner" restaurant was bandied about, Kroc 
himself did most of the site selection in the early years 
and was firmly committed to "a choice location keyed to the 
important emphasis on family trade . . . churches, schools 
76Kroc, "Appealing to a Mass Market," 74; Props, 
"Experiences I Remember," 8. 
77J. Anthony Lukas, "As American as a McDonald's 
Hamburger on the Fourth of July," New York Times Magazine 
4 July 1971, sec. 6, pp. 4-5. The McDonald's official 
preferred to remain anonymous, a common choice given 
McDonald's almost paranoid preoccupation with corporate 
security. The corporation hesitates to join trade 
associations or attend industry conferences where discussion 
of operational procedures or marketing might divulge in-
house information. It finally joined the National 
Restaurant Association in 1985. Bertagnoli, "Inside 
McDonald's," 21 August 1989, 44. 
and homes ... the basics of community living. 1178 The 
fact that competition was less in the suburbs than in the 
city only reinforced the decision. By the late 1960s and 
early 1970s, however, analysts' fears of market saturation 
and a weakening economy plagued by high inflation forced 
McDonald's to broaden its base of growth. McDonald's 
readjusted its focus and turned attention to urban 
locations, including the 1972 debut of three units in 
Manhattan, as well as to newly developing sites in large 
shopping centers and strip malls. 79 
In its urban locations, McDonald's offered the same 
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quality, service and cleanliness (value was later tacked on) 
as in its suburban units. McDonald's success in achieving a 
national image of consistency and efficiency was lauded by 
Time magazine in 1987. "McDonald's has become such a 
pervasive reference point in American life," Time reported, 
"that many consumers think of the company as a public 
institution--one that is more reliable than the post office 
7811 The Birth of McDonald's," supplement to the 1966 
McDonald Corporation Annual Report, McDonald's Corporation 
Archives. As early as 1958, McDonald's toyed with building 
small-scaled units in urban business districts, an idea that 
came to fruition during the 1970s and 1980s. Props, "R.A.K. 
Remembered, " 3; Dictaphone memo from Fred Turner [head of 
operations] to Richard and Maurice McDonald, 13 June 1958, 
reprinted in The Legacy Series, dictaphone tape transcript, 
(Oak Brook, IL: McDonald's Corporation, 1988), 31-34. 
79McDonald' s Corporation Annual Report, 1972, 
McDonald's Corporation Archives, 9. Other major urban areas 
targeted in the early 1970s were Boston, Chicago, and 
Pittsburgh. 
or the phone company. 1180 Not only more reliable, but 
given that 19 million Americans--a full 8% of the 
population--ate at a McDonald's each day in 1985, also a 
seemingly indispensable part of American daily life. 81 
The 1970s and 1980s were boom decades for McDonald's, 
building upon the success engineered by Ray Kroc in the 
1960s and Richard and Maurice McDonald in the 1950s. 
Breaking away from the competition through aggressive 
advertising and strict quality control, McDonald's led the 
fast-food industry with 18.4% of all fast-food sales. 82 
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At the height of the 1970s recession, McDonald's averaged an 
annual growth rate of 15%, giving the corporation a 
reputation of being "recession-proof. 1183 Of course, 
McDonald's grew so rapidly because its licensees provided 
much of the initial capital to open a unit. That 
franchising arrangement allowed the corporation to expend 
its own resources on new product development, national 
80stephen Koepp, 
Bashers, watch Out! 
April 1987, 58. 
"Big Mac Strikes Back: 
McDonald's is on a Roll!" 
Burger 
Time, 13 
81McDonald's Corporation Annual Report, 1985, 
McDonald's Corporation Archives; Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, 1985, 6. 
82Doyle, "McDonald's Corporation," table 1, p. 4. 
Figure for 1974. This reflects nearly a 100% increase over 
the 1969 market share figure, resulting from McDonald's 
television marketing blitz in the early 1970s. 
83 rbid., 31. Pre-recession growth between 1965-1972 
was moderately less, averaging only 11% per annum, still a 
respectable figure. 
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network advertising, and international expansion. 
By 1985, a new McDonald's was opening somewhere in the 
world every seventeen hours, "which is another way of saying 
that every day the sun rises on another McDonald's. 1184 
With just over 8,900 restaurants in 43 countries worldwide, 
McDonald's celebrated its thirtieth birthday by converting 
Ray Kroc's original Des Plaines unit into a McDonald's 
Museum. 85 While 80% of McDonald's restaurants were still 
located in the same kind of residential neighborhoods that 
attracted Ray Kroc, McDonald's could also be found in 1,700 
shopping malls, 24 tollway stops, and in hospital, school, 
and museum cafeterias across the country. 86 
What was it about McDonald's that earned it the loyalty 
first, of so many millions of Americans, and later, of 
millions worldwide? In the 1950s and 1960s, McDonald's 
served American families a simple meal--a hamburger, fries, 
and a milkshake--for the low price of 45 cents. Dubbed the 
"All-American Meal," reflecting and pandering to Cold War 
sensibilities, this trio provided a convenient alternative 
to the traditional meal prepared at home. Indeed, the sheer 
convenience of receiving lunch or supper in thirty seconds 
or less was a strong draw among busy parents ferrying 
children to music lessons, baseball games, and scout 
84McDonald's Corporation Annual Report, 1985, 21. 
8511McDonald's Chronological History Report," 53. 
86McDonald's Corporation Annual Report, 1985, 24, 27. 
meetings. 
The convenience of McDonald's, of course, was made 
possible by the efficiency of its operations. Richard and 
Maurice McDonald never quite grasped the significance of 
their tinkerings with format, menu, and price in the 1948 
conversion of their San Bernardino drive-in. They were 
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experimenting primarily to rid themselves of their carhop 
problems. But the changes the McDonald brothers made, in 
effect, created the fast-food industry and linked it to the 
mass industrialism of the previous half century. Ford's 
massive assembly lines had their offspring in the glistening 
stainless steel kitchens, the regimented, almost automated 
movements of the burger crew, and the daily outpouring of 
tens of thousands of cloned hamburgers with interchangeable 
tastes and smells. The assembly-line automobile could 
fittingly be called the symbol of American progress in the 
first three decades of this century. In the thirty years 
after World War II, that honor belonged to a McDonald's 
hamburger. 
Ray Kroc built upon what the McDonald brothers 
bequeathed to him in their licensing agreements and in the 
later buyout. Kroc never expressed a strong religious or 
political bent, but his belief in the American capitalist 
system was akin to the most ardent of fervors. The success 
of capitalism, Kroc was convinced, rested on the overarching 
ambition of average Americans to succeed. 
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McDonald's doesn't confer success on anyone. It 
takes guts and staying power to make it with one of our 
restaurants. At the same time, it doesn't require any 
unusual aptitude or intellect. Any man with common 
sense, dedication to principles, and a love of hard work 
can do it. And I have ... asserted that any man who 
gets a McDonald's store today and works at it 
relentlessly will become a success, and many will become 
millionaires--no question. 87 
Horatio Alger could not have asked for a more loyal follower 
in the 1950s. 
The success that had made McDonald's an "American 
Phenomenon," however, had a stronger foundation than the 
combined tinkerings of the McDonald brothers and Ray Kroc's 
optimism. Before McDonald's could raise its arches to feed 
America's children, it had to first forge an identity within 
a fledgling industry catering to convenience. When the 
McDonald brothers "invented" fast-food, they were building 
upon decades of food service innovations geared to preparing 
large volumes of food quickly and cheaply. When Ray Kroc 
outlined his own distinctive franchising program, he drew 
upon the franchising success stories and failures of prior 
restaurant chains. Most important, when McDonald's 
consciously targeted children as its primary customer, it 
harkened back to a fifty year history of marketing consumer 
products to children. By 1955, the radio, television, and 
toy industries all had sophisticated market strategies 
87Kroc, Grinding It Out, 111. Kroc was not being 
necessarily sexist here. Husband-wife teams provided 
McDonald's with some of their best licensees in the early 
years and by the mid-1970s, it was not uncommon to have a 
lone female owner/operator at the helm of a McDonald's unit. 
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directed at children. It was these early precursors in food 
service, licensing, and children's marketing that provided 
the textbook for McDonald's later meteoric success. 
CHAPTER 3 
THE CONVENIENCE FOOD INDUSTRY AND 
CHILD CONSUMERISM BEFORE MCDONALD'S 
Two-car garages out back; modest weekend 
motor jaunts; roadside inns and hot dog 
stands do a rushing business; the kids get a 
good deal of fun out of the comic strips; the 
children earnestly follow numerous [radio] 
programs; sometimes the 'small fry' is sent 
to the store. It's good training for him; 
and Jane is excited about being moved up into 
the allowance-receiving ranks; a glamorous $5 
bill monthly lust for movies, sodas and 
notions . . . 
J.C. Furnas, Ladies' Home Journal 
In 1948, when Richard and Maurice McDonald redesigned 
their octagonal restaurant in the shadow of Route 66, 
America's obsession with automobile travel and petty 
consumerism was well underway. Seven years earlier, the 
Ladies' Home Journal had documented it in How America Lives, 
a portrait of middle-class American families on the brink of 
World War II. Instead of finding an America fearful of war, 
the Ladies' Home Journal discovered a country that found 
security in the consumer goods that it owned and the 
services it could purchase. Such an environment had 
1J. C. Furnas and Ladies' Home Journal, How America 
Lives (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1941), 66, 87, 304, 
105, 93, 299, 207, jacket cover, respectively. Overall, the 
book sketches the life of sixteen families, representing 
various racial, ethnic, social, and economic backgrounds. 
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provided fertile ground for both the rise of roadside 
eateries and the increasing prevalence of childhood 
consumerism. Ultimately, McDonald's would marry these two 
disparate trends, and find its own success in appealing to 
this same need for security. 
On the Road: The Convenience Food Industry 
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Long before McDonald's, entrepreneurs in the 1920s had 
already begun to develop an industry catering to the 
automobile. Gas stations fulfilled an obvious and immediate 
need, while campgrounds grew up around the See America First 
movement's emphasis on recreational motoring. And roadside 
eateries quickly sprang up as a convenient and inexpensive 
alternative to packing a lunch for Americans "on the 
road. 112 
Edgar Waldo (Billy) Ingram unleashed America's first 
roadside hamburger chain in Wichita, Kansas, in 1921. 3 
Somewhat brazenly christened "White Castle 11 -- 11 white for 
purity ... castle for strength"--Ingram's modest 
2A good analysis of Americans' obsession with motoring 
is Warren James Belasco, Americans on the Road: From 
Autocamp to Motel. 1910-1945 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
1979). 
3 Ingram's partner in White Castle was Walt Anderson who 
had operated a remodeled streetcar as a restaurant in 
Wichita in 1916. Ingram purchased Anderson's interest in 
White Castle in 1933. Jim Oliphant, "The Tower and the 
Glory," Chicago Tribune, 25 February 1991, sec. 5, p. 1; Ray 
B. Browne, review of Body Food, Soul Food: The American 
Restaurant Then and Now, by Richard Pillsbury, in Journal of 
Popular Culture 26, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 174-75. 
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restaurants served a greasy, onion-laden, two-and-one-half-
inch square hamburger selling for five cents. 4 Ingram's 
food retailing operations quickly traversed eleven states 
from Kansas to New York. Ingram personally owned the entire 
chain of White Castles. His refusal to take on any long-
term debt to expand--his own credo was "he who owes no money 
can't go broke 11 --or to open up ownership to franchisees 
effectively negated the head start he had in the convenience 
food industry. 5 In contrast to McDonald's, White Castle 
targeted an adult, rather than family, market. Open round-
the-clock, it appealed mainly to truckers or workers late at 
night or early in the morning. 
Following on the heels of White Castle, the A & W Root 
4oliphant, "The Tower and the Glory, " 1; J. Anthony 
Lukas, "As American as a McDonald's Hamburger on the Fourth 
of July," New York Times Magazine, 4 July 1971, sec. 6, 
pp. 4-5. Ingram added his own innovation to streamline the 
frying of hamburgers. He pierced five holes into each patty 
before steaming them, thirty-six at a time, on a large 
griddle. The holes allowed the hamburgers to thoroughly 
cook without being flipped over. 
5oliphant, "The Tower and the Glory," 2; Love, 
McDonald's: Behind the Arches, 19, 163. McDonald's 
expansion, in contrast, was financed not only through 
franchising, but also through extensive leveraging. Ray 
Kroc's buyout of the McDonald's brothers, for example, was 
only made possible through a complicated debt transaction 
involving twelve different lenders, dubbed the "Twelve 
Apostles." The entire transaction cost McDonald's over $14 
million, only $2.7 million of which was the principal amount 
paid to Dick and Mac McDonald. Paine, Webber, Jackson & 
Curtis, "McDonald's Corporation Prospectus," 20 April 1965, 
6; Ray Kroc with Robert Anderson, Grinding It Out: The 
Making of McDonald's (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1977; 
reprint, Chicago: St. Martin's Paperbacks, 1987), 121-23. 
Page references are to the reprint edition. 
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Beer chain, named after founders Allen and White, opened in 
1924. Capitalizing on Prohibition, Allen and White 
developed a unique non-alcoholic syrup recipe and sold it to 
investors willing to sign on as franchisees. In exchange 
for a $2,000 fee, high compared to McDonald's $950 
franchising fee thirty years later, A & W licensees received 
extensive territorial franchises granting exclusive control 
of the A & W Root Beer trade over a city, state, or 
region. 6 
Allen and White's root beer recipe quickly became 
popular, and the partners added a full line of hamburgers 
and hot dogs. Their real profit, however, came from 
licensees' on going orders for the patented root beer syrup. 
The terms of Allen and White's contracts with their 
franchisees required that only A & W's syrup be purchased, 
at prices set by the parent company. The franchisees were, 
in effect, hostages to Allen and White's control of the flow 
of syrup. 7 Franchisors preferred this type of product tie-
in arrangement, since it gave the parent company not only 
the up front franchise fee but also a steady, guaranteed 
6Love, McDonald's: Behind the Arches, 49. Although 
A & W still exists, it is not a major competitor in the 
fast-food industry. One of Allen and White's early 
franchisees, however, used his Washington, DC territorial 
license as breeding ground for one of America's largest 
hotel chains. The licensee's name was J. Willard Marriott. 
7 Ibid.; Thomas Dicke, Franchising in America: The 
Development of a Business Method, 1840-1980 (Chapel Hill 
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 119. 
income. 
Territorial franchising and tie-ins were perfected 
under two of the "hottest and most lucrative franchise 
operations in the country . market leader [the soft-
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serve ice cream market] Dairy Queen and arch rival Tastee 
Freeze. 118 Both drive-ins took advantage of innovations in 
the serving of ice cream, specifically, the chilling of a 
dairy mix in a large stainless steel vat which was then 
served through an attached spigot, similar to the drafting 
of beer. Between 1944 and 1948, Dairy Queen opened 2,500 
outlets through territorial franchising with up front 
franchising fees as exorbitant as $50,000 per territory and 
a surcharge of 45 cents per gallon of soft serve. 9 Harry 
Axene, a former farm equipment salesman who had pioneered 
Dairy Queen's expansion at the end of World War II, 
established competitor Tastee Freeze in 1950, with a format 
similar to Dairy Queen, but using improved machinery. 
Although the hefty up-front franchising fees made Axene and 
his partners immediate millionaires, both companies were 
plagued by incompetent and poorly trained licensees and lack 
of consistent national images. 
It was Howard Johnson's which provided the closest 
parallel to McDonald's. Unlike White Castle, A & W, Dairy 
Queen, and Tastee Freeze, which stranded their franchises 
8Love, McDonald's: Behind the Arches, 36. 
9 Ibid., 50-51. 
63 
after the contract was signed, Howard Johnson's restaurant 
chain provided on going training, corporate supervisors, and 
a thick operations manual dubbed "Howard Johnson's 
Bible. 1110 Howard Johnson's, however, served a full sit-
down dinner in restaurant units located along the emerging 
highway system, drawing primarily upon tourists for 
customers. Like Kroc, Johnson had not planned on going into 
the restaurant business. 
Saddled with $18,000 in debt owed by his father's 
defunct cigar business, Johnson took over the management of 
a floundering drugstore in his hometown of Wollaston, 
Massachusetts. 11 Johnson turned the store around in four 
years, relying on the popularity of its homemade ice cream. 
Then, Johnson expanded his operations to include several 
walk-up ice cream stands on nearby beaches. 12 Johnson's 
new stands, little more than shacks, were so popular that on 
opening day, twelve police officers were summoned to control 
the crowd. 13 
By 1935, Johnson was ready for further capital 
expansion--he already had twenty-five company-owned units 
10Jack Alexander, "Host of the Highways," Saturday 
Evening Post, 19 July 1958, 48. 
11Ibid.' 48-50. 
12 b . d h d . d h . I i . , 50. Jo nson i not create t e ice cream 
recipe himself; rather he purchased it from an elderly 
German pushcart vendor who lived nearby. The secret to the 
recipe was the increased butterfat content in the ice cream. 
13Dicke, Franchising in America, 120. 
dotting Massachusetts' highways--but was stymied by local 
banks that refused to lend to him. 14 Like McDonald's with 
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its distinctive arches, Howard Johnson's restaurants boasted 
recognizable blue and orange exteriors topped with roof-line 
cupolas. Creditors' concerns that the buildings were too 
distinctive to be reusable should Johnson default, forced 
Johnson into locating alternative financing. That 
alternative was franchising. 
In 1935, Johnson sold his first franchise to a 
restauranteur on Cape Cod. Johnson supplied all the 
foodstuffs from his corporate commissary, provided initial 
training, and gave on going consultation. 15 By 1940, 
Howard Johnson's had grown to 132 restaurants, 92 of which 
were franchised. Of the $207 million that Howard Johnson's 
earned that year, $132 million was directly produced by the 
continual food sales to franchisees. 16 
Aside from his franchising savvy, Howard Johnson was 
successful because he created an image of his restaurants as 
14rbid.; Alexander, "Host of the Highways," 50. 
15Dicke, Franchising in America, 120-21. 
16Ibid., 121. Unlike McDonald's, Howard Johnson's 
later expanded into highway motor lodges, responding to 
travelers' need for reliable, secure, and affordable 
shelter. By July 1958, there were 47 of these lodges 
operational or under construction. Less than a decade later 
(1966), Howard Johnson's 220 lodges attested to the 
influence of the new interstate system on the continued 
popularity of motoring. Alexander, "Host of the Highways," 
16; Russell Lynes, "Fast Food and Footloose Americans," 
Harpers 232 (January 1966): 31. 
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targeted parents, who either read the magazines to their 
younger children or screened them for their older ones. 
Youth's Companion, premiering in 1827, was the first 
magazine to offer children premiums, or free gifts, for 
their parents' paid subscriptions: dolls, books, and magic 
lanterns (a prototype of the modern slide projector) were 
common examples. St. Nicholas, founded in 1873, never 
directly promoted a product to children, but frequently ran 
adult-targeted advertisements that included word games for 
young readers or promotions for children to create their own 
ads. 19 
After 1900, advertisers developed a more direct 
approach using illustrations and copy appealing to 
children's tastes rather than to their parents' concerns. 
The "copy stressed fun • . . or taste • . . whereas earlier 
[when the ads were targeted to parents] it might have 
emphasized instruction or nutrition." 20 An example of the 
latter was a Quaker Oats advertisement, circa 1900, reading 
"Fretful children are nervous, peevish, and ill-tempered 
because of lack of proper and sufficient nourishment .... 
Quaker Oats will build up the child's body and--then comes 
19william Delmar Jenkins, Jr., "A Content Analysis of 
Children's Print Advertising, 1948-1974" (Ph.D. diss., 
University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, 1976), 4-5. 
Al though the bulk of Jenkins' longitudinal analysis deals 
with the post-World War II years, he surveys the earlier 
history of children's print advertising. 
20Ibid., 1. 
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d t 1121 goo na ure .... Proof of the former was the more 
sophisticated approach convincing children that purchasing a 
specific consumer product was fun. Jello gelatin (invented 
in 1897) was fun because it squiggled in the hand while 
Campbell soups (1898) drew on the image of a hot meal after 
playing in the snow. In a longitudinal ranking of the major 
lure in children's print advertisements, "fun" consistently 
placed near the top (see Figure 3). And fun could be a 
strong lure. 
National Biscuit Company's (Nabisco) Cream of Wheat 
offered readers of the August 30, 1900 edition of the 
Youth's Companion two scenic photogravures (photographs 
reproduced with engraved plates or cylinders) with the 
purchase of two boxes of cereal. In November, 1902, cereal 
manufacturer Ralston-Purina, enticed St. Nicholas readers 
with a free bank in return for one box top off a cereal 
package. 22 While print advertising failed to reach the 
youngest ranks of the children's market, it did set a 
precedent for the strong leadership of the food industry in 
child marketing. 
In 1877, food advertising accounted for less than 1% of 
commissions recorded by N.W. Ayer, one of the largest 
21Quoted in Dwight Macdonald, "Profiles: A Caste, A 
Culture, A Market," New Yorker 34 (22 November 1958): 77. 
This was a two-part series on Eugene Gilbert, a pioneer in 
youth marketing research. 
22Jenkins, "A Content Analysis of Children's Print 
Advertising," 7. 
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1948 1952 
Fig. 3. "Fun" in Children's Print Ads, 1948-1974. After 
World War II, "fun" consistently ranked high as a lure in 
children's print advertising. It was a lure that worked 
well on television, too. William Delmar Jenkins, "A Content 
Analysis of Children's Print Advertising, 1948-1974," (Ph.D. 
diss., University of North Carolina--Chapel Hill, 1976), 
244-47. 
national advertising agencies of the time. By 1901, food 
advertising had jumped to 15% and remained the single 
largest client base until overtaken by auto advertising at 
the end of the decade. 23 And the precedents set in the 
first decades of the century continued unabated: food 
products accounted for nearly one-quarter of all print 
advertisements directed at children between 1948 and 
1974. 24 Print advertising, however, failed to reach 
consumers younger than seven or eight. The first real 
forays into kindergarten consumption were accomplished 
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through the food industry's use of "host selling" on radio. 
Little Orphan Annie pitched ovaltine, Jack Armstrong 
spoke for Wheaties, cowboy hero Tom Mix touted Kix, and Babe 
Ruth batted for Quaker Oats. 25 Radio relied extensively 
on a real or fictitious character's friendship with 
youngsters to sell a product, a concept known as "host 
23Harvey A. Levenstein, Revolution at the Table: The 
Transformation of the American Diet (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1988), 35. 
24Jenkins, "A Content Analysis of Children's Print 
Advertising," 29. Toy advertising was a close runner-up 
accounting for another one-fifth of print ads for this time 
period. 
25The litany of character or celebrity-endorsed 
products confirms the dominance of the food industry: 
Sergeant Preston - Quaker Oats Gene Autry - Wrigley gum 
Superman - Kellogg's Roy Rogers - Post. 
Captain Midnight - oval tine Sky King Peter Pan 
peanut butter 
selling." 26 The packaged food industry, primarily cereal 
manufacturers, dominated the child's advertising field 
during the 1930s and 1940s, mapping a route for McDonald's 
to follow two decades later. 
Unlike television, radio shows were typically 
underwritten by a single sponsor. The sole sponsorship 
format resulted in a cohesive marketing message for each 
show, with the sponsor and its agency dictating program 
format, content, and, occasionally, even character 
dialogue. 27 Frequently, the identity of the sponsor was 
itself part of the show's title, as in "Tom Mix and the 
Ralston Straight Shooters," or was prominent in the show's 
opening theme. 
"Wheaties, the breakfast of champions presents . 
Jack Armstrong! JACK ARMSTRONG! JACK ARMSTRONG! The All-
American Boy!" Premiering in 1933 on the Columbia 
Broadcasting System (CBS) network, Jack Armstrong, along 
70 
26Host selling was not limited to radio. A comparison 
study of advertising in the Sunday comics for the years 1947 
and 1955 revealed that a constant 96% of ads incorporated 
the products' names into the story-line of the strips, using 
the characters to pitch the products. Francis E. Barcus, 
"Advertising in the Sunday Comics," Journalism Quarterly 39, 
no. 2 (Spring 1962): 200-201. 
27Llewellyn White, The American Radio: A Report on the 
Broadcasting Industry in the United States from the 
Commission on Freedom of the Press (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1947; reprint, New York: Arno Press, New 
York Times, 1971), 56-57. Page references are to the reprint 
edition; Eric Barnouw, A History of Broadcasting in the 
United States, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1968) f 96-98 • 
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with his sister Betty and best friend Billy, tackled the 
menacing villains, Black Vulture, and the Silencer. In his 
spare time, he was a marketing spokesman for General Foods' 
Wheaties brand cereal. 
General Foods so inextricably linked together the 
attributes of the boy hero and the Wheaties brand that the 
two became indistinguishable. Unclear to young children, of 
course, was that Jack Armstrong was a fictitious character, 
an actor reading a script, not a live teenage boy. But the 
Wheaties jingle reinforced the charade nevertheless: 
Have you tried Wheaties? They're whole wheat with all 
the bran. / Won't you try Wheaties? for wheat is the 
best food of man! / They're crispy and crunchy the whole 
year through. / "Jack Armstrong" never tires of them; 
and neither will you. So just buy Wheaties--the best 
breakfast food in the land! 28 
The success of the Wheaties jingle was challenged and 
matched by the competition, with Little Orphan Annie singing 
for Ovaltine and the Nabisco's children's chorus praising 
Cream of Wheat. 
Jingles were an innovation that transcended the mere 
descriptive phrases of print advertising. Even the youngest 
listeners remembered a catchy tune, and its constant 
repetition, while annoying to adults, nonetheless reinforced 
brand-name awareness and recognition for both parents and 
28Frank Buxton and Bill Owen, The Big Broadcast: 1920-
1950, rev. ed. (New York: Viking Press, 1972), 121-22. 
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children. 29 These radio jingles also foreshadowed 
McDonald's own musical forays ("Grab a bucket and mop ... " 
and "You, you're the one ... ) as well as McDonald's own 
"Twoallbeefpatties ... 11 tongue-twister several decades later. 
The use of host selling and jingles, however, still 
fell short of making the sale. Because of their general 
inexperience and naivete, it is tempting to underestimate 
the consumer savvy of youngsters. With children's interest 
in radio beginning at age four and peaking at age ten, 
however, the eight to thirteen year old audience were both 
devout listeners and wizened consumers. 30 One eleven-
year-old boy, already jaded with the novelty of radio, 
commented in the mid-1940s, "I don't listen to the radio too 
much anymore because the commercials have gotten so thick 
they've gotten me disgusted. 1131 Sponsors' use of 
29Ron Lackman, Remember Radio (New York: G.P. Putnam's 
Sons, 1970), 3. Lackman claimed he could still sing the 
Cream of Wheat jingle thirty years later. 
3011 child' s Likes and Dislikes of Radio Turn Corner at 
10 Years of Age," New York Times, 9 June 1935, reprinted in 
Childhood, Youth and Society, ed. Fred M. Hechinger (New 
York: New York Times/Arno Press, 1980), 67; Roy De Verl 
Willey and Helen Ann Young, Radio in Elementary Education 
(Boston: D. C. Heath, 1948), 10-13; Charles Hull Wolfe, 
Modern Radio Advertising (New York: Funk & Wagnalls, 
Printers' Ink, 1949), 175-76. By 1949, Wolfe was a veteran 
radio ad-man who wrote commercials for the "Red Skelton 
Show," the "Jack Benny Show," and "Inner Sanctum." He also 
developed the "Programeter," a device to measure audience 
response to radio advertisements. 
31Quoted in Albert N. Williams, Listening: 
Collection of Critical Articles on Radio (Freeport, 
Books for Libraries Press, 1948; reprint, 1968), 89. 
references are to the reprint edition. 
A 
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complimentary premiums, updating the enticement used by turn 
of the century periodicals, proved such a lure that even 
jaded listeners responded. 
In addition to hawking adventure and Wheaties, Jack 
Armstrong promoted a host of child consumer goods including 
whistling rings, a spy decoder, toy bomb sights, and similar 
gadgets necessary to waging cold and hot war intrigue in the 
backyard on a summer afternoon. 32 These childish gizmos, 
occasionally free but frequently costing a few pennies or 
nickels apiece, had been widely used in older periodical 
advertisements and were simply co-opted by radio. Spy 
paraphernalia was especially popular on children's serials 
during and immediately after World War II. Reflecting new 
Cold War sensibilities, Tom Mix and General Mills' Kix 
cereal teamed up in 1947 to offer atomic bomb rings which 
sparkled in a darkened room, reminiscent of the glow of 
radioactive fallout. 33 
32More than just pitching consumerism, children's radio 
characters also "reaffirmed the nation's homefront 
patriotism." Jack Armstrong, for example, convinced one 
million children to join the "Write-A-Fighter" campaign in 
1943. Planting victory gardens and conserving scrap paper, 
metals, and glass were other wartime uses of the host-
selling tactic which overall points to the effectiveness of 
radio marketing (whether ideas or products) to children. 
William M. Tuttle, Jr., "The Homefront Children's Popular 
Culture: Radio, Movies, Comics--Adventure, Patriotism, and 
Sex-Typing," in Small Worlds: Children and Adolescents in 
America, 1850-1950, eds. Elliott West and Paula Petrik 
(Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 145. 
33G. Howard Poteet, Radio! (Dayton, OH: Pf la um 
Publishing, 1975), 59. 
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The impact of radio advertising on the creation of a 
children's consumer consciousness is undeniable. While 
radio's advertising volume was marginal compared with 
newspapers, the personal nature of the medium extended 
consumer awareness to youngsters old enough to follow the 
simple plots of "Terry and the Pirates" or "Captain 
Midnight." With 30 million radio sets transmitting in 22.9 
million American homes in 1935, the radio was the "most 
widely owned of the various articles usually associated with 
the American standard of living. 1134 Radio was the 
preeminent family entertainment during the 1920s and 1930s. 
Its function of culturally assimilating Americans while 
informing, entertaining, and advertising to them validated 
the prominent status radio assumed in American living 
rooms. 35 
Ironically, children's radio was a programming 
afterthought. The hours from 3:00 pm to 5:00 pm were "dead 
34 In comparison, 22 million passenger cars were in use, 
representing approximately 18 million automobile-owning 
families. Only about 11 million families had telephones in 
1935. Herman S. Hettinger and Walter J. Neff, Practical 
Radio Advertising (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1938), 37; 
Wolfe, Modern Radio Advertising, 94-95. 
35A powerful image of the importance of radio to 
Americans is in N. Ray Hiner's "Seen But Not Heard: 
Children in American Photographs." Hiner reprints a 1941 
picture of Georgia farm children in threadbare clothes, 
standing in their equally worn and sparsely decorated home. 
Very prominent in the picture, however, is the family radio, 
resting on a clean and pressed doily, presumably one of this 
family's few precious links to the modern world. Small 
Worlds: Children and Adolescents in America, 194. 
time," long past women's programming slots in the morning 
and early afternoon, but too early for the evening's news. 
The empty air time, however, coincided perfectly with the 
end of the school day. While children's programs were 
originally intended to be fillers, they tapped into an 
audience of restless youngsters with free time on their 
hands before dinner. Inexpensive to produce, they had the 
net effect of training young children to make consumer 
choices. 36 
Radio sponsors never intended to create a distinct 
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children's market, though they had made significant headway 
into segmenting it by World War II. Three- to eight-year-
olds preferred fairy tales; eight- to thirteen-year-olds 
listened to adventure serials; and teenagers chose news and 
sporting programs. 37 A 1940s survey by International 
Business Machines (IBM) confirmed the extent of children's 
listening habits. Over 99% of American children had a radio 
at home, with 44.4% of youngsters enjoying the privacy of a 
36This marginal role of children's programming, and 
hence, advertising, is revealed in the percentages of 
programming devoted to children. In 19 3 3, the National 
Broadcasting Company (NBC) developed only 3.6% of its 
overall programming for children, small compared to the 5.3% 
undertaken by CBS. Moreover, in a programming crunch, 
children's shows were the first to be cut. In 1939, NBC had 
reduced children's shows to only 2.9% and CBS, to only 3.1% 
of its overall programming, devoting the former children's 
airtime to reporting on the European theater of war. White, 
The American Radio, 66. 
37wolfe, Modern Radio Advertising, 175-76; Hettinger 
and Neff, Practical Radio Advertising, 119-20. 
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radio in their own bedrooms. These children listened to an 
average of sixteen different programs weekly with 69.3% of 
children claiming that radio was a primary influence in 
purchasing a consumer product. 38 
The legitimacy of advertising to children was 
repeatedly validated. In a survey of the ten most commonly 
cited criticisms of radio advertising, the fact that 
advertisers targeted children did not even appear; rather, 
that the ads were dull, silly, or misrepresented 
products. 39 And in 1948, New York educator Dorothy 
Gordon, moderator of the New York Times Youth Forum 
affirmed: 
We are living in a world of commerce, and children can 
learn a great deal about trade products and raw 
materials through a commercial message brought to them 
by an intelligent advertiser. There is untold drama in 
the history of consumer goods .... Advertisers are 
def eating their own ends by ignoring the large potential 
buying power of the present younger generation and 
neglecting to pav attention to developing the consumer 
of the future." 40 
Gordon was mistaken in claiming that advertisers were 
ignoring the children's market. While it lacked priority, 
it did not need for attention. But it received both in 
generous doses from Walt Disney and his alter-ego, Mickey 
38wolfe, Modern Radio Advertising, 175. Wolfe himself 
has only two pages out of six hundred devoted to children's 
advertising. 
39The survey was conducted in the 1940s; precise date 
is unknown. Wolfe, Modern Radio Advertising, 594-95. 
40Quoted in Williams, Listening, 100-101. 
Mouse, who irrevocably legitimized child marketing by 
shrouding it in a cloak of traditional family values, a 
technique that McDonald's later perfected. 
Walt Disney enjoyed early success as an animator 
selling seven-minute animated reels retelling the tales of 
Cinderella, Alice in Wonderland, and Red Riding Hood. 41 
This success, however, soon turned sour. Inexperienced at 
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the legalities of his craft, Disney had carelessly neglected 
to copyright his first original character, Oswald the 
Rabbit. The oversight left him in the late 1920s without a 
character, near personal bankruptcy, and made him 
scrupulously cautious in protecting his characters. 42 
Disney rebounded with the creation of Mickey Mouse. 
Mickey was created as an adventurous, animated parallel to 
real-life aviator, Charles Lindbergh. His first short 
flick, "Plane Crazy" (carrying through the Lindbergh 
allusion), was only an adequate filler. Disney, 
capitalizing on the sound innovation pioneered in Al 
Jolson's The Jazz Singer, made Mickey's third flick, 
"Steamboat Willie," a "talkie." 
Talking pictures revolutionized the motion picture 
industry, although children had already been a mainstay of 
41These were crudely animated short flicks that were 
used in theaters as filler, not the full-length animated 
features for which Disney was subsequently famous. 
42Richard Collier, "Wish Upon a Star: The Magical 
Kingdoms of Walt Disney, " Readers' Digest (October 19 71) : 
231-33. 
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cinema audiences two decades before Jolson's 1927 
experiment. As early as 1908, social reformer John Collier 
observed, "The nickelodeon is the creation of the 
child." 43 Collier estimated that in 1910, between 500,000 
and 600,000 children trekked to the cinema daily. 44 Walt 
Disney launched his "Steamboat Willie" into this world of 
children's cinema and held his breath for their response. 
An immediate success, "Steamboat Willie" unleashed a 
barrage of praise on Disney, yet the costs of reproducing 
the hundreds of animated pieces of celluloid film ("eels") 
for a seven-minute reel exceeded the incoming revenues from 
its theatrical release. Like Kroc, who turned to real 
estate acquisition to pad revenues and provide loan 
collateral, Disney turned to trademark licensing in 1932 to 
keep his constantly teetering studio out of bankruptcy. 
Mickey's face made its way onto watches, roller skates, 
sweatshirts, pianos, and greeting cards, a handful of the 
hundreds of licenses Disney granted. By 1965, 5,000 
43John Collier, "Cheap Amusements," Chari ties and the 
Commons 20 ( 11 April 1908): 75. Quoted in David Nasaw, 
"Children and Commercial Culture: Moving Pictures in the 
Early Twentieth Century," in Small Worlds, eds. West and 
Petrik, 25. 
44Quoted in John Collier, "The Motion Picture," in 
Proceedings of the Child Conference for Research and Welfare 
( 1910), reprinted in Nasaw, "Children and Commercial 
Culture," 17, 19, 24. Clutching their nickels, these 
children constituted a statistically significant audience 
for film-makers and distributors who relied upon children, 
as radio did, to fill theaters during the late afternoon, 
early evening, and weekend hours. 
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different items promoted Mickey Mouse. 45 Pandering to the 
comic book craze, Mickey and later raspy-voiced Donald Duck 
each had their own series. Lionel Toy Corporation, who had 
been among the first manufacturers to directly market to 
children in the early 1900s, was saved from bankruptcy in 
1933 by Mickey Mouse. Lionel sold 250,000 Mickey miniature 
railroad engines in a scant three weeks, preempting its 
financial collapse. Sixty other firms were likewise saved 
by the venerable Mickey. 46 
The licensing tie-in encouraged in childhood 
consumerism on an unprecedented scale. Parents sanctioned 
it because Disney's films validated parental authority and 
reinforced traditional family roles. Cinderella was 
deferential and compliant, even to her unrelentingly abusive 
step-mother. And Mickey Mouse, a typically adventurous 
youth, was equally wholesome. His radio show, "The Mickey 
Mouse Theater of the Air," debuted on NBC in 1937 and was 
immediately popular. 47 Disney offered parents wholesome 
pre-packaged adventure for their children without risks, a 
strategy later carried through in the Disney theme parks and 
in television's "The Mickey Mouse Club." It was a strategy 
that would later work for McDonald's as well. 
45R. Collier, "Wish Upon a Star," 235. 
46rbid., 235-36; Jenkins, "A Content Analysis of 
Children's Print Advertising," 8. 
47Buxton and Owen, The Big Broadcast, 159. 
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McDonald's did not create drive-in eating, nor was it 
the first corporation to market products to children. Ray 
Kroc, bolstered by his own twenty years in the food 
industry, consciously imitated the successes of others and 
avoided their errors. From the roadside eateries of the 
1920s and 1930s, McDonald's learned that forcing a 
franchisee to purchase tie-in products was ultimately self-
defeating. It left the licensee vulnerable to exorbitant 
price increases by the parent company or, worse, left bare 
the licensee's risk of being completely severed should the 
licensee and parent company quarrel. 48 Similarly, the 
experiences of A & W, Tastee Freeze, and Dairy Queen taught 
Kroc to avoid territorial licensing; thus, with a few early 
exceptions, McDonald's granted its licenses one restaurant 
at a time to discourage absentee operators. McDonald's 
learned its greatest lessons, however, from Howard 
Johnson's. 
Howard Johnson based his company's success on the 
profitability of his licensees. His competitive franchise 
fee of $1,000 (in 1940) enabled franchisees to focus capital 
on establishing quality control and uniform service, which 
48Kroc, Grinding It Out, 84. Though McDonald's policy 
of requiring franchisees to rent land from the corporation 
could be considered a tie-in, a 1980 court ruling upheld 
McDonald's policy. The location of McDonald's uni ts in 
family neighborhoods, the ruling concluded, was an integral 
part of the package that McDonald's sold to licensees, and, 
therefore, could be regulated by the corporation. Dicke, 
Franchising in America, 129. 
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Johnson oversaw through a corps of "special investigators" 
and undercover "shoppers. 1149 Equally important, Howard 
Johnson's showed that catering to the family trade could be 
highly profitable. Johnson provided standardized sit-down 
meals tailored to families on vacation, and even provided 
high chairs and youth booster seats, novel for the time. 50 
Kroc emulated Johnson by keeping franchising fees low, 
thus opening up licensing to the small, middle-class 
entrepreneur. McDonald's own hefty operations manuals 
paralleled Johnson's "Bible," and the corporation employed a 
similar fleet of field inspectors to regulate quality. 
Finally, McDonald's followed Howard Johnson's into the 
family trade, creating for itself a similar image of 
wholesomeness and Americanism that exploited families' needs 
for secure eating away from home. And McDonald's eventually 
surpassed Howard Johnson's in catering to children by giving 
children their own Happy Meal, their own Playlands, and 
their own friend, Ronald McDonald. Howard Johnson's made 
visiting a restaurant with children possible; McDonald's 
made it preferable to eating at home. 
The experiences of the periodical and radio advertisers 
who marketed consumer products to children before World War 
II also set important precedents for McDonald's. Print 
advertisers stressed the "fun" of their products over the 
49Dicke, Franchising in America, 121-22. 
50Alexander, "Host of the Highways," 48. 
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less emotional attributes of quality, price, or reliability, 
while the use of premiums encouraged children to actively 
lobby parents for consumer products. The dominance of the 
food industry in radio advertising to children set a 
precedent for host selling, blurring the line between an 
actor and the fantasy character he played. 
McDonald's drew upon these marketing innovations in 
their own promotions. As early as 1958, the McDonald 
brothers had suggested using children's premiums to Ray 
Kroc. Free toys would be fun for the kids, the brothers 
reasoned, and would help to draw in the parents. Kroc 
initially hesitated at the brothers' proposal, concerned 
that premiums would dilute McDonald's quality image, though 
he was willing to experiment with offering brownies or 
gingerbread for children "strictly as a commercial item for 
profit [selling] for about 12 cents. 1151 Kroc later 
changed his mind and McDonald's now offers an endless series 
of premiums in its Happy Meal product. 
McDonald's also built upon the tradition of Walt 
Disney. Disney recognized the emerging children's market 
and legitimized it by offering parents a safe and wholesome 
recreational outlet for their children. McDonald's co-opted 
those images of security and wholesomeness and infused them 
into the experience of eating a rushed meal surrounded by 
51Dictaphone memo from Dick McDonald to Ray Kroc and 
reply from Ray Kroc to Dick and Mac McDonald (October 1957), 
reprinted in The Legacy Series, 16-18. 
83 
restless youngsters. McDonald's even exceeded Disney by 
encouraging families to visit daily or weekly, making a stop 
at McDonald's a normal routine rather than the occasional 
treat that a trip to Disneyland implied. 52 And McDonald's 
patterned Ronald after Mickey Mouse, realizing that a 
smiling face and a cheery disposition would result in happy 
children and a profitable corporation. 
McDonald's took the lessons that it had learned from 
the food and restaurant industry and applied them to the 
1950s, capitalizing on the postwar phenomena of the Baby 
Boom and suburbanization. These predecessors had bequeathed 
to McDonald's an emerging children's market, more 
potentiality than actuality, but one, to which the 250,000 
sales of Mickey's Lionel train attests, was filled with 
great promise. 
52with the recent development of home-based video 
recorders, however, Disney films can now be seen routinely 
every day. 
CHAPTER 4 
"WHEN YOU'RE GREEN, YOU'RE GROWING . 11 : 
THE FIFTIES AND SIXTIES 
As long as you're green you're growin?, as 
soon as you're ripe you start to rot. 
Ray Kroc, Grinding It Out 
After two decades of depression and war, Americans were 
on the verge of fulfilling the hopes of social planners who 
had envisioned an America marked by secure boundaries, 
affluence, and a revitalization of family and community. 
Yet their optimism was prematurely marred by anxiety over a 
smoldering Cold War. Affluence was praised as patriotic, 
yet criticized as shallow and conformist, while the sanctity 
of the home was challenged by sensationalized images of 
juvenile delinquency and crime. 
McDonald's responded to these contradictions by 
aggressive image building. Ordering a hamburger, fries, and 
a shake took on a more compelling and underlying cultural 
subtext. For the Cold Warrior, the "All-American" meal 
described not only the product, but also the patron. To the 
investor, a McDonald's franchise demonstrated confidence in 
1Ray Kroc with Robert Anderson, Grinding It Out: 
Making of McDonald's (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 
reprint, Chicago: St. Martin's Paperbacks, 1987), 6. 
references are to the reprint edition. 
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American capitalism and economic superiority. The parents 
who thronged to McDonald's in their station wagons tacitly 
reinforced the new consumer ethos, unconcerned that 
McDonald's was subtly "consumerizing" their children. 
Americans in the 1950s and 1960s were constructing a new 
social and cultural framework, anchored by their concerns 
over the Cold War, their increasing affluence, and, above 
all, the raising of their children. In suburb and station 
wagon, in ranch house and drive-in, America was being 
redefined in the 1950s and 1960s. In the words of Ray Kroc, 
it was "green and growing," and so was McDonald's. 
Trailing Americans to the suburbs--in some cases, 
preceding them with keen foresight--McDonald's validated 
home and community. With a "come as you are" approach, 
McDonald's offered an image of itself as a home away from 
home, ironic given the restaurant's dictum that a patron's 
visit last no more than twenty minutes. Responding to 
suburbanites' preoccupation with rebuilding the physical and 
intangible structures of community life, McDonald's became 
the good neighbor, eager to offer a meeting room and free 
hamburgers to community groups. In an era where concerns 
over safety and security transcended the evening news and 
reached deep into Americans' daily lives, McDonald's 
promised a "company vision of itself as guardian of the 
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nuclear family. 112 It crystallized this vision through its 
advertising and marketing. 
In 1962, less than a year after Ray Kroc's $2.7 million 
buyout of the McDonald brothers, McDonald's issued its first 
corporate advertising manual. Although some licensees 
questioned the necessity of the manual, Kroc felt that the 
guidelines were crucial to maintaining one consistent 
national image for the rapidly expanding chain. Refusing to 
leave anything to chance, Kroc and his marketing staff 
provided franchisees with acceptable and approved sample ads 
that reflected the image that Kroc wanted for McDonald's. 
Mom likes McDonald's, too (claimed a teenage boy in an 
early McDonald's print advertisement]. [She] says she 
can feed us for less there than she can at home. She 
likes the speedy service . . no car hops . . . no 
tipping . . . plenty of parking space . . . but most of 
all no dishes to wash and no fussing in the kitchen. 
Dinin~ at McDonald's is one of the good things of 
life. 
Appealing to the freedom from cooking or cleaning was the 
hallmark of McDonald's advertising to mothers. "Youngsters 
love McDonald's Hamburgers--and you will, too! Everything 
at McDonald's is so inviting ... so spotlessly clean. 114 
As Elaine Tyler May has noted, housekeeping in the 1950s had 
more than a sanitary purpose. Keeping a clean and tidy 
2chip Brown, "Life in the Fast-Food Lane: Nobody's 
Done It Like McDonald's," Washington Post, 23 February 1981, 
sec. 1, p. 4. 
311McDonald's Advertising Manual, 1962," 8. 
4 Ibid. f 9 • 
house proportionately reflected a mother's love for her 
family, kept her yearnings for autonomy in check (she was, 
after all, the "lady of the house"), and bolstered the 
family's peace of mind by providing a physically and 
psychologically uncluttered retreat from the chaos of the 
outside world. 5 
McDonald's clever exploitation of women's near 
obsession with domestic tasks reinforced prevailing social 
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mores and positioned McDonald's as wholesome and mainstream, 
two images which eluded their competition. In July, 1965, 
Mrs. M. Rogers of Newark, Delaware, wrote McDonald's that 
she was very impressed with their cleanliness when she took 
her son's scout troop on tour there. McDonald's changed her 
preconceived ideas of what a hamburger stand looked like, 
she continued, and she ended her letter with a ringing 
endorsement. "As for my own family, we will be stopping by 
for those delicious hamburgers and f rench fries more 
often! 116 First came cleanliness in this mother's mind, and 
only then the tastiness of the meal. 
Rarely, however, was a McDonald's advertisement 
targeted to parents without reference to their children. 
The corporation took full advantage of the spiraling birth 
rate during and immediately after World War II to develop a 
5Elaine Tyler May, Homeward Bound: American Families 
in the Cold War Era (New York: Basic Books, 1988), 3-15. 
611McDonald's Newsletter" 
Corporation Archives. 
(July 1965), McDonald's 
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long term customer base. The October, 1960 issue of the 
"McDonald's Newsletter" recapped that each of 180 million 
Americans had consumed 2.2 hamburgers that year, at the 
expense of approximately 100,000 cattle. "And with 11,000 
babies born every day ... and McDonald's units opening as 
rapidly as they are ... Man! What a potential! 117 
McDonald's multiplication was correct. In 1960, an 
average of 11,634 babies were born each day, contributing to 
the large cohort known as "Baby Boom" children. 8 From 1945 
to 1965, over 80 million children were born, peaking in 1957 
with 4.3 million live births. The birth rate steadily 
increased until it peaked in 1957 at 25.3 births per 1,000 
population. The marriage rate actually had its own peak 
earlier in 1945, reflecting the obvious lag of time between 
marriage and childbearing. 9 This massive statistical 
increase in births created a society newly geared to the 
raising of children. 
In his historical analysis of childbearing, Lloyd de 
Mause postulated six distinct "modes of parental attitudes" 
toward children. The last two modes, spanning the twentieth 
711 McDonald's Newsletter" (October 1960), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. 
8 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of 
the United States: 1965 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1965), table 46, p. 47. 
9 considering that a woman's childbearing year_s spans 
two decades, it is conceivable that many of the couples who 
married in 1945 were still having children by 1957. 
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century, clarify the postwar parent/child relationship. 
Prior to World War II, the dominant mode of interaction was 
a "socialization mode." Operant conditioning and 
psychoanalysis formed the dual foundations of this mode with 
the primary role of parent as educator. By the 1950s, 
however, parents retreated from being overt tutors to 
allowing children's own developmental levels to dictate 
their actions. Parents took a more passive role in this 
"helping mode," guiding, rather than coercing children's 
behavior. For the first time, de Mause continued, children 
were considered legitimate and full persons in their own 
right. 10 To McDonald's benefit, one of the newly 
legitimated roles assigned to children was a consumer one. 
Echoing de Mause, but on a more practical and popular level, 
was Dr. Benjamin Spock. 
Dr. Spock has become a cultural icon in his own right, 
hailed in the 1950s as an expert on affective and effective 
childbearing, yet condemned a decade later for creating an 
undisciplined generation of children accustomed to 
permissiveness and rebellion toward authority. Central to 
Spock's advice, however, was the belief that each child be 
given the opportunity to develop an independent 
10Lloyd de Ma use, The History of Childhood (New York: 
Harper & Row, 1974), 1-6, 52-54. 
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personality. 11 In effect, Dr. Spock's advice created a 
generation of parents who willingly allowed young children 
"practice" making economic decisions. Permitting a 
youngster, for example, to choose where to eat or what 
cereal to buy, gave the child a concrete lesson in decision-
making and consumerism, skills transferable as the child 
matured. 
With the exception of Howard Johnson's, McDonald's was 
the only national restaurant chain which provided consumer 
learning experiences for young children. McDonald's put the 
straws, napkins, and condiments within children's reach, 
giving even three-year-olds a role in the family meal. 
Older children, five- and six-year-olds, were encouraged by 
both McDonald's and parents to do the actual ordering. 
Aided by an extremely limited menu and a bolstering parent a 
few feet away, children who ordered their families' food 
received a simultaneous lesson in self-confidence and 
consumerism. A mother whose family visited a Portland, 
Oregon, McDonald's in December, 1960 wrote that her children 
were "thrilled" with ordering their own lunches. 12 A 
Hermosa Beach, California, mother wrote McDonald's in 
11Nancy Pottishman Wells, "Mother, the Invention of 
Necessity: Dr. Benjamin Spock's Baby and Child Care," in 
Growing Up in America: Children in Historical Perspective, 
eds. N. Ray Hiner and Joseph M. Hawes (Urbana, IL: 
University of Illinois Press, 1985), 293-96. 
1211McDonald's Newsletter" (January 1961), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. 
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September, 1964 that "my little boy" had ordered their food. 
When he took it to his waiting mother, she noticed that the 
counterman had given her son too much change. 13 The 
minutiae of consumerism took awhile to learn. 
McDonald's continually encouraged children to order 
their own hamburger and fries, even providing a stepstool 
for children too young to reach the counter on their own. 
The corporation's message, however, did not always reach 
individual licensees and managers and fueled a constant 
stream of letters from parents whose respective "McDonald's 
Experiences" fell short of the rhetoric. Addressing 
parents' complaints of children being ignored, McDonald's 
Corporation issued a reminder in one of its 1982 
Newsletters: 
And then, you know, some things just might make little 
kids cry. If you're three feet tall and all you need is 
a straw or a napkin for Mom and Dad, it may not seem 
like much to some people but at that moment, it's 
possibly the most important responsibility in the world 
to that little person. Being ignored for five minutes 
by chattering counter people is enough to bring tears to 
the eyes of even the most staunch junior citizens. 14 
McDonald's not only provided children with a valuable 
learning experience, it also offered parents a means of 
1311McDonald's Newsletter" 
McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
(January/February 1965), 
1411McDonald's Newsletter" (November 1982), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. Obviously, this has been a 
longstanding problem for the corporation. It is interesting 
to note that this reminder, written in 1982, has the same 
tone and tenor of McDonald's earlier missives to licensees 
in the 1950s and 1960s. 
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showering their children with love, attention, and praise. 
"Over a million kids a day eat at McDonald's. Why not treat 
yourself and the kids to a lunch at McDonald's today? 1115 
McDonald's elevated even lunch to the status of being a 
special treat for children. But the "treat" was also for 
the parent: 
Or, 
If you're too busy to fix lunch todal, why not come to 
McDonald's. The kids will love it. 1 
If fixing dinner for your family is a problem tonight, 
take them to McDonald's. The kids will love it. So 
will you.17 
A sense of conspiracy was even added in this commercial, 
Hey Mom! Hide the pots and pans. McDonald's has dinner 
ready right now. And you can come as you are. 18 
While McDonald's was obviously a treat for the kids, it 
was only so for the parents if it did not require a lot of 
preparation. The emphasis on- "come as you are 11 equated 
McDonald's with home, where no one dressed up for meals and 
where the atmosphere was relaxed, casual, and comfortable, 
in other words, familial. McDonald's persuaded parents of 
1511McDonald's Marketing Manual, 1969-1971, 11 McDonald's 
Corporation Archives, Advertisement #13, Code #307-McD-20. 
This was a local twenty second television spot ad done by 
the D'Arcy, Masius, Benton, & Bowles Advertising Agency 
(D 'Arey). 
16Ibid., commercial Code# 307-McD-10. 
second spot. 
This was a ten 
17Ibid., Advertisement #15, Code #309-McD-20. This was 
a twenty second spot from 1969. 
18Ibid. This commercial is listed as a variant of the 
preceding one. Both were done by D'Arcy in 1969. 
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the 1950s and 1960s that they and their young children were 
indeed welcomed at McDonald's. The persuasion was 
necessary. Most restaurants frowned on child patrons; 
juvenile antics at the dinner table could be tolerated at 
home but became embarrassing in a restaurant. Parents 
unaccustomed to dining out with their children became 
quickly enamored of the novelty of a restaurant that 
actually catered to their youngsters. One mother from 
Libertyville, Indiana, wrote: 
I do really appreciate them [McDonald's drive-ins] as 
our children are too small to take to a restaurant. 
This gives me a chance to eat out and with the children. 
. . . I have a feeling we are going to be a part of the 
McDonald's family for years to come. 19 
Also, McDonald's was convenient because it was so close 
to home. Unlike Dick and Mac McDonald who built their San 
Bernardino unit to attract a cross-section of local 
residents, tourists, and railroad and orange grove laborers, 
Ray Kroc originally concentrated his McDonald's in the 
growing suburban neighborhoods, areas increasingly defined 
as "home" for middle-class Americans. "The big cities are 
not for us," Kroc told the McDonald brothers in a dictaphone 
memo in March; 1958. "The big cities are too blase. They 
don't even turn their head [sic] to see a new kind of a 
hamburger place, but in [the] towns, they brag about us. 
They talk about us. They are loyal. They are 
1911McDonald's Newsletter" 
Corporation Archives. 
(June 1966), McDonald's 
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By 1945, over 15% of Americans called themselves 
"suburbanites." The trend toward suburbanization continued 
with a full third of Americans living in the suburbs by 
1965. 21 McDonald's followed Americans out to the suburbs, 
though they were nearly equally, yet quietly, committed to 
urban areas. McDonald's fostered an image of itself, in its 
earliest years, as an exclusively suburban phenomenon. That 
image, however, ignores the large number of major cities in 
which McDonald's located units. Of McDonald's first forty 
stores, approximately half were built in urban areas, 
including Los Angeles, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Dallas. 22 
Additionally, another quarter were located in areas which 
would not be fully suburbanized for another decade, such as 
Joliet, Illinois, or Kenosha, Wisconsin. 
Kroc himself pref erred suburban locations for their 
aura of newness, cleanliness, and family solidarity. A 
native Chicagoan, he relocated his own family to northwest 
suburban Arlington Heights in 1937, long before the 
20Dictaphone memo from Ray Kroc to Richard and Maurice 
McDonald (March 1958), reprinted in The Legacy Series, 
dictaphone tape transcript (Oak Brook, IL: McDonald's 
Corporation, 1988), 25. 
21Carl Abbott, Urban America in the Modern Age, 1920 to 
the Present (Arlington Heights, IL: Harlan Davidson, 1987), 
7. 
22J. Kenneth Props, "McDonald's Early History," (July 
1984), McDonald's Corporation Archives; "Store Openings by 
State, Licensed by Ray Kroc's Company, " McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. 
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northwestern corridor became a haven for disaffected 
Chicagoans in the 1960s and 1970s. A suburbanite by choice, 
Kroc nevertheless encouraged the development of urban 
McDonald's units in order to maximize public exposure and 
acceptance. 
All McDonald's restaurants, whether urban or suburban, 
had to be located in family neighborhoods--on this Kroc was 
adamant. And he could be obstinate if proposed sites did 
not meet his "station wagon" or "church steeple" criteria. 
In 1958, McDonald's operations head, Fred Turner, proposed 
that McDonald's build an experimental "downtowner" unit, 
appealing to commuters and downtown residents. Knowing that 
a downtown unit had limited family appeal, Turner 
circumvented Kroc and, instead, suggested it directly to the 
McDonald brothers. 23 
It is easy to see why Kroc liked suburbia. Suburbs 
provided the perfect fertile ground for McDonald's 
expansion. Kroc envisioned McDonald's as innovative and 
distinctive, technologically superior to either standard 
drive-ins or so-called "greasy spoons." The newest of the 
planned suburban developments in the 1950s and early 1960s 
seemed to be grasping at the same image. 
Some of the most famous of these new communities were 
23Dictaphone memo from Fred Turner to Richard and 
Maurice McDonald, 13 June 1958, The Legacy Series, 31-34. 
The "downtowner" idea was eventually shelved for financial 
reasons, primarily the exorbitant price of downtown real 
estate. 
developer William Levitt's "Levittowns. 11 Sociologist 
Herbert Gans' study of Levittown, New Jersey, confirms its 
distinctive qualities. Levitt offered residents not only 
new homes, prefabricated in the latest mass production 
technology, but also completed schools, shopping centers, 
and even neighborhood pools. 24 Levitt gave his residents 
a "jump start" on suburban living by prefabricating those 
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elements of community infrastructure which normally develop 
only over time. Thus, as McDonald's integrated its supply, 
distribution, and consumption functions, William Levitt was 
similarly integrating the residential functions of home, 
school, and community. 25 While not all suburban expansion 
was developed "from scratch 11 --significant numbers of neo-
suburbanites lived in older towns which had been co-opted by 
b~lging cities and transformed into peripheral residential 
communities--Levitt's towns represented a cohesive and 
conscious attempt at creating a new model of American 
middle-class life in the 1950s. 26 They serve as an 
24Herbert J. Gans, The Levittowners: Ways of Life and 
Poli tics in a New Suburban Community (New York: Pantheon 
Books, 1967), 4-7. Gans himself was one of the original 
residents of Levittown; the insight he offers combines the 
dual-perspective of insider and sociologist. 
25Dorothy Barclay, "Children Within Suburban Limits," 
New York Times Magazine, 10 February 1957, 42. 
26Levittowns were not unique here. Rexford Tugwell' s 
"Garden Cities" program in the 1930s was an equally 
conscious attempt to reconfigure residential and community 
patterns. Even earlier examples were the distinct_factory 
communities such as the Pullman neighborhood in Chicago 
(housing Pullman's railroad car workers) and Cudahy, 
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effective counterpoint to McDonald's, which similarly 
attempted and accomplished the same end. 
Suburbia's popularity increased as Baby Boom parents 
looked to the new developments to provide affordable homes 
to house the spiraling child population. Although historian 
Kenneth T. Jackson credited America's frenzied pace of 
postwar suburbanization to a racist rejection of the city, 
the reason most often given by Gans' Levittowners for moving 
to the suburbs was the desire to own one's own home. 27 In 
1948, over two million couples were still living with 
relatives, most often, their own parents. With both the 
Wisconsin, the southside Milwaukee suburb built for Patrick 
Cudahy' s meatpackers. Even the development of the more 
culturally-isolated "bedroom" suburbs, (Scarsdale, NY, for 
instance), frequently bereft of significant commercial, 
industrial, or community institutions, reflected a desire to 
reshape American family life. The history of American 
suburbanization has been diverse and experimental in nature, 
fueled not only by developers' goals, but also by local and 
regional preferences and norms. 
27Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The 
Suburbanization of the United States (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1985), 289-93; Gans, Levittowners, 32-34. 
Herbert Gans had spearheaded the argument that postwar 
suburbanization was fueled by the desire to purchase an 
affordable home. Kenneth T. Jackson's research, however, 
showed the entire phenomenon of American suburbanization to 
be a racist response to the ethnic and racial diversity 
inherent in urban life, hence, "white flight." The logical 
problem with Gans' study, of course, is the very 
geographically and temporally limited sample he drew upon: 
Levittown, New Jersey, in the late 1950s. Jackson's 
weakness is that he used one motive to rationalize the 
entire two hundred year history of suburbanization in 
America, dismissing the contextual importance of time and 
place. Al though both are seminal works -- Gans for his 
insider's perspective and Jackson for his inclusivity 
neither study provides a comprehensive understanding of 
American suburbanization. 
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birthrate and per capita income on the rise--from $593 in 
1940 to an inflationary $1501 ten years later--more 
Americans could afford their own homes. To postwar parents, 
suburbia provided a "fusion of need and desire. 1128 
In 1940, new housing starts in the U.S. amounted to 
603,000, large in comparison to the depressed market of the 
1930s, but meager when measured against the nearly two 
million of 1950. 29 Propelling this growth rate were the 
creation of the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) in 1934 
and the Veterans Administration (VA) in 1944. The FHA's 
goal was to stimulate the construction industry by 
stabilizing the mortgage market. The agency insured long-
term, fixed rate loans made by private lenders to working-
and middle-class Americans buying into "stable 
neighborhoods," defined until the mid-1960s almost 
exclusively as white, suburban neighborhoods. 30 In 1948 
alone, the FHA backed $2.7 billion in mortgage loans and 
joined leagues with the newly created Veterans 
Administration to provide home loans for returning 
28u. S. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of 
~t=h~e:;___,.U=n=i~t=e~d=---=S~t=a=t=e==s~,~-C==o=l~o=n=i~a=l=-----=T=i=m=e=s=---___,t=o"'----=1~9~7~0, vol. 1 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), 
Series F 1 7-30, p. 225; William H. Chafe, The Unfinished 
Journey: America Since World War II (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1986), 117. 
29u. s. Bureau of the 
vol. 2, Series N 156-169, 
housing. 
Census, 
p. 639. 
Historical Statistics, 
Figures exclude farm 
30Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier, 208, 215. 
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servicemen. 31 
Authorized by the 1944 Servicemen's Readjustment Act 
(G.I. Bill), the VA insured low-interest, no down payment 
loans to veterans, many of whom purchased into subdivisions 
like Levittown. "I worked very closely with the FHA," 
Levitt said in a 1983 interview with Esquire, "Got together 
a little group . . . and we sat down with then commissioner 
Abner Ferguson and we explained to him the only way we were 
going to get a volume of housing was to grant to the 
veteran, in effect, a one hundred percent mortgage. 'Cause 
[sic] he had no cash. 1132 The VA's loan program peaked at 
$7.1 billion in 1955 and, combined with the FHA's efforts 
and the linking of the nation's suburbs through the 
Interstate Highway Act of 1956, signalled an unprecedented 
federal commitment to suburban development, frequently at 
the expense of urban areas. 33 
The freeing up of mortgage money, however, did not 
31u.s. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics, 
vol. 2, Series N 291-300, p. 650. Figures include sales for 
both new and existing homes. 
32Ron Rosenbaum, "The House that Levitt Built," Esquire 
(December 1983): 385. 
33u.s. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics, 
vol. 2, Series N 291-300, p. 650. For a discussion of 
interstate highway development, see Mark Rose, Interstate: 
Express Highway Politics, 1939-1989, rev. ed. Knoxville, 
TN: University of Tennessee Press, 1990. For an analysis 
of the inequities between the federal subsidy of America's 
postwar cities and suburbs, see Richard o. Davies, The Age 
of Asphalt: The Automobile, the Freeway, and the Condition 
of Metropolitan America, Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 
1975. . 
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totally account for the jump in postwar home ownership. 
Advances in residential archtecture also had an impact, 
particularly the stylistic innovations of the ranch and, 
later, the split-level style of homes. The popularity and 
affordability of these new forms created an unprecedented 
level of demand for single-family housing in the postwar 
decade. By 1956, a full 59% of Americans owned their own 
homes. 34 
Ranch housing "represented the ultimate in 
'livability, ' 'comfort, ' and 'convenience. '" 35 Open and 
airy compared to urban bungalows, the 1950s ranch with its 
expansive picture windows sought to recreate the imagined 
relaxation of a California sunporch. Even the name "ranch" 
conjured up images of the Western outdoors. More tangible 
benefits were the one story design, especially suited to 
families with toddlers, the emphasis on large and 
utilitarian kitchens, and the use of casual "family rooms" 
to replace the more formal Victorian duet of parlor and 
sitting room. 
Although aesthetically distinctive only in their 
34 Interdepartmental Committee on Children and Youth, 
Children in a Changing World (Washington, DC: White House 
Conference on Children and Youth, 1960), 9. This figure 
includes homes both paid in full and those with outstanding 
mortgages. It also represents only non-farm families; the 
ownership rate for farmers in 1956 was higher, at 70%. 
35clifford E. Clark, Jr., "Ranch-House Suburbia: 
Ideals and Realities," in Recasting America: Culture and 
Politics in the Age of the Cold War, ed. Lary May (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1989), 171, 177. 
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simplicity, ranch homes offered an innovative response to 
the millions of parents who heeded Dr. Spock's dictum of 
child-centered parenting. The Baby Boom had forced a 
redefinition of family life, just as it forced the McDonald 
brothers to similarly rethink their drive-in restaurant. 
Parents, who moved to the suburbs "for the good of the 
children," idealized family life in their new neighborhoods. 
Brochures advertising tree-lined streets, manicured lawns, 
and tidy rows of ranches reinforced the image of suburbia as 
carefree, yet structured. In essence, suburbs offered 
Americans the opportunity to start fresh, to recreate the 
definition of American life centered on the values of family 
and community. 
One of the challenges to this new definition of 
American life was urban juvenile delinquency. Kroc stressed 
McDonald's suburban roots, in part, to counter the standard 
images of the drive-in as a teen hangout. In hindsight, Kroc 
and suburban parents overreacted to fears of urban crime and 
wayward youths. While Children's Bureau statistics reported 
a 45% rise in juvenile crimes between 1945 and 1953, they 
generalized from a small statistical sample which was not 
representative for all urban areas. The FBI's Uniform Crime 
Reports, which used equally skewed numbers and continually 
expanded the definition of delinquency to include legal but 
antisocial behaviors, ''sensationalized and distorted" the 
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actual extent of a juvenile crime wave. 36 The 
postwar antidote to the perceived spiraling in juvenile 
crimes was a tight-knit home, guarded by firm yet loving 
parents who would provide the strong role models that 
children needed. FBI Director Hoover's "terrifying vision 
of a juvenile crime wave once the children born during the 
war and in the subsequent baby boom reached the dangerous 
teen years," impelled parents even of babies and toddlers to 
see in the new suburbs a fresh start, free from the 
established patterns of urban crime. 37 
McDonald's continually reassured parents of its 
wholesomeness, safety, and family appeal. A 1961 essay on 
youth and automobiles shows that 18.5% of all licensed 
drivers were under twenty-four years old; automobile 
ownership and use were not only prolific for this age 
cohort, but were interpreted as the medium for teenagers 
acting out their tensions and anxieties. Hot rodding, 
36James Gilbert, A Cycle of Outrage: America's 
Reaction to the Juvenile Delinquent in the 1950s (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), 66-75. In addition to 
Gilbert's analysis, William Graebner, Coming of Age in 
Buffalo: Youth and Authority in the Postwar Era 
(Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990) and John 
Medell, Into One's Own: From Youth to Adulthood in the 
United States, 1920-1975 (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1989) analyzed the developing teenage 
youth culture and its juvenile delinquency overtones in the 
postwar years. Graebner's study focused on social class and 
race as two key determinants in the formation of youth 
subcultures, while Model! concentrated on the increasing 
sexual socialization of teens through the peer-defined 
structures of dating, courtship, and teen marriage. 
37Gilbert, A Cycle of outrage, 72. 
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cruising, and dangerously exhibitionist driving habits were 
perceived as a revolt against the strictures society placed 
on teen behavior. 38 This, combined with the correlation 
between juvenile delinquency and car use (auto theft and 
traffic violations were two of the most common teenage 
crimes) makes it clear why McDonald's needed to continually 
reinforce a wholesome image for itself, accomplished, in 
part, by disowning teenage patrons. 39 
"Teen-agers, and their patronage, should be accepted 
but not solicited," McDonald's Chicago headquarters told its 
field managers and licensees in 1966. 40 McDonald's main 
problems with teenagers were between 7 pm and closing, after 
the main family meal times of lunch and supper. While 
McDonald's ambivalence toward teen patrons tarnished its 
image as a wholesome, family restaurant, it contradicted 
McDonald's sales goals to unilaterally prohibit teenagers. 
In 1965, for example, teenagers accounted for one-third of 
McDonald's total sales volume. 41 The best that McDonald's 
could do was to control the teens as much as possible, 
38Ross A. McFarland and Roland C. Moore, "Youth and the 
Automobile," in Values and Ideals of American Youth, ed. Eli 
Ginzberg (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), 171-
75. 
39 rbid; Gilbert, A Cycle of Outrage, 69-71. 
4011 McDonald's Newsletter" (April 1966), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. Emphasis is in the original. 
4111 McDonald' s Newsletter" (November/December 
McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
1965), 
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riding a fine line between needing their patronage, and not 
alienating the family trade which accounted for the other 
two-thirds of its sales. 
Kroc tried to forestall the teenage problem, as did the 
McDonald brothers earlier in San Bernardino, by enacting 
strict and precise rules of behavior for teens who visited 
McDonald's: no loitering, no shouting, no hot rodding, no 
alcohol on the premises, and no blaring radios. Kroc hoped 
the presence of husky lot men (basically "bouncers") and the 
lack of telephones and jukeboxes, combined with an 
exhaustive list of prohibited behaviors, would stem 
teenagers' rowdiness. 42 The teenage problem, however, was 
double-edged. Not only did teens comprise a sizable 
percentage of McDonald's patrons (McDonald's family image 
notwithstanding), but teenagers also formed the core of 
McDonald's front line employees, its "crew." 
Even in the 1950s and 1960s, McDonald's attracted a 
large percentage of high school and college aged employees. 
The seasonal nature of the drive-in industry (although 
McDonald's was open year-round, revenues were highest in the 
summer months) combined with typically low starting wages 
predictably meant that a significant proportion of employees 
were young. For them, McDonald's was a full-time summer or 
part-time year-round job. The corporation even boasted that 
42 rbid; "McDonald's Newsletter" (April 1966), 
McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
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its mass production food system required little in the way 
of employee training, the perfect job situation for 
inexperienced teens. Harvard Business School professor 
Theodore Levitt likened McDonald's to a "highly 
sophisticated piece of technology . . . with the capability 
of producing a predictably standardized, customer-satisfying 
output while minimizing the operating discretion of its 
attendant ...• It is a machine that produces, with the 
help of totally unskilled machine tenders, a highly polished 
product." 43 The problem for Ray Kroc, however, was that 
not only did he have to control his teenage patrons in order 
to maintain McDonald's family image, he also needed to 
create an image of wholesomeness for his teenage employees. 
To underscore this image, Ray Kroc set strict standards 
of employee personal appearances. Clean and starched 
uniforms, a prohibition against mustaches or beards, and a 
mandated length for haircuts ("Beatle" haircuts were 
expressly forbidden) created the wholesome 1950s and 1960s 
teen look that Norman Rockwell later immortalized in "A 
Happy Adventure," commissioned by McDonald's in 1971. 44 
Kroc was quite fastidious about his own appearance, and much 
43Theodore Levitt, "Production-line Approach to 
Service," Harvard Business Review (September-October 1972): 
46. 
44
"McDonald's Newsletter" (June 1964), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. "A Happy Adventure" showed a clean-
cut crewman surrounded by a group of smiling children. The 
painting hangs in the lobby of McDonald's Corporation 
Archives in Elk Grove Village, Illinois. 
106 
of McDonald's personal appearance regulations stemmed as 
much from Kroc's own quirks as from the need to maintain a 
family image. And, taking a cue from the McDonald brothers' 
problems with female carhops, Kroc hired males exclusively 
in McDonald's company-owned units (called "McOpCo" stores) 
and encouraged his licensees to do the same. 
Owner/operators, many of whom were husband-wife teams, 
obviously found Kroc's dictum unworkable since the success 
of the unit frequently necessitated the on site presence of 
both husband and wife. The rule was also necessarily 
ignored in the few cases where a lone woman was contracted 
as a franchisee. By the late 1960s, however, it was obvious 
even to Ray Kroc that his prohibition of female crew members 
was neither practical nor being obeyed. In 1968, McDonald's 
Corporation formally rescinded the prohibition and openly 
hired female employees in all its units. 45 
Kroc's concerns over female crew members, however 
impractical, stemmed from the strong sexual associations 
revolving around carhops, fry cooks, and male teenage 
patrons. Although drive-ins occasionally experimented with 
alternatives to carhops--Los Angeles' "Motormat" drive-in 
45 
"McDonald's Chronological History Report," 26. This 
prohibition applied only to crew positions. McDonald's 
continued to hire women into office positions at its 
corporate headquarters, including June Martino who began as 
Ray Kroc's secretary and eventually graduated to 
Secretary /Treasurer of McDonald's Board of Directors. 
Overall, however, Martino was the exception rather than the 
rule, and McDonald's managerial staff and crew during the 
1950s and 1960s continued to be overwhelmingly male. 
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with its high speed conveyor system was an example--female 
restaurant attendants were still the norm for most drive-ins 
in the 1950s. 46 Beyond the sexual association was the 
growing societal prescription that a woman could best serve 
her family and her own interests within the domestic sphere. 
The 1950s woman, as opposed to her temporarily independent 
wartime sister, was told that society needed her to be 
sexually demure, physically nurturing, and psychologically 
supportive of husband and children. 47 The female carhop's 
sexuality and employment in a culturally marginal 
institution (a drive-in restaurant) represented an outright 
rejection and rebellion against this new definition of the 
postwar "modern" woman. It was a rebellion which McDonald's 
could not afford to promote. Thus, through its continual 
emphasis on cleanliness, convenience, and the American 
family, McDonald's catered to the newly defined image of the 
postwar suburban homemaker. 
"Our theme is kinda [sic] synonymous with Sunday 
School, the Girl Scouts and the YMCA [Young Men's Christian 
Association]. McDonald's is clean and wholesome. It is for 
the family with youngsters. 1148 Ray Kroc continually honed 
this message, in the 1965 Newsweek interview quoted here, 
4611 Eating Goes Assembly Line at California Drive-in," 
BusinessWeek, 23 July, 1949, 22-23. 
47E. May, Homeward Bound, 62-70. 
48Ray Kroc, "The Hamburger King," interview, Newsweek, 
13 September 1965, 74-75. 
and in nearly every one of McDonald's press releases or 
promotional brochures. Mothers eagerly responded to 
McDonald's appeals, even writing to McDonald's corporate 
headquarters to request that more restaurants be built in 
their neighborhoods. 49 The lures of convenience and 
wholesomeness partly explained parents' acquiescence to 
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their youngsters' demands for McDonald's. On a more basic 
level, what made all these visits to McDonald's possible was 
a new and unprecedentedly positive attitude toward 
consumerism. 
Cleansed of the extravagant and wasteful connotations 
plaguing it in the 1920s, domestic consumerism, that is, 
purchases made for the home or to benefit the family, 
provided an outlet for female initiative, family nurturing, 
and Cold war containment.so It also became a major factor 
driving McDonald's success. McDonald's provided children 
with a controlled consumer learning experience, an 
experience parents considered essential to their children's 
maturation. Parents who themselves became enamored with the 
"untold drama of the history of consumer goods" inevitably 
passed that trait on to their children.s1 By the mid-
49 
"McDonald's Newsletter" (September 19 61) , McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. 
soE. May, Homeward Bound, 162-68. 
SlQuote by Dorothy Gordon, moderator of the 
York Times Youth Forum, reprinted in Albert N. 
Listening: A Collection of Critical Articles 
(Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1948; 
1948 New 
Williams, 
on Radio 
reprint, 
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1960s, the "nickel consumerism" of the grocery store or 
"five and dime" had been expanded into a multi-billion 
dollar industry. 
That children became the targets of Madison Avenue 
advertisers is not, in and of itself, surprising. Preteens 
and teenagers, especially, were increasingly perceived 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s as independent moral and 
social agents, rather than passive adjuncts to their 
parents. The public outcry over juvenile delinquency and 
the correlative belief that youth was responsible for its 
actions, attested to this shift in the perception of 
children. But critics, like Vance Packard in the 1950s and 
Peggy Charren of Action for Children's Television (ACT) in 
the 1970s and 1980s, erroneously faulted the advertising 
industry for creating consumer desires among children. In 
so doing, they missed the role that parents and the larger 
society played in socializing the young. 52 
1968), 100-101. References are to the reprint edition. 
52Myrna Carol Morris, "Consumer Socialization of 
Preschool Children: The Parental View," (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Georgia - Athens, 1975), 13, 52-54. Morris 
studied children aged two to seven in a Clarke County, 
Georgia, nursery school and concluded that children's 
interest in and readiness for consumer roles was directly 
related to the degree that their parents (primarily mothers) 
encouraged such behavior. Taking children along on shopping 
errands, prompting children to make small purchases for 
themselves, and giving them an allowance at an early age all 
indicated the parental sanctioning of child consumerism 
(pp. 93-98). Morris's thesis was later reinforced by a 
1985 study offering the same conclusions. Les Carlson, 
"Parental Style and the Consumer Socialization of Children," 
(Ph.D. diss., University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 1985), 26. 
Long before the 1950s, consumerism had become a 
national craze, into which children increasingly became 
swept. Even before World War I, cultural historian Neil 
Harris has observed, "the buying drama had begun to serve 
[as] a symbol for modernity and the buying experience had 
become a ritual ... a metaphor for national mobility, 
social climbing, economic competition, and moral 
deterioration. 1153 Consumerism following World War II 
retained all these metaphors and added one: national 
security. 
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The connection between security and consumption was not 
new. In the 1700s and 1800s, consumption provided a false 
sense of security in one's spiritual state. 54 But by the 
mid-twentieth century, personal security took on a more 
secular cast. What made the 1959 Nixon/Khrushchev Moscow 
"kitchen debate" unique, even humorous from a 1990s 
perspective, was the use of household appliances as the 
measure of a nation's strength and prestige. In the 1950s 
Both Morris and Carlson assumed that only mothers 
significantly affected their children's consumer behavior. 
Mothers, frequently with children in tow, made the bulk of 
the family's routine purchases. The major family purchases 
in which the father was involved--buying a new home or a new 
car--ordinarily did not take the children's preferences into 
account. 
53Neil Harris, "The Drama of Consumer Desire," in 
Cultural Excursions: Marketing Appetites and Cultural 
Tastes in Modern America (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1990), 183. 
54Ibid., 175. 
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and 1960s, toasters, refrigerators, and washing machines 
transcended their obvious mechanical functions, even 
transcended the less tangible promises of convenience or 
efficiency. They became weapons in a Cold War that was 
waged as much in Sears, Roebuck or Macy's as it was in 
partitioned Germany or smoldering Korea. While the United 
States temporarily trailed in the space race and an exact 
missile parity proved elusive, America in 1959 could claim 
unilateral victory in the consumer race. In redefining the 
parameters of the Cold War, the United States guaranteed 
itself at least a rhetorical edge.ss 
While not front line soldiers in the consumer war, 
children, especially teenagers, became early recruits. In 
August, 1959, the same month that Newsweek and U.S. News and 
World Report covered the Moscow "kitchen debate," Life 
reported on the "New, $10-Billion Power: the U.S. Teen-age 
Consumer." To put teens' spending power in perspective, 
that $10 billion, Life continued, exceeded by a billion 
dollars the total sales of General Motors.s 6 High school 
students in 1959 had, on average, about four times the 
spending money of their counterparts in 1945, enjoying $10 a 
ssE. May, Homeward Bound, 162-64. 
S611 New, $10-Billion Power: 
Consumer," Life, 31 August 1959, 78. 
The U.S. Teen-age 
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week compared to the $2.50 of 1945. 57 While 38% of their 
total spending went for miscellaneous items, including 
transportation, books, and personal grooming, the largest 
line item expenditure was for food, presumably eating out. 
The analysis of teenage spending patterns sparked 
either intense criticism or awe, depending on who was doing 
the reporting and for what audience. Eugene Gilbert, whose 
longitudinal study of teens from 1945 to 1959 revealed the 
differences in spending money cited above, established one 
of the earliest marketing research firms specifically 
detailing the consumer preferences of children, preteens, 
teens, and young adults. 58 A two-part series in Harpers 
in 1959 hailed Gilbert's profession as new and innovative. 
57Eugene Gilbert, "Why Today's Teen-agers Seem So 
Different," Harpers 219 (November 1959): 77. Gilbert's 
methodology was unique for the 1950s and consisted of having 
specially trained teenaged interviewers conduct the 
marketing research questioning sessions. Gilbert correctly 
assumed that teens would more openly relate to a peer rather 
than to an adult. Gilbert then sold this information to 
companies seeking to capitalize on the growing youth market. 
58Arri ving at a precise and consistent definition of 
these stages of a young person's life is elusive. overall, 
however, the sources suggest that "child" is a youngster 
under age ten or eleven, while "preteen" (also ref erred to 
as "tween") covers the ages ten to thirteen. "Teenager" is 
more definitionally precise, ranging from ages thirteen 
through nineteen. "Young adult" is more elusive, though 
tends to refer specifically to married youth (which in the 
late 1950s included many eighteen- and nineteen-year-olds) 
as well as persons in their twenties who were financially 
and residentially dependent upon their parents. These 
categories became further confused in the 1960s as 
"children" were further broken down into preschooler versus 
school-aged and when the status of semi-independent college 
students clouded the distinctions. 
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And by 1975, more than fifteen national child research 
firms, including Gilbert's, his early competitor Rand Youth 
Poll (established 1953), and the National Baby Panel, all 
offered the latest marketing data on babies, children, and 
youth. 59 But a 1963 article in Marriage and Family Living 
stressed the need for "money management programs" to teach 
teens prudent consumerism, while The PTA Magazine echoed 
parents' worries that "making things too easy" for their 
children amounted to insulating them from the economic 
realities of the non-suburban, non-middle-class world. 60 
The economic importance of the teen market over the 
younger children's market lay in teens' more expansive and 
more immediate consumer role. Because of its peer-
referenced nature, the teen market was a continual "hot 
market," changing in tune with regional and national fads. 
The fluidity of the market required constant flexibility by 
marketers, but the effort was rewarded in securing brand 
loyalty. 61 Overall, the lack of frugality among 
teenagers, their attention to fads, their increasing 
5911 companies to Consider in Researching CHILD, YOUTH & 
STUDENT MARKETS," Journal of Advertising Research 15, no. 4 
(August 1975): 35-36. 
6
°Kathryn Summers Powell and David A. Gover, "The 
Adolescent as a Consumer: Facts and Implications," Marriage 
and Family Living 25, no. 3 (August 1963): 364; Dale and 
Elizabeth Harris, "The Affluent Child," The PTA Magazine 58, 
no. 6 (March 1964): 27-29. 
61June Sochen, Cafeteria America: New Identities in 
Contemporary Life (Ames, IA: Iowa State University, 1988), 
66. 
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disposable income, and their freedom from household expenses 
made them an ideal market. 62 But the younger children's 
market was not totally bypassed. In a mid-1950s survey for 
CBS, Eugene Gilbert discovered that over half of the four 
million children who watched the children's television show 
"Captain Kangaroo" tagged along with their mothers on 
grocery errands and specifically requested the products that 
were advertised on Bob Keeshan's (Captain Kangaroo) 
show. 63 Although McDonald's was unique among drive-in 
restaurant chains in its appeal to children and families, 
other types of corporations were equally creative and 
adamant in developing the children's market. 
As they did in the 1920s and 1930s, cereal 
manufacturers continued to take an aggressive lead. From 
1955 to 1956, Quaker Oats offered children "FREE GOLD RUSH 
LAND" as a product premium. The ads did not lie; the 
children were indeed entitled to a share of the "land in the 
fabulous Klondike Gold Country of the Yukon 11 --a whole square 
62Helen B. Shaffer, "Youth Market," Editorial Research 
Reports, 25 August 1965, 626. Affiliated with the 
Congressional Quarterly Service, Editorial Research Reports 
dispatched up-to-date information on social trends to 
newspapers, magazines, radio, and television. Fred D. 
Lindsey, "Expanding Markets: The Young Adults, " Nation's 
Business 46 (March 1958): 70-72; Grace and Fred M. 
Hechinger, "In the Time it Takes You to Read These Lines the 
American Teen-Ager Will Have Spent $2,378.22," Esquire (July 
1965): 65. 
63Macdonald, "Profiles: A Caste, A Culture, A Market," 
New Yorker 34 (22 November 1958): 78. 
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inch's worth. 64 Blevins Popcorn Company mimicked Quaker 
Oat's successful ploy by offering their own one square inch 
of "Davy Crockett Land," exploiting the popularity of 
Disney's legendary western adventure hero. 65 McDonald's 
and other advertisers hoped enticing the children would 
bring in the parents. Children's real economic value, they 
believed, was in influencing their parents' decisions on 
where to eat, what cereals to purchase, and what clothing or 
toys to buy, in contrast to the more independent economic 
role they would assume in the 1970s and 1980s. Thus, 
McDonald's used children to tap into the increasingly 
affluent middle-class. 
In 1935, the per capita personal income of Americans 
was $474. Twenty years later, the accumulated economic 
gains of war and prosperity had pushed this figure to $1881, 
an increase of nearly 300%. 66 More disposable income 
meant increased restaurant visits. Since McDonald's in the 
1950s was still perceived as a "treat," rather than as the 
routine meal stop it became by the 1970s, disposable income 
levels assumed a greater importance to the corporation's 
64rbid. 
65 Ibid. 
66u.s. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics, 
vol. 1, Series F 17-30, p. 225. 
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early success. 67 Fueling the increase in disposable 
income was a reorientation of the American workforce into 
white-collar, middle management, and professional ranks. 
Between 1950 and 1958, the number of professional and 
technical workers increased 50%, compared to only a 4% rise 
in the demand for highly skilled labor. 68 These numbers 
reflected not only the increasing technological orientation 
of postwar society, but the success of the federal 
government's program to revitalize and professionalize 
American workers. While the G.I. Bill had the intended 
impact of siphoning off large cohorts of veterans from the 
job pool, it also contributed to a realignment of social 
class. 69 
The Bill's small business provisions provided seed 
capital to finance postwar entrepreneurialism, giving Ray 
Kroc's franchising efforts a boost. World War II had 
interrupted Americans' career paths; the rethinking of one's 
~ 
67A more recent critique of McDonald's is that it is 
now immune in fluctuations in income levels. For example, 
inner-city minorities, with little disposable income, tend 
to patronize McDonald's at levels disproportionate to their 
income. While this has left McDonald's vulnerable to 
charges of exploitation, it reveals just how routine a visit 
to McDonald's has become. Alix M. Freedman, "Fast-Food 
Chains Play Central Role in Diet of the Inner-City Poor," 
Wall Street Journal, 19 December 1990, sec. A, 1. 
68 Interdepartmental Committee on Children and Youth, 
Children in a Changing World, 31. 
69Keith w. Olson, The G.I. Bill, the Veterans and the 
Colleges (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 
1974), 21-24. 
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occupational life after the war was just part of Americans' 
overall reorganization of their private lives. 70 Between 
1946 and 1947, for example, Americans purchased more than 
1.2 million businesses with over half of these in the 
service and retail industries, the sector into which drive-
in restaurants fell. 71 Equally important, Title II of the 
G.I. Bill subsidized the continuing education of veterans in 
colleges, universities, and vocational schools. In 1947, 
1.15 million veterans utilized Title II provisions, 
comprising more than 49% of all students enrolled in higher 
education that year. 72 Its net impact not only created 
the technologically trained workers needed by postwar 
industry, but precipitated a swelling in middle-class ranks. 
While McDonald's was arguably committed to both 
suburban and urban neighborhoods in the 1950s and 1960s, its 
target audience was consistently middle-claSj>. The station 
wagons, bicycles, and ranch homes that Kroc centered on 
became iconographic symbols for a society that increasingly 
defined itself as child-centered, suburban, and middle-
income. The symbolism, however, proved shallow. It not 
70Thomas s. Dicke, Franchising in America: The 
Development of a Business Method, 1840-1980 (Chapel Hill, 
NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 124. 
71 Ibid. 
72olson, G.I. Bill, table 1, p. 44. The impact of the 
vets on America's colleges, however, was temporary. By 
1953, most veterans had graduated and their ranks dwindled 
to only 6% of all college or university students. 
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only betrayed the urban, ethnic, and racial diversity of 
postwar America, but it also lacked substance, because what 
"middle-class" meant in 1955 was still largely undefined. 
The old nineteenth century middle-class had been 
maverick entrepreneurs who had shunned corporate ties in 
search of independent wealth. The new middle-class, 
identifiable by their formal "white-collar" uniform, were 
bound to the whims of the corporation and reinforced the 
status quo rather than challenged it. 73 The postwar 
emphasis on a consumer-driven economy required a coordinated 
corporate bureaucracy with predictable job responsibilities, 
privileges, and advancement. The "team" replaced the 
individual as the agent of economic production while the 
individualistic Protestant work ethic succumbed to a new 
"social ethic" in which the needs of the organization became 
paramount. 74 McDonald's was able to integrate both 
.... 
polarities in its franchising program, offering rapid 
expansion to the corporation through an individualistic 
franchising program that respected its owner/operators as 
independent entrepreneurs. 
An October, 1963 McDonald's market research suFvey 
73c. Wright Mills, White Collar: The American Middle 
Classes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), xiv-xvi. 
Although Mills spoke of the middle-classes, in plural, his 
thesis limited them to an essentially single, homogeneous, 
and unidimensional entity. 
74William H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man · (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956), 3. 
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showed that 43% of Americans did not eat at drive-in 
restaurants, a 3% drop from a year earlier. 75 Ray Kroc 
was intent on convincing the other 57% that McDonald's, in 
particular, was one drive-in worth visiting. While Kroc's 
emphasis on the family trade promised solid results--83% of 
those who did eat at drive-ins had children aged thirteen or 
younger--the primary way to attract more potential customers 
was through rapid and large-scale expansion of units, an 
ambitious goal possible only through aggressive 
franchising. 76 
Ray Kroc liked to boast that McDonald's franchising was 
respectable, not the "rackets" that he dubbed the 
competition, by appealing to the reputations of some of his 
earliest franchisees. 77 lMost well-known among this 
pioneering circle was John w. Gibson, Assistant Secretary of 
Labor from 1945 to 1950, who with partner Oscar Goldstein 
enjoyed one of the few territorial franchises Kroc ever 
approved, in the District of Columbia/Alexandria, Virginia, 
area. While Gibson and Goldstein would later shine as the 
creators of the Ronald McDonald character, Gibson's early 
importance was the inherent air of respectability which he 
lent to McDonald's franchising. The vast majority of Kroc's 
7511 McDonald's Newsletter" 
Corporation Archives. 
76rbid. 
(March 1964), McDonald's 
77Dictaphone memo from Ray Kroc to Richard and Maurice 
McDonald (October 1957), reprinted in The Legacy Series, 10. 
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licensees, however, were ordinary men and women, frequently 
husband and wife teams, who hoped that McDonald's was the 
great pearl hidden among the many franchising fads in the 
1950s. 
"Be Your Own Boss--With that age-old dream in mind, 
62,000 would-be bosses ... paid $1 each to investigate 
businesses ranging from pizza parlors to paperback-book 
forums, from chimney cleaning to insect control. 1178 
l 
Newsweek's reporting of the 1962 "Start Your Own Business" 
exposition revealed one of the most frequently cited reasons 
for entering into a licensing arrangement: security. 
"You've got 50% of your problems licked with a franchise," 
claimed a newly minted and confident Mister Donut 
franchisee. "I get expert advice, I've got someone walking 
with me." The franchisee, who had recently folded an 
independently owned sporting goods store after a discount 
house moved in, was confident that the security of "a 
nationally advertised concern" would give him the head start 
and endurance needed for success. 79 Although McDonald's 
was probably not represented at the fair--by late 1961, 
McDonald's already had a year's backlog of franchisees 
7811 The Everlasting Dream 
Newsweek, 12 February 1962, 68. 
79Ibid., 69. 
Be Your Own Boss, " 
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waiting for their units--it offered the same security. 80 
Kroc correctly believed that adherence to his quality, 
service, and cleanliness credo combined with targeting the 
family niche would create a distinctive national image for 
McDonald's unlike that of its~competitors. McDonald's arch-
rival, Burger King, for example, offered large territorial 
franchises strung together by a weak central corporation. 
The lack of on going training, coordinated advertising, and, 
most importantly, the failure to create a consistent company 
image, prevented Burger King from being a serious threat to 
McDonald's until 1977, when Burger King lured away 
McDonald's executive Donald Smith to "McDonaldize" Burger 
King. 81 
The America that McDonald's was born in offered the 
ideal mix of place, time, and circumstance. Overshadowed by 
the threat of Soviet aggression, Americans redefined their 
private and public lives along the new imperatives of 
security and stability. Domesticity was more than a 
personal choice; it became the last bulwark against 
encroaching communism. The Baby Boom and the correlative 
urban exodus represented a search for utopian families and 
communities, all the more desired because of the encroaching 
ao"Meat, Potatoes and Money," Time, 3 November 1961, 
81; Paine, Webber, Jackson and Curtis, "McDonald's 
Corporation Prospectus," 20 April 1965, 8-9. 
81
"Burger King Corporation," International Directory of 
Company Histories: Food Services & Retailers, ed.. Lisa 
Mirabile (Chicago: St. James Press, 1990), 613-14. 
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threat of juvenile delinque~cy. Consumerism not only lost 
its extravagant connotations, but became a line of para-
military defense equal to an act of patriotism. And 
increases in discretionary income simultaneous with the 
swelling of middle-class ranks legitimized America's claim 
of victory in the ongoing rhetorical sparring with the 
Soviet Union. McDonald's unconsciously reflected, 
benefitted from, and exploited all these ideologically 
intertwined, yet diverse strands of postwar American 
society. 
Something as simple as naming its anchor entree the 
"All-American Meal" and flying the American flag round-the-
clock created an image of McDonald's as boosterist, if not 
outright patriotic. The needs of the newly redefined 
American family, quixotically isolated and private yet 
charged with the intensely public mission of defending 
democracy, were met with unmatched precision by the McDonald 
brothers and Ray Kroc. McDonald's provided child-oriented 
meals in a familial setting, allowing families to eat in the 
privacy of their cars, publicly surrounded by dozens of 
families doing the same. McDonald's catered to Baby Boom 
children using them to reach parents. Parents willingly 
acquiesced to their children because routine dining out with 
children had become both novel and convenient. Located in 
primarily middle-class neighborhoods, McDonald's drew upon 
the bulging numbers of child-centered, suburban families. 
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Their success be~ame McDonald's own. 
.I 
CHAPTER 5 
GIVING SOMETHING BACK 
What people remember is that McDonald's helps 
needy children; homes for the aged; destitute 
families .... People don't forget this, and 
it is places such as this that they like to 
patronize, a restaurant with a heart, a 
McDonald's. 1 
"McDonald's Newsletter" 
McDonald's had one goal in the 1950s and 1960s: to 
create a market for themselves distinct from other drive-in 
restaurants. They accomplished this by targeting young 
families whose needs for convenience and desires for 
wholesomeness matched what McDonald's offered. To 
strengthen their hold on the family market, McDonald's 
created, in effect, a "good neighbor policy" which 
emphasized beneficence and community concern. Corporate 
philanthropy was the key to this policy. 
McDonald's believed that parents needed to be assured 
that the restaurant was socially good for their children 
before they acquiesced to the demands for a hamburger and 
111McDonald's Newsletter" (January/February 
McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
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1966), 
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fries. 2 Mc~onald's provided these assurances through a 
comprehensive strategy of public relations which included 
corporate sponsorship of Little League baseball and scout 
troops, curriculum materials for elementary school students, 
opportunities for extra-curricular activities, and funding 
for children's medical needs. McDonald's was neither the 
first nor most prolific benefactor of children. The Ford, 
Rockefeller, and Carnegie Foundations all predated 
McDonald's philanthropic efforts and indulged on a larger 
scale. Other foundations, however, did not make explicit, 
as McDonald's did, the connection between benefactor and 
beneficiary, or in this case, between corporation and 
customer. 
McDonald's sponsorship of Little League baseball, for 
example, was done one team at a time, each by an individual 
owner/operator who boasted that he, and by implication, 
McDonald's systemwide, supported community activities. 
McDonald's philanthropy was personal, even intimate, as when 
a Norwalk, California, owner opened his unit early, 
specifically to accommodate a young girl who had just had a 
tooth pulled and wanted a shake. 3 While Ray Kroc's own 
2Given the negative image of most drive-in restaurants 
in the 1950s and 1960s, parents were primarily concerned 
about McDonald's social wholesomeness. Questions about 
McDonald's nutritional value or criticisms over McDonald's 
advertising did not arise until the 1970s. 
311 McDonald' s Newsletter" (November/December 
McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
1965), 
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ind~fendent philanthropy frequently followed the standard 
pattern of donating to medical research institutes, 
McDonald's beneficence, especially in the early years, was 
local, personal, and heartwarming. But it was not without 
fanfare. 
Although Ray Kroc genuinely believed in "giving 
something back" to the communities which sustained 
McDonald's success, he understood and exploited the public 
relations value which the philanthropy generated. Every 
program, every donation, every sponsorship produced its own 
series of public relations press releases. Corporate 
headquarters produced ''canned" releases, pre-written, 
generic announcements ostensibly tailored to the specific 
event, which were available to licensees to send to the 
local press. The press became an unwitting accomplice in 
McDonald's marketing strategy, writing up unit openings, 
tours, or product promotions as human interest stories. 
Although the uniqueness of McDonald's made it legitimately 
newsworthy, the goodwill generated through these stories 
provided McDonald's in the 1950s and 1960s with a level of 
customer loyalty second only to Kroc's marketing idol, 
Sears, Roebuck. 
McDonald's initially intended its philanthropy to serve 
primarily as a marketing tool, to create and reinforce the 
image of McDonald's as a company with a heart in order to 
increase sales. Regardless of Kroc's sincerity in h1s own 
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personal philanthropy, McDonald's original intent was 
clearly profit-motivated. While they no doubt contributed 
to their respective communities, McDonald's owner/operators 
could be callous in exploiting customer goodwill. Like Ray 
Kroc who was rarely ever pictured without a hamburger in 
hand, operators frequently made media events out of simple 
class tours or a few free hamburgers. 
Children were only the ostensible targets of McDonald's 
philanthropy. Although McDonald's philanthropy was (and 
continues to be) primarily child-centered, the real people 
to reach, of course, were the parents who actually 
controlled the family purse strings. In the 1950s and 
1960s, an image of McDonald's as wholesome or good was 
essential to reaching the expanding customer base of young 
families. Later, in the 1970s and 1980s, it was crucial for 
encouraging the parental acquiescence necessary to assure a 
more independent child consumer market for McDonald's 
products. Equally important, the goodwill created would 
serve as a hedge against the increasing number of social 
criticisms levelled against McDonald's in these latter 
decades. 
The focus of McDonald's philanthropy shifted after the 
early 1970s. Considered a novelty in 1955 or 1960, 
McDonald's by the 1970s had become a cultural institution in 
its own right. Like Sears, Roebuck and its long term 
sponsorship of the children's show "Mr. Rogers," McDonald's 
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took on the role of national, rather than merely local, 
benefactor. In 1960, an individual McDonald's operator 
might sponsor a local Little League team; in 1985, 
McDonald's donated $2.6 million to the Muscular Dystrophy 
Association (MDA) alone. 4 As the philanthropy expanded and 
became inherently less personal, McDonald's called upon 
Ronald McDonald to personalize its corporate giving, just as 
he personalized McDonald's advertising. 
After Ronald McDonald became McDonald's official 
corporate spokesman in 1966, philanthropy became decidedly 
more complex. Ronald completed the shift of McDonald's 
corporate beneficence from pure utilitarianism to a more 
genuine yet self-interested sincerity. Although McDonald's 
philanthropy was still marketing-driven, the increasingly 
personal relationship that Ronald McDonald developed with 
children encouraged, even forced, McDonald's to become more 
interested in philanthropy for its own sake. As Ronald 
became more of a friend, he was increasingly expected to 
help his young friends when they were sick, bored, or in 
need of education. Through advertising rhetoric and Ronald 
McDonald, McDonald's raised customer's expectations of the 
restaurants and achieved its goals of differentiating itself 
from the competition and guaranteeing parental acceptance. 
But it had also locked itself into a mandatory pattern of 
411 Presence Builds Preference: 
Department," publicity brochure (May 
Corporation Archives, 12. 
Communications 
1986), McDonald's 
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philanthropy, which not only had to be grandiose, but also 
sincere. 
McDonald's philanthropy started with Ray Kroc. 
Although the McDonald brothers had suggested offering candy 
premiums to children in 1957, their explicit intent was to 
bolster sales, not to establish a long term pattern of 
corporate beneficence. Kroc balked at the brothers' simple 
suggestion since he felt that token premiums cheapened 
McDonald's quality image. Instead, Kroc developed a more 
sophisticated approach promising both increased sales and 
customer goodwill. That same year, Kroc retained Cooper and 
Golin (later Golin/Harris Communications), a small Chicago 
public relations firm, on a monthly retainer of $500. 
McDonald's financial chief Harry Sonneborn was "mad as hell" 
that Kroc splurged with McDonald's very limited income when 
corporate employees were being asked to forgo pay raises so 
the corporation could meet payroll and pay its suppliers. 
Kroc defended his actions on a hunch; initially even he was 
unsure exactly how a public relations firm would benefit 
McDonald's. In retrospect, however, Kroc credited Max 
Cooper and Al Golin with "making McDonald's a household 
word. 115 
First, Al Golin maneuvered to get Ray Kroc's and 
5Ray Kroc with Robert Anderson, Grinding It Out: 
Making of McDonald's (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 
reprint, Chicago: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 114. 
references are to the reprint edition. 
The 
1977; 
Page 
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McDonald's story in dozens of major newspapers across the 
country. In 1959, Golin convinced the Associated Press to 
send columnist Hal Boyle, a Pulitzer Prize war 
correspondent, to interview Kroc. That one story generated 
immediate national exposure in one of the most widely 
syndicated columns in the United States. By the next 
morning, McDonald's name appeared in over six hundred 
newspapers and requests for franchising information poured 
in. Within weeks, every major newspaper or periodical 
wanted to interview Kroc. 6 Both Ray Kroc and Harry 
Sonneborn quickly realized the important role that public 
relations would play for McDonald's. 
The national image that Cooper and Golin created for 
McDonald's played on the themes of convenience, family 
wholesomeness, efficiency, and economic opportunity for 
licensees. On the local front, however, the public 
relations' firm emphasized neighborhood commitment, personal 
attention, and the tangible benefits that a community 
received from hosting a McDonald's. Most important among 
the latter was the commitment each McDonald's explicitly 
made to being a community booster. "Be a Joiner . . . Be a 
Promoter . . . Be Charitable . . . Be a Handshaker " 7 
While some individual licensees balked at the extra 
6 Ibid . ' 12 7 - 2 8 ; J 0 hn F . Love ' ::..:M:..:C::.:D:,,.,O:o.,:n..,.a=l'""d,_'-=s:;_:_: _....:B=e=h=i=n=d==----=t=h=-=e 
Arches (New York: Bantam Books, 1986), 210-12. 
7 
"McDonald's Advertising Manual, 
Corporation Archives. 
1962," McOonald's 
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effort and expense required--they were already required to 
allocate 2 1/2% of gross sales for direct advertising--most 
operators realized the financial benefits of a goodwill 
campaign. 8 Owner/operators quickly became members of the 
their communities' Chambers of Commerce and, where 
appropriate, joined the local Elks or Kiwanis. 9 Although 
association membership garnered a degree of community 
respect for McDonald's among the local business and 
political elites, the primary community emphasis remained on 
small-scale philanthropy as a way to reach individual 
consumers either unfamiliar or uncomfortable with 
McDonald's. 
Opportunities for free press and local goodwill 
abounded for those operators who, like Ray Kroc, looked at 
every opportunity as a marketing one. An Ohio operator 
provided complimentary cups and Coca-Cola syrup for a 
funeral breakfast. A St. Louis licensee sent one thousand 
free burgers to a local elementary school as a special 
luncheon treat. A Fort Wayne, Indiana, operator sponsored a 
8 By 1977, the required percentage had risen to 4. 5%. 
"Dictaphone memo from Ray Kroc to Richard and Maurice 
McDonald" (September-October 1959), dictaphone tape 
transcript, reprinted in The Legacy Series (Oak Brook, IL: 
McDonald's Corporation, 1988), 74; "McDonald's Newsletter" 
(February 1960), McDonald's Corporation Archives; "The Fast-
Food Stars: Three Strategies for Fast Growth," 
Businessweek, 11 July 1977, 59. 
9 
"McDonald's Community Relations Kit, " in 
Marketing Manual, 1969-1973," McDonald's 
Archives. 
"McDonald's 
Corporation 
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Little League dinner and provided free orange drinks at the 
county fair. 10 Each incident in itself was merely a small 
act of generosity, but compounded by the hundreds, became a 
significant marketing strategy. So formalized had 
McDonald's policy of "spontaneous" local generosity become 
by the late 1960s, that the 1969-1973 edition of its 
"Marketing Manual" listed specific guidelines on "How to 
Handle Local Charity Requests," "How to Use the Orange 
Bowl," and "How to Use the Prize Steer Program. " 11 In the 
Orange Bowl program, McDonald's loaned the use of its 
oversized orange drink dispenser, the Orange Bowl, to 
community groups, providing them with free drink mix and 
cups. The Prize Steer program referred to an ongoing 
practice by enterprising licensees to buy the prized steer 
at a county fair and donate it to charity. The mere act of 
buying the winning steer reinforced the quality image of 
McDonald's beef while donating it scored extra points toward 
goodwill . 12 
Of all the national drive-in restaurant chains, 
McDonald's alone engaged in any significant and formalized 
level of community philanthropy. White Tower and White 
Castle both had local followings, but never turned to 
10
"McDonald's Newsletter" (September 1964); (July 
1960); (August 1960), McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
11
"McDonald's Marketing Manual, 1969-1973." 
12 rbid.; "McDonald's Newsletter" 
McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
(October 1964), 
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organized philanthropy to give themselves a marketing edge. 
In the 1960s, Kentucky Fried Chicken was preoccupied with 
finding full sit-down restaurants which would take on its 
chicken as a house specialty. Neither Burger King nor 
Burger Chef had a substantial national image prior to the 
1970s, and, even then, their decentralized organizational 
structures prevented coordinated corporate-wide efforts at 
philanthropy. 13 
In January, 1961, McDonald's was already located in 
thirty states and boasted print public relations coverage of 
2,200 column inches in newspapers with a combined 
circulation of 46 million readers. George A. Glenn, editor 
of the retail trade publication Chain Store Age, publicly 
congratulated McDonald's on its keen marketing use of public 
relations. "We could all take a lesson," Glenn reiterated, 
"from the McDonald's chain of drive-in restaurants when it 
comes to public relations. 1114 This was high praise for a 
national chain less than ten years old, relying solely on 
revenues generated by the sale of a fifteen cent hamburger. 
Kroc's policy of "giving something back," however, attracted 
not only the industry's attention but the notice of 
individual customers as well. 
1311 Burger King 
Company Histories: 
Mirabile (Chicago: 
McDonald's: Behind 
Corporation," International Directory of 
Food Services & Retailers, ed. Lisa 
St. James Press, 1990), 613-14; Love, 
the Arches, 280-81. 
14Quoted in "McDonald's Newsletter" (January 1961), 
McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
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Testimonials from satisfied parents crowd McDonald's 
newsletters from the 1950s, 1960s, and even 1970s. Although 
the newsletters contained an obvious self-reporting bias, 
parents seemed genuinely amazed that a business would take 
the time to indulge in a local act of generosity, especially 
toward children. A common promotion, for example, was to 
send youngsters a birthday card with a coupon for a free 
McDonald's hamburger. The promotion was effective in spite 
of a less than inspiring verse: 
We want to add to your good cheer 
On this your natal day. 
So bring this card when you appear 
For a little treat McDonald's way. 
The mother of a young birthday boy later wrote the 
corporation, 
What a wonderful surprise when your card was received by 
our little boy. He was thrilled beyond words at the 
thought of the "All American Meal." It's a friendly act 
you're performing and children do remember. Our 
patronage is yours anytime we feel the "All American" 
urge. 15 
Sending a birthday card was a guaranteed success strategy 
for McDonald's. Goodwill such as this simply could not be 
purchased through a standard advertising approach. The 
corporation's financial cleverness was equally obvious when 
the youngster came to redeem the coupon for his 
complimentary birthday meal, with parents and siblings in 
tow. For the price of one free meal, McDonald's tallied up 
1511McDonald's Newsletter" (July 1961), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives; "McDonald's Advertising Manual, 1962," 
McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
several extra sales and a lot of goodwill. 
Adults were not the only ones gushing with gratitude 
towards McDonald's. One seven-year-old from Royal Oak, 
Michigan, wrote on hers, and presumably, her brother's 
behalf, 
Dear MacDonald,[sic] 
We like your milkshakes and 
hamburgers. 
Love, 
Lynn--and Scott16 
McDonald's even made an honorable mention in one fourth 
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grader's Thanksgiving prayer. When asked to write what they 
should be thankful for at Thanksgiving, the youngster wrote, 
"I am thankful we have nice cars to drive and eat hamburgers 
in. 1117 The teacher obviously assumed the child equated 
"hamburgers" with "McDonald's" and sent the child's innocent 
quip to the corporation. But the letter was no laughing 
matter; it and the scores of similar ones reprinted in 
McDonald's newsletters through the years confirm the 
increasingly personal relationship between McDonald's and 
its customers. McDonald's, however, was not unique it is 
unorthodox approach to marketing. 
In 1958, Harvard University business professor Theodore 
Levitt examined what he called "The Dangers of Social 
Responsibility" for the autumn issue of the Harvard Business 
1611McDonald's Newsletter" (November 1960), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. 
1711McDonald's Newsletter" (January 1962), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. 
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Review. Levitt, who later became famous in McDonald's 
circles after his 1972 article extolling McDonald's 
production-line approach to food service, criticized the 
socially responsible pose assumed by American businesses in 
the 1950s, 
Occasionally, somebody exhumes the apparently antique 
notion that the business of business is profits; that 
virtue lies in the vigorous, undiluted assertion of the 
corporation's profit-making function. But these people 
get no embossed invitations to speak at the big, 
prestigeful [sic], and splashy business conferences--
where social responsibility echoes as a new tyranny of 
fad and fancy. 18 
Although Levitt conceded that the "social 
responsibility syndrome" is a "game" which corporations play 
to defuse criticism of their practices, or to drum up sales 
(as in McDonald's case), he nonetheless saw it as dangerous. 
"What people say," Levitt continued, "they ultimately come 
to believe if they say it enough, and what they believe 
affects what they do .... The talk about social 
responsibility is already more than talk. It is leading 
into the believing stage; it has become a design for 
change." 19 In McDonald's case, it became the total 
embodiment of the corporation's relationship with its 
18Theodore Levitt, "The Dangers of Social 
Responsibility," Harvard Business Review (September-October 
1958): 42. Levitt's criticisms were intended to rebut a 
series of articles, previously published in the Harvard 
Business Review, which extolled corporate social 
responsiveness as the future of American capitalism. Levitt 
strongly disagreed and urged a refocusing on the financial, 
rather than the social, responsibilities of the corporation. 
19Ibid., 43-44. 
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customers. 
Thirty years of McDonald's internal memoranda, 
newsletters, and marketing manuals confirm Levitt's premise. 
The 1969-1973 edition of McDonald's "Marketing Manual" 
placed first and foremost the image-making opportunities of 
community philanthropy. "In weighing local charity 
requests, the important thing is what the tie-in will do for 
your image in the community. Key factors should be the 
worthiness of the cause, city-wide enthusiasm and 
acceptance." 20 While image enhancement was a priority for 
many American corporations in the 1950s, McDonald's was in 
the unenviable position of needing to repudiate the 
delinquent overtones of its predecessors and competitors in 
the restaurant drive-in industry. Although McDonald's never 
masked its marketing motivations, a developing strain of 
sincere corporate responsibility co-existed. 
Not all of McDonald's largess received widespread 
publication. Although many operators were slick at public 
relations, other licensees took a more subtle tack. A 
Midwest operator, a "family man himself," quietly folded the 
check for a class trip of youngsters eating lunch at 
McDonald's and discreetly placed it in his pocket. No 
fanfare; most likely the only person aware of the 
20
"How to Handle Local Charity Requests," in 
"McDonald's Advertising Manual, 1969-1973." 
philanthropy was the teacher. 21 At Christmas time, 1960, 
a Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, licensee treated a group of 
local orphans to a meal. 22 Obviously, these children did 
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not have the family ties that justified and rationalized so 
much of McDonald's philanthropic efforts. There were no 
parents or siblings to drag to McDonald's; these children, 
because of their social situation, were not among McDonald's 
target audience and were not in the position to develop long 
term brand loyalty to McDonald's products. The operator's 
gesture merely reflected a simple concern for orphaned 
children at Christmas. A purely altruistic motive for 
McDonald's generosity, however, was the exception rather 
than the rule, and flowed more from the personalities of 
individual operators than from the corporation's marketing 
directives. Overall, McDonald's corporate emphasis 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s was on image enhancement 
through community involvement and beneficence. In this, 
McDonald's immensely succeeded. 
McDonald's first formalized marketing manual, in 1962, 
cited the restaurant's "business mission" as "bringing 
2111 McDonald's Newsletter" (July 1960), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. This small act of generosity, 
however, could not escape headquarters' watchful eye. 
Complicated tally sheets tracked outgoing food and incoming 
cash, making it difficult for any owner/operator to either 
intentionally defraud the company or even engage in 
unheralded generosity. 
2211 McDonald's Newsletter" (January 1961), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. 
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customers to your windows as you capitalize on the favorable 
nationwide corporate image of McDonald's. 1123 By the 1970s 
and 1980s, McDonald's had fulfilled its mission to the point 
where McDonald's image was no longer under its own control. 
True to the basic precepts of public relations, McDonald's 
and Cooper and Golin had fixed an image of McDonald's in 
Americans' minds, and as Levitt had warned, once fixed, the 
image would be difficult, if not impossible, to 
displace. 24 Since McDonald's image was inextricably tied 
to an increasingly high level of corporate largess, 
McDonald's, by the 1970s, found itself locked into a pattern 
of philanthropy. Because of the image it had itself 
perpetuated, McDonald's needed to continually regenerate its 
largess while simultaneously making it seem less 
commercialized. McDonald's corporate quandary, although one 
of its own choosing, locked the restaurant into expending 
more money on philanthropy without commensurate public 
recognition for it. McDonald's solution was using "Ronald 
McDonald" as the spokesman for both its community-based and 
its national philanthropic programs. 
In a 1989 cover story on McDonald's, Restaurants and 
Institutions magazine interviewed McDonald's top corporate 
executives as well as a sampling of its suppliers, 
licensees, and crewpersons. According to Peter Nelson, 
2311 McDonald's Advertising Manual, 1962," Foreword. 
24Levitt, "Dangers of Social Responsibility," 42. 
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senior vice president of marketing, "Ronald McDonald does 
not sell products. You see him interacting with children--
he's more the McDonald's spirit." "The clown," concluded 
Restaurants and Institutions reporter Lisa Bertagnoli, "is a 
symbol of goodwill, not moneymaking. 1125 McDonald's Nelson 
was correct in asserting that Ronald "does not sell 
products"; although the clown was initially developed as a 
hard-hitting salesman to children, by the 1970s, his image 
was significantly diluted to that of big brother or friend. 
Bertagnoli, however, was further off the mark. McDonald's 
goodwill emphasis is inherently and by definition a money-
making function of the corporation. Regardless of 
McDonald's public posture regarding its philanthropy, 
bottom-line profits continued to be a powerful motivation. 
The judgmental error, however, is in assuming that the 
inextricable linking of the two motives in any way 
diminishes the very tangible financial and social benefits 
McDonald's has wrought. On the contrary, after McDonald's 
adoption of Ronald McDonald as company spokesman in 1966, 
McDonald's philanthropy benefitted more Americans, 
especially children, than ever before. 
Although still strongly community-oriented, McDonald's 
philanthropy after Ronald assumed the form and function of 
more traditional corporate beneficence. While individual 
25Lisa Bertagnoli, "Inside McDonald's," Restaurants and 
Institutions, 21 August 1989, 64. 
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operators still sponsored bowling or baseball teams, and 
scout troops were always welcome to tour, McDonald's overall 
was redefining its philanthropy through the national persona 
of Ronald McDonald. Before Ronald, the corporation's 
marketing emphasis was only vaguely national with the 
primary advertising medium being occasional print 
advertisements in Readers' Digest or the Saturday Evening 
Post and the many interviews that Ray Kroc gave to the 
national press. Local marketing was much more crucial in 
the 1950s and 1960s since McDonald's was in an intense 
expansion mode and continually needed to convince local 
communities of the benefits of hosting a McDonald's. By the 
late 1960s and 1970s, McDonald's had become fully 
nationalized, with more than 3,300 units by 1975, and could 
pull back from intense community lobbying efforts and rely 
more on the coordinated national marketing message of Ronald 
McDonald. 26 
Probably the most immediate connection McDonald's made 
between Ronald McDonald and McDonald's national philanthropy 
was the "Ronald McDonald House.'' In 1973, Kim Hill, 
daughter of Philadelphia Eagles tight end Fred Hill, was 
being treated for leukemia at Children's Hospital in 
Philadelphia. Her illness became the rallying cry for the 
Eagles to raise $800,000 for the hospital and for some type 
26McDonald's Corporation Annual Report,· 1975, 
McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
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of residential facility for families with seriously ill 
children. 27 The local Philadelphia McDonald's restaurants 
were solicited as part of the Eagles' overall fundraising 
efforts and what resulted was an ongoing three-way 
partnership between the National Football League (NFL), 
McDonald's, and various children's hospitals across the 
country. 
McDonald's did not take sole credit for the Houses. 
The Seven-Up Bottling Company, Serta Mattress, Campbell 
soups, Zenith, Sunbeam, Nabisco, Keebler, Panasonic, 
Westinghouse, and Coca-Cola all substantially donated their 
products for use in the Houses. 28 Because of its inherent 
connection to children, however, McDonald's went one step 
further. Through the Ronald McDonald Children's Fund, a 
foundation established by Ray Kroc's friends in 1977 as a 
seventy-fifth birthday present to Kroc, each Ronald McDonald 
House was provided up to $25,000 "seed money" to capitalize 
the facility. Absorbed into Ronald McDonald Children's 
Charities (RMCC) after 1984, the Fund by 1988 had provided 
nearly $995,000 to help establish more than 100 Ronald 
McDonald Houses across the United States. 29 
2711 Ronald McDonald House Newsletter," 1 (Winter 1979), 
7. 
2911 RMCC Guidelines for Grants, 1986" McDonald's 
Corporation Archives; "RMCC, Inc. Financial Statements," 30 
April 1987-30 April 1988, McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
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McDonald's motivation in funding the Ronald McDonald 
Houses, was, like all its other philanthropic activities, a 
mixture of genuine concern and corporate self-interest. 
"Over the past fifteen years," McDonald's President and 
Chief Operating Officer Ed Rensi recalled, "people have 
asked me why our company became so involved in the Ronald 
McDonald House. It has nothing to do, even remotely, with 
the hamburger business. I tell them that the two businesses 
have one important common denominator, people." 30 Rensi's 
posturing ignored several important connections between 
McDonald's hamburger business and the Houses. Ronald 
McDonald's name and face were highly associated with the 
Houses; the annual March sale of Shamrock Shakes provided 
much of the seed money for fledgling new Houses; and 
Golin/Harris Communications in Chicago, McDonald's own 
public relations firm, wrote and distributed the "Ronald 
McDonald House Newsletter." And it was the Elkman 
Advertising Agency, consultant to the Philadelphia area 
McDonald's operators, who originally proposed the idea of 
McDonald's sponsorship of the first House. 31 McDonald's, 
among the dozens of corporations that donated to the Houses, 
enjoyed the immediate and continuous recognition as primary 
benefactor. Known as "The House That Love Built," the 
30
"The Ronald McDonald House Report" [formerly the 
"Ronald McDonald House Newsletter"] (Summer 1989), 5. 
31Love, McDonald's: Behind the Arches, 214. 
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Houses equally could be perceived as "The House That Ronald 
Built." 
Although McDonald's did not initiate the Ronald 
McDonald House idea, it was an opportunity they could not 
ignore. In the Conceptual Foundations of Business, Richard 
Eells and Clarence Walton described six different models of 
corporate social responsibility. Three of the models viewed 
social responsibility as "obligations imposed;" the other 
three saw it as "responsibilities assumed." 32 Ray Kroc, 
however, considered social responsibility as opportunities 
embraced. Kroc was by no means a theorist; he often chided 
American higher education for wallowing in theory to the 
detriment of action. 33 But Kroc understood the important 
role of social responsibility in creating a positive, even 
familiar, image for his restaurant chain. 
Eells and Walton further described corporate 
philanthropy as an "indirect benefit," a rupture of the 
common-law rule that corporate funds be spent on a guid pro 
guo basis, that is, only on activities which directly 
benefitted the corporation. 34 Rather, Eells and Walton 
continued, corporate philanthropy should be utilized to 
"influence the American 'style of life' ... by seeking to 
32Richard Eells and Clarence Walton, 
Foundations of Business, rev. ed. (Homewood, IL: 
Irwin, 1969), 198-201. 
33Kroc, Grinding It Out, 199. 
34Ibid., 557-58. 
Conceptual 
Richard D. 
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help shape and influence the evolution of the culture 
itself." 35 In other words, corporations should take on 
the role, not merely of economic profit-center, but of 
social institution. McDonald's is the example that proves 
Eells and Walton's thesis. 
When Ray Kroc told McDonald's shareholders in 1966 that 
he had seen McDonald's become a national institution he was 
far from exaggerating. Not only is an institution highly 
organized and recognizable, but it touches many different 
facets of individuals' lives. Religion and government, two 
of the most prominent institutional forces in twentieth 
century America, affect Americans from birth through death. 
Obviously, McDonald's does not have the theological or 
philosophical bases of religion or government, but its 
influence on people can be similarly multidimensional. 
On children, especially, McDonald's impact has been 
inordinately strong. In addition to the Ronald McDonald 
Houses and Ray Kroc's own privately funded foundation for 
medical research, McDonald sponsors the All-American 
Basketball Team, the All-American High School Band, the Ray 
A. Kroc Youth Achievement Award to outstanding high school 
seniors, the McDonald's American Cup in youth gymnastics, 
the McDonald's Hispanic Heritage Art Contest for elementary 
school children, and the Academic, Cultural, Technological 
and Scientific Olympics (ACT-30), a scholastic competition 
35Ibid., 212. 
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among African-American teenagers. 36 "McDonald's 
commitment to charities is so wide and deep," Restaurants 
and Institutions reported in 1989, "that competitors do not 
even try to imitate it. 1137 (see Appendix) Even more 
pointed, the competition would not know where to begin. 
The McDonald's All-American Basketball Team first 
suited up in 1977 and featured the top twenty-five high 
school basketball players in the U.S. By 1985, more than 
$475,000 had been raised through game ticket sales to 
directly fund Ronald McDonald Children's Charities, which in 
1984 became McDonald's umbrella foundation for all its 
children's philanthropy. The roster of players who have 
played for the Golden Arches team is indeed impressive: 
Earvin "Magic" Johnson, Michael Jordan, Patrick Ewing, and 
Isiah Thomas all played in the McDonald's tournament while 
in high school. 38 For many players, the McDonald's game 
provided them with their first taste of national exposure 
and corporate sponsorship, and, as the above listing 
attests, a National Basketball Association (NBA) future 
awaited many of McDonald's players. 
3611 McDonald' s Public Relations Department," publicity 
brochure ( 198 7) , McDonald's Corporation Archives; 
"McDonald's Community Service and Social Investment Report, 
1981-1982," McDonald's Corporation Archives, 8-12. 
37Bertagnoli, "Inside McDonald's," Restaurants and 
Institutions, 21 August 1989, 70. 
3811 Presence Builds Preference: 
Department, " publicity brochure (May 
Corporation Archives, 12. 
Communications 
1986), McOonald's 
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The McDonald's All-American High School Band, nicknamed 
"The Band Whose Pants Don't Match," debuted as a last minute 
entry in the 1967 Macy's Thanksgiving Day Parade, the same 
forum which had nationally introduced Ronald McDonald 
several years earlier. In something of a character 
reversal, it was usually somber Harry Sonneborn who pushed 
for McDonald's sponsorship of the gimmicky band and the 
national media coverage it attracted. Sonneborn tracked 
down the world's largest drum, stored in a Texas university 
warehouse awaiting resale, and quickly assembled a marching 
band composed of two students from each state and the 
District of Columbia. In a marketing coup, Sonneborn and Al 
Golin ordered a new drumskin advertising "McDonald's All-
American Band" and unveiled it during the parade, in direct 
violation of the parade commission's stringent regulations 
on commercial advertising among parade participants. Kroc 
was proud of Sonneborn's initiative in pulling off the stunt 
and the band's popularity guaranteed it an annual spot in 
the parade. 39 Under the directorship of Radio City Music 
Hall's Paul Lavelle for most of its history, the Band in 
1985 boasted 102 members out of nearly 4,900 nominees. 40 
39Kroc, Grinding It Out, 150. 
40In addition to Macy's parade, the McDonald's All-
American Band also performs in the Fiesta Bowl, the 
Tournament of Roses parade, and Jerry Lewis' annual Muscular 
Dystrophy telethon. It has even performed in New York's 
famed Carnegie Hall. Obviously, all these forums have 
generated wider exposure for McDonald's marketing..:. induced 
philanthropy. 
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In addition to providing travelling expenses for the parade, 
inclusion in the Band made students eligible for New England 
Conservatory of Music (Boston) scholarships. 41 
McDonald's has encouraged local owner/operators to 
supplement the corporation's efforts on a local or regional 
level. Licensee Herman Petty, owner of seven Chicago 
McDonald's, established a college scholarship program for 
his own crew workers, in addition to assisting several of 
them obtain their own McDonald's franchises. 42 William 
Pickard, another African-American operator in Detroit, 
emphasized the training he provided to his crew "so that any 
one of them will have the expertise to open his own 
operation. 1143 McDonald's pointed to operators like Petty 
and Pickard in response to charges that McDonald's 
philanthropy was marketing-driven or impersonal. And 
4111 Presence Builds Preference," 12; Cheryl M. Patric, 
"The Band Whose Pants Don't Match," The Instrumentalist 
(April 1974), McDonald's Miscellaneous Clippings File, 
McDonald's Corporation Archives, 1. The Instrumentalist 
article was an excellent example of how McDonald's blends 
philanthropy and marketing. The author was an account 
executive with Cooper and Golin, McDonald's public relations 
firm. Obviously, the article was intentionally submitted to 
generate favorable publicity for McDonald's sponsorship of 
the band. 
42Bertagnoli, "Inside McDonald's," 46. Petty was 
McDonald's first African-American operator, hired in 1968 
amid the first wave of racial insensitivity charges directed 
at McDonald's. Petty has since established McDonald's Black 
Franchisee Association and has been instrumental in helping 
other minority operators set up their own McDonald's units. 
43 
"An Academic Twist to the Sale of Hamburgers, " Ebony 
(October 1974): 70. 
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although a wide array of scholarship or award programs are 
available either to McDonald's own crew as a fringe benefit 
or to high school students at large, the bulk of McDonald's 
philanthropy targeted children not in high school, but in 
the elementary grades, McDonald's primary consumer audience. 
A pattern of consistent brand loyalty is usually 
developed between the ages of seven and nine. 44 A seven-
year-old is already a discriminating, even cynical shopper, 
who is frequently allowed to make routine consumer decisions 
for himself/herself. By age nine, 90% of children shop 
independently of their parents, with over half purchasing a 
product they specifically saw advertised on television. 45 
McDonald's clearly targeted this age cohort, noticeably 
extending it down to preschoolers, as their principal 
marketing niche; thus, this is where most of their 
philanthropy is expended. 
"Our primary audience," stated McDonald's in its 1969-
1973 "Marketing Manual," "is made up of young families with 
children ages 2 to 11. Your advertising should be reaching 
44Scott Ward, Daniel B. Wackman, and Ellen Wartella, 
How Children Learn to Buy: The Development of Consumer 
Information-Processing Skills (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 
Publications, 1977), 23, 178. Preschoolers, however much 
they pester their parents for products seen on television, 
are still inconsistent in their brand affections. This 
cognitive limitation is one which McDonald's has gone far in 
ameliorating. 
45James Utah McNeal, "The Development of Consumer 
Behavior Patterns in Childhood" (Ph.D. diss., University of 
Texas--Austin, 1964), 49-50, 68, 82. 
this group first. You are wasting valuable, hard-earned 
dollars if you are placing your ads in other areas." 46 
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Not only did McDonald's hit this group hard with an intense 
Saturday morning advertising campaign, it also soft-peddled 
advertising to them, in the form of complimentary curriculum 
materials for school, library, and scout meetings. 
Curriculum decisions are most frequently made by local 
and state school superintendents, based on state law and 
current trends in education. Corporate involvement in the 
curricular process is not novel; publishers, for example, 
intensely compete and lobby school boards to have their 
respective titles "adopted" for state-wide use, guaranteeing 
the books' long term sales. Similarly, computer 
manufacturers, especially Apple/Macintosh, have routinely 
donated thousands of dollars of hardware for classroom use, 
counting on software sales and future hardware expansion 
needs, as well as developing brand loyalty and computer use 
among children, to compensate for their initial 
philanthropy. 47 The difference, of course, between these 
46
"McDonald's Marketing Manual, 1969-1973," 3. 
47 Joseph Galaskiewicz, "Corporate Contributions to 
Charity: Nothing More than a Marketing Strategy?" in 
Philanthropic Giving: Studies in Varieties and Goals, ed., 
Richard Magat (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 
247. In the case of Apple/Macintosh, of course, once a 
school system received its complimentary computers, it was 
difficult to reconfigure to the non-compatible and more 
costly IBM-based system. By donating hardware to schools, 
Apple, in essence, locked in a market for itself. With the 
increasing compatibility options between IBM and Apple, 
however, schools have regained more flexibility in 
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efforts and McDonald's was that the school board, rather 
than the child or his/her parents, were the principal 
targets of the corporation's marketing efforts. Young 
children were likely to be less successful urging their 
parents to buy a computer system than they would pestering 
to visit McDonald's. Thus, because of its product line, 
McDonald concentrated its classroom efforts on a smaller 
scale. 
In 1965, McDonald's published Let's Eat Out, a 
children's storybook about a family's visit to McDonald's. 
Siblings Tom and Sue give their visiting European friend 
Hans "an American treat": McDonald's. 48 The book 
reflected obvious Cold War sensibilities: the family car's 
license plate was 11 1776," "mass production" was equated with 
"American," and a German child was educated in the benefits 
of capitalism. Tom and Hans themselves ordered the food, 
reflective of McDonald's intent to directly involve children 
in consumer purchasing, and rounded out their "All-American" 
trip with a visit to the local baseball stadium, another 
American cliche. McDonald's provided complimentary copies 
of Let's Eat Out to schools, libraries, and doctors' offices 
across the country. McDonald's newsletter, however, 
suggested that operators send the books directly to 
developing their computer systems. 
48John Jones, 
Publishing, 1965). 
Let's Eat Out (Chicago: Melmont 
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individual teachers, rather than to the local school boards, 
and to send the books without prior authorization. If the 
teachers already had the books in hand, McDonald's hoped, 
they would bypass standard textbook review procedures and 
immediately adopt the books for classroom use. 49 While 
it was obvious from the logo and text who sponsored the 
storybook, McDonald's did limit the overall commercialism of 
the book. Except for the "Golden Arches Success Story" 
reprinted at the end of the book, the story represented a 
soft-sell approach. McDonald's hoped the children would 
take the books home and show their parents, who would be so 
impressed with McDonald's generosity and the "success 
story," that they would visit their local restaurant. 
Evidently, the book did elicit positive feelings for 
McDonald's as one Terre Haute, Indiana, librarian wrote to 
McDonald's, "We feel sure that these colorful, eye-appealing 
books will circulate widely among our juvenile patrons. 1150 
That is exactly why McDonald's published the book. 
Let's Eat Out was a one-time publication. A more on 
going philanthropic intrusion into classroom curriculum was 
the series of McDonald's "Action Packs," targeted to 
students in grades K-9. The Action Packs were mini-
curriculum units that addressed physical education 
49 "McDonald's Newsletter" (November /December 
McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
1965), 
50Letter dated 15 June 1965, in "McDonald's Newsletter" 
(August 1965), McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
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(grades K-2), nutrition (grades 1-4), ecology (grades 4-6), 
and career choices (grades 6-9). The ecology packet alone 
reached 15-20 million students. 51 Complimentary 
educational films emphasized anti-drug messages ("Get It 
Straight''), bicycle safety ("Bicycles R Beautiful"), home 
safety ("Home Safe Home"), and, of course, the history of 
McDonald's ("The McDonald's Story"). Most of these 
classroom materials were discreet about using McDonald's 
trademarked logos. The supplements themselves were 
assembled by experts in the topics featured, not by 
McDonald's; thus, the direct advertising was minimal. 
Again, McDonald's focus was as much on attracting parental 
attention and goodwill as in developing brand loyalty among 
children. 
McDonald's strategy of using philanthropy to strengthen 
its public image and increase its sales has proved 
phenomenally successful, if judged by the number and scope 
of awards and honors that the corporation has received. Its 
safety films have been endorsed by the National Safety 
Council, the National PTA, and the American Red Cross. 52 
In 1971, Ray Kroc even received the Boys Scouts' "Good 
Scout" Award, ostensibly attesting to Kroc's embodiment of 
51McDonald's Corporation Annual Report, 1973, 
McDonald's Corporation Archives, 7. 
52McDonald's Corporation Annual Report, 1981, 
McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
the Scout virtues of patriotism, courage, and self-
reliance. 53 For its ecology awareness efforts alone, 
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McDonald's received the "Keep America Beautiful Award," the 
"Arbor Day Foundation Award," and the "National Foresters 
Association Award," all in 1976. 54 
While attributing a direct causal link is presumptive, 
McDonald's sales have also undoubtedly benefitted from the 
corporation's homey and concerned public image. The mother 
of one band member wrote McDonald's to thank them for their 
generosity and ended her letter with "God Bless 
McDonald's. 1155 Parents, like the mother who guaranteed 
her family's patronage whenever "we feel the 'All-American' 
urge," provided McDonald's with a steadily increasing core 
of grassroots community support, crucial to the corporation 
as it further expanded into America's small towns, suburbs, 
and later, urban neighborhoods. 
McDonald's diversified its philanthropy, not only to 
achieve the greatest good, but to generate the broadest 
possible publicity. The fact that its charity was an 
53McDonald's Corporation 
McDonald's Corporation Annual 
Corporation Archives. 
Annual Report, 
Report, 1974, 
1971, 17; 
McDonald's 
54McDonald's Corporation Annual Report, 1976, 
McDonald's Corporation Archives. This, of course, only 
reflects a few of the literally dozens of local and national 
awards honoring McDonald's community service or 
philanthropy. 
55 
"McDonald's Newsletter" 
Corporation Archives. 
(March 1982), Mcbonald's 
amalgamation of sincere social concern and unadulterated 
self-interest was not unique to McDonald's. A 1974 
Conference Board survey of corporate philanthropy listed 
"Social Responsibility" and "Self-Interest" as the two 
primary and competing motives for corporate donations. 56 
Even Ray Kroc's own personal dictum of "giving 
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something back" was widely repeated throughout the postwar 
decades. In his historical review of corporate charity, 
Peter Dobkin Hall showed that the period from 1950 to 1980 
was marked by the philanthropic leadership of the "self-made 
man," like Ray Kroc. Alfred Sloan and Charles Kettering at 
General Motors, Walter Teagle at Standard Oil, and Gerard 
Swope at General Electric all prominently donated corporate 
and personal funds in a largess matching McDonald's. Unlike 
Kroc, who emphasized practical vocational training over 
theory, their charity was primarily aimed at national 
educational institutions, like the Sloan Business School at 
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, which could serve 
to develop future corporate managers. 57 
56James F. Harris and Anne Klepper, Corporate 
Philanthropy: Public Service Activities ([New York]: 
Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs/The 
Conference Board, [ 1976]), 17. The survey analyzed the 
contributions function of 457 American corporations, chosen 
from Fortune magazine's annual listing of highest revenue-
producing companies. 
57Peter Dobkin Hall, "Business Giving and Social 
Investment in the United States," in Philanthropic Giving: 
Studies in Varieties and Goals, ed. Richard Magat (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1989), 235-36. 
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McDonald's used its philanthropic efforts, rather, as 
"social currency," to be redeemed whenever McDonald's faced 
opposition moving into an anxious neighborhood or when 
targeted by activist groups seeking advertising, 
nutritional, or environmental concessions. 58 When faced 
with dissent, McDonald's relied upon the positive local and 
national image which it had carefully developed, especially 
its image of family wholesomeness. This image, McDonald's 
reminded its operators, needed to be jealously guarded and 
nurtured, and most importantly, needed to be consistent. 
None of its competitors could approximate McDonald's 
philanthropy. Kroc's commitment to aggressively seeking out 
philanthropic opportunities combined with the corporation's 
solid financial footing made possible by the book value of 
its real-estate gave the corporation a definitive edge. 
Although each operator chose his/her own outlet, community 
commitment, involvement, and generosity was a dictum from 
the corporation's headquarters and, more emphatically, from 
Ray Kroc. Licensee contributions, however, numerically and 
geographically expanded the image of McDonald's generosity, 
far beyond what Kroc could do alone, especially in the late 
1950s and early 1960s when Kroc's primary corporate 
commitment was to unit expansion. More important from a 
marketing perspective, licensees personalized and localized 
58The term is borrowed from Galaskiewicz's analysis of 
the marketing functions of corporate philanthropy. 
Galaskiewicz, "Corporate Contributions to Charity," 252. 
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the beneficence, giving it a name and a face. In essence, 
McDonald's was grasping at the community spirit most 
stereotypical of Mainstreet, U.S.A., by encouraging licensee 
sponsorship of local Little League, scout troops, libraries, 
and schools. It was these images of family, home, and 
community that finally proved successful in absolving 
McDonald's of its associations with the seamy teenage 
hangouts which typified drive-in stands throughout the 1950s 
and 1960s. 
Because of its success at creating an image of 
McDonald's as "good," parents saw it_ as a safe and wholesome 
place to visit, or to send their children to alone. 
McDonald's, in fact, reinforced the same values that many 
parents tried to inculcate in their own children: study 
skills and ecological awareness through the Action Packs; 
sanctioned extracurricular activities through the band, 
basketball, and gymnastics teams; and concern for others 
through the Ronald McDonald Houses. The wholesome image 
that McDonald's created through its centralized corporate 
philanthropy and the combined commitment of hundreds of 
individual operators guaranteed parental approval, even 
admiration, for McDonald's. Philanthropy, however, meant 
little to children, especially the youngest ones most 
inexperienced in consumer imagery. The enticement for them, 
of course, was that McDonald's was simply fun and home to 
Ronald McDonald. 
CHAPTER 6 
"MEET RONALD MCDONALD" 
"Children define Ronald in terms of the 
specific things they see him do on TV. He is 
nice because he shares his fries. He's smart 
because he figures out a way to catch 
Hamburglar and get the hamburgers back. He's 
magical because he makes an "M" with his 
fingers or bounces up to the moon on a pogo 
stick. He is more than a clown, he's a real 
person. 111 
McDonald's Corporation 
The October, 1966 edition of "McDonald's Newsletter" 
introduced Ronald McDonald to licensees as "our new 
spokesman to the children of America. 112 The "Meet Ronald 
McDonald" issue clearly and simply stated Ronald's role in 
the corporation, 
Keep Ronald selling the kids. They are your prime 
market and the "influentials" which bring the parents to 
your units. Watch your family business grow as Ronald 
sells the kids on "fun eating" at McDonald's. 113 
Ronald's original function was a combination of salesman and 
corporate mascot, not unlike Buster Brown or Mickey Mouse. 
111 Brief History of Ronald 
McDonald's Corporation Archives, 
original. 
McDonald," 20 
2. Emphasis 
June 
is 
1990, 
in the 
211 McDonald's Newsletter" 
Corporation Archives. 
(October 1966), McDonald's 
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All three characters teetered between fantasy and reality 
and were specifically used to appeal to a children's 
consumer market. Unlike Disney's Mickey and the Brown Shoe 
Company's Buster, however, Ronald McDonald was real, a flesh 
and blood multidimensional character who visited hospitals, 
performed magic shows, and greeted children at restaurants. 
Ronald existed in two worlds simultaneously, creating 
confusion for children but profits for the corporation. 
Ronald created the image of McDonald's as fun. By the 
early 1960s, Ray Kroc had already successfully created an 
image of McDonald's as a clean, efficient, and wholesome 
forum for routine dining out. McDonald's earlier marketing 
had focused almost exclusively on earning parental approval, 
using corporate and licensee philanthropy to disassociate 
itself from the teenage drive-ins and to build customer 
goodwill. Through numerous national interviews, Ray Kroc 
carried the message of McDonald's to parents. Ronald 
McDonald conveyed it to children. And the message was that 
it was fun to eat hamburgers and fries, fun to visit 
Ronald's house. 
An informal, longitudinal look at McDonald's children's 
commercials from the mid-1960s to 1980s highlights Ronald's 
success as a marketer. Ronald was originally created to 
deliver a hard-hitting sales pitch to children and, in the 
earliest spots, Ronald's commercialism was explicit. 
Children were prompted either to ask their parents directly 
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for McDonald's or to specifically request a certain product. 
By the 1970s, however, the consumer function of young 
children became increasingly independent of parental control 
and consumer groups rallied against the explicit 
commercialism of McDonald's. Ronald reacted with distinctly 
less overt commercialism in his message and soft-peddled his 
pitch. McDonald's advertised itself as the natural 
extension of a baseball game, after school, or a trip to the 
mall, and Ronald took on the role of cheerleader and 
teammate, beginning his transformation from marketing 
gimmick to "friend." 
Surprising for a corporate spokesman, Ronald became 
increasingly detached from explicit association with the 
corporation. This was both intentional and unavoidable. 
With 97% of American children recognizing Ronald by 1973, 
continuation of his hard selling persona was unnecessary and 
risked parental backlash. 4 Ronald's mere presence was 
advertising for the corporation and a subtle approach was 
favored. But a subtle use of Ronald was also crucial, even 
unavoidable, from a philanthropic point of view. As Ronald 
increasingly became the focal point of McDonald's 
4The "Ronald McDonald Awareness Studies" have become 
somewhat legendary at McDonald's. The first survey, done by 
Cooper/Golin in 1967, yielded a 77% awareness rating. The 
1973 study cited that 97% of American children recognized 
Ronald. The surveys were conducted periodically among one 
thousand children aged five through twelve in ten different 
U.S. cities. "McDonald's Marketing Manual, 1971-1973," 
McDonald's Corporation Archives, 1. 
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philanthropy, especially through the Ronald McDonald Houses 
and Ronald McDonald Children's Charities, the clown needed 
to shed his commercial image lest the corporation's 
beneficence seem less than sincere. Between 1963 and 1985, 
Ronald McDonald was transformed from salesman to friend, so 
that by 1989, McDonald's could in some honesty claim, 
"Ronald McDonald does not sell products .... He's more the 
McDonald's spirit. 115 
In 1965, however, the debut of Ronald McDonald merited 
little more than a footnote in the corporation's monthly 
newsletter. After Ray Kroc's buyout of the McDonald 
brothers in December, 1961, Kroc encouraged individual 
operators to develop their own local advertising strategies. 
Kroc was centralizing operational control and sought to 
spare the highly leveraged corporation the expense of 
advertising. Also, Kroc hoped that licensee initiative on 
local marketing would compensate for their increasing lack 
of control on operational, production, and distribution 
fronts. "It was really a free-wheeling time," one licensee 
recalled. "We had very little direction from corp [sic] and 
we only looked to them to develop the [national] 
5Lisa Bertagnoli, "Inside McDonald's,'' Restaurants and 
Institutions, 21 August 1989, 64. Obviously, Ronald 
McDonald does indirectly "sell products" or else the 
corporation would not expend millions annually to continue 
promoting the character. 
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commercials. 116 Oscar Goldstein, a Washington, DC licensee, 
contracted with an advertising agency to develop a character 
for a local ad campaign. This character became Ronald 
McDonald. 
Using a clown as an advertising gimmick already had 
precedent among McDonald's licensees. A Memphis, Tennessee, 
owner/operator had previously promoted McDonald's on the 
locally produced Looney Zoo Show, whose "Tiny the Clown" 
plugged McDonald's products to its child audiences. An 
Orlando, Florida, licensee did a similar promotion with 
"Checkers the Clown." And "Bozo," Chicago's immensely 
popular children's clown, frequently promoted the hamburgers 
and fries of its local sponsor, McDonald's. 7 Goldstein, 
however, was the first to develop a permanent character to 
represent a specific franchise. Goldstein and his partner, 
John Gibson, created Gee-Gee Distributing Company (for 
~oldstein and ~ibson) and ran their nearly forty Washington, 
DC area units as a mini-empire within McDonald's. They 
exploited one of the few territorial franchises Kroc ever 
611 McDonald's Twenty-fifth Anniversary," 1980, 
McDonald's Corporation Archives, 18. 
711McDonald's Newsletter" (April 1962), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. Interestingly, even after Ronald 
McDonald became the corporation's official spokesman, an 
Ohio licensee was still experimenting with his own clown 
mascot, "Flippo," taking advantage of the marketing freedom 
Kroc conceded to franchisees. "McDonald's Newsletter" (May 
1967), McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
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granted. 8 Crucial to their "empire" was a distinct and 
long term advertising presence in the local market, thus the 
creation of Ronald McDonald. 
The actor chosen to play the first Ronald was Willard 
Scott, better known later as the weatherman on NBC's "Today" 
show. Scott's clown bore such little resemblance to the now 
famous appearance of McDonald's clown that children today 
would fail to recognize him. The original Ronald costume 
was a dark red and yellow jumpsuit, white gloves, and white 
shoes. On his nose, Scott wore a McDonald's paper soft 
drink cup and on his hair, a stringy blond wig. Anchored to 
his waist was a tray from which he dispensed free burgers 
and fries to child audiences. His personality and 
mannerisms were clumsy and silly, reminiscent of the antics 
of Red Skelton's "Freddie the Freeloader" character. 9 
From 1963 to 1965, Ronald continued as the advertising 
spokesman only for the Washington, DC area. Ronald first 
attracted McDonald's Corporation's attention in April, 1965 
with a short blurb about how rising sales at Gee-Gee's units 
were tied to a manic clown whose antics appealed to child 
8Ray Kroc with Robert Anderson, Grinding It Out: The 
Making of McDonald's (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1977; 
reprint, Chicago: St. Martin's Paperbacks, 1987), 157-58. 
Page references are to the reprint edition. Kroc 
repurchased the territory from Goldstein and Gibson in 1967 
for $16.5 million. 
911 Brief History of Ronald McDonald," 1. 
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patrons. 10 Ronald, however, was not instantly adopted by 
the overall corporation. Bozo had been plugging McDonald's 
hamburgers for several years on his own popular children's 
show and seemed to be a more ideal advertising character 
than upstart Ronald. Bozo's clown persona was fully 
developed and he already boasted a loyal following of 
youngsters. Ronald would have to develop both from scratch. 
The Bozo character, however, was contractually tied to his 
television show and the fact that his character was already 
developed denied McDonald's the flexibility and independence 
to create their own marketing spokesman. 
Ronald's "victory" over Bozo did not guarantee instant 
stardom. Ronald McDonald made his official corporate debut 
in a flying hamburger on network commercials for the 
November, 1965 Macy's Thanksgiving Day Parade. But his 
presence failed to capture even an honorable mention in 
McDonald's 1965 Annual Report, though overall sponsorship of 
the parade was widely touted. 11 Ronald's anonymity did 
not last long. 
After the October, 1966 "Meet Ronald McDonald" issue, 
McDonald's ordered thirty-five one-minute television spots 
featuring the clown to air on NBC's and CBS's Saturday 
lO"McDonald' s Newsletter" 
Corporation Archives. 
(April 1965), 
11
"Brief History of Ronald McDonald," 1; 
Corporation Annual Report, 1965," McDonald's 
Archives, 7. 
McDonald's 
"McDonald's 
Corporation 
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morning cartoon line-up. McDonald's "kid blitz" reached 4.6 
million homes that first month alone. 12 The marketing of 
Ronald on children's television showed immediate results. 
By April, 1967, only six months after Ronald's formal 
adoption as company spokesman, an appearance by the clown 
could automatically boost the day's sales by 50%, an 
impressive accomplishment that underscored the importance of 
both the fledgling child consumer market and children's 
influence on their parents. 13 As with McDonald's earlier 
success with food production and distribution, consistency 
was the key to Ronald's popularity. 
Willard Scott's characterization of Ronald lasted only 
a short time. The goofy mannerisms and amateurish costume 
were quickly updated for mass appeal. By the late 1960s, 
Ronald had consistently assumed his present appearance of 
yellow jumpsuit, red and white striped shirt and socks, 
yellow gloves, and red wig and shoes. Only his hairstyle 
and make-up would undergo subtle changes in the next two 
decades from the "Afro" look of the 1970s to a sleeker style 
for the 1980s. In addition to costume changes, McDonald's 
hired a professional clown to assume Ronald's role. 
Ringling Brothers, Barnum & Bailey's "Coco the Clown" 
became the second national Ronald, complementing the dozens 
12 
"McDonald's Newsletter" (November /December 
McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
1966), 
13
"McDonald's Newsletter" 
Corporation Archives. 
(April 1967), McDonald's 
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that were hired locally for store appearances, tours, and 
magic shows. Hungarian by birth, Coco spoke no English; 
thus, he built his characterization of Ronald entirely on 
pantomime and circus antics. The Ronald that is most 
memorable, however, was personified in the 1970s by 
professional clown King Moody, who gradually transformed 
Ronald from a circus buffoon into a likable friend to 
children. While King Moody provided a transitional 
characterization for Ronald, remnants of Ronald's direct 
selling tactics continued until the 1980s. 
In its 1969-1973 "Marketing Manual," McDonald's 
outlined its "Ronald philosophy": 
Ronald is first and foremost a McDonald's salesman. If 
your Ronald is qualified to put on a short show this is 
an added plus. His only reason for existence is to sell 
hamburgers and other McDonald products . . . NOT to make 
children laugh, although if he can, it helps his 
believability .... The only true test of Ronald's 
effectiveness must be in the cash register, as the 
result of a sustained advertising effort to children on 
TV using Ronald commercials. We have created Ronald to 
be loved and admired by all children. Once this was 
achieved, we then used the personal endorsement 
technique to sell our products. 14 
Bluntly put, the only reason for the creation and continued 
existence of Ronald McDonald in the 1960s and 1970s was to 
sell hamburgers to unsuspecting youngsters who considered 
him a friend. 
All of the early national McDonald's commercials had 
14
" Ronald McDonald: Personal Appearance 
Recommendations," in "McDonald's Marketing Manual, 1969-
1973," vol. 2, McDonald's Corporation Archives. Emphasis is 
in the original. 
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Ronald explicitly touting a product. "Fishing," with 
Willard Scott as Ronald, plugged McDonald's new fish filet 
sandwich. Coco in "Delivery Wagon" and "Flying Hamburger" 
initiated the "McDonald's is Your Kind of Place" theme 
developed by the D'Arcy, Masius, Benton & Bowles Advertising 
Agency in late 1967. In addition to plugging specific 
products, such as the burgers-fries-shake trio in "Flying 
Hamburger," this promotion created a jingle that 
inextricably associated Ronald with McDonald's in children's 
minds and became one of McDonald's most successful and 
memorable advertising campaigns. 15 The standard jingle 
refrain, to the tune of "Down By the Riverside," 
McDonald's is your kind of place 
It's such a happy place ... 
Hap-hap-hap-happy place . . . 
A bright and happy place . . . 
was changed for children's audiences to 
McDonald's is your kind of place ... 
Because its Ronald's place ... 16 
The change was made specifically to attract children's 
attention. 
By the mid-1970s, however, McDonald's changed their 
strategy to "soft-peddle" Ronald's marketing message. 
Ronald commercials that specifically advertised a product 
15 
"McDonald's Commercials," tape 1, 
33-07, McDonald's Corporation Archives, 
61-104, and 104-145 respectively. 
# 90.254.001, TVT 
commercial #16-60, 
1611McDonald's Newsletter" (November 1967), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. 
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were intermingled with, and gradually gave way to, spots 
that showed Ronald playing football, baseball, or relaxing 
at "his house": McDonald's. In "Ronald Basketball" and 
"Ronald Football," for example, a McDonald's hamburger was 
the inspiration that allowed team player Ronald to score the 
winning points. After his victory, Ronald was magically 
transported to McDonald's where he exclaimed, "Ah, this is 
the place to go after the game . . . or whenever you play up 
a big appetite. Why not stop at my house today?" The tag 
line on the commercial replayed the "Your Kind of Place" 
jingle. 17 In "Ronald Fun House," Ronald's circus antics 
took place in a fun house with distorting mirrors. His 
pitch was "Next time you're hungry, come on over to my 
house. McDonald's is a real fun house. 1118 The continual 
equating of McDonald's with Ronald's "house" reinforced an 
image of Ronald as real and downplayed McDonald's real-world 
function as a restaurant. These later commercials also 
reveal a more fundamental shift in McDonald's approach to 
children. 
By the late 1970s, Ronald promoted not so much an 
individual product as he promoted himself. Children's 
loyalty to Ronald superseded even their hankerings for 
1711McDonald's Marketing Manual, 1969-1973," storyboards 
for children's television commercials, #272-McD-60 and #220-
McD-60R. 
18Ibid., commercial #274-McD-60. 
original. 
Emphasis is in the 
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McDonald's newest product for children, the "Happy Meal." 
Through Ronald McDonald banks, dolls, coloring books, comic 
books, and a literal panoply of other toys, the image and 
personality of Ronald McDonald, clown and friend, rather 
than the image of McDonald's the restaurant, was constantly 
reinforced. 
Ronald McDonald was effective only so long as children 
believed that the Ronald they saw on television was the same 
Ronald who performed the magic show at the restaurant down 
the street or visited them in the hospital. To maintain the 
charade, McDonald's published very detailed instructions on 
how a Ronald must act, what tricks to perform, and how to 
manage a child audience. In January, 1972, the corporation 
sponsored the first national meeting of Ronald McDonalds 
with sixty individual, yet identical, Ronalds in 
attendance. 19 This formal meeting of the clowns helped to 
standardize Ronald's personality across the country and to 
minimize any doubts by children as to who the "real" Ronald 
was. 20 In 1974, McDonald's formalized Ronald's persona in 
a detailed handbook issued to the national and local actors 
19
"McDonald's Newsletter" (February 1972), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. 
20McDonald's perception of Ronald McDonald was even 
more hallowed than that of Santa Claus. Many youngsters 
believe that Santa visits them on Christmas Eve, but that 
the "Santas" they see on the street corners or in the stores 
are his "helpers." McDonald's sought to prevent even that 
much ambiguity by making each Ronald so identical that 
children were encouraged to believe that there was only one 
Ronald McDonald. 
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appearing as Ronald. 
"Ronald McDonald & How!" a confidential in-house 
manual, standardized Ronald's costume, make-up, and unit 
appearances. It included twenty-four detailed pages for 
creating Ronald's trademarked clown face, how to handle 
unruly or tired children, how to deal with sick youngsters 
during hospital appearances, and even how to tell a good 
joke. Ronald's role, especially during lot appearances, was 
to serve as an intermediary, a bridge, between children and 
the restaurant. One way to do this, the manual suggested, 
was to have the restaurant manager help Ronald distribute 
free trinkets, "to demonstrate to the kids that he [the 
manager] is their friend.1121 Most important, however, 
was the following advice: "Never remove your gloves in 
front of a kid because that will spoil your image as a 
mystical person--not just a man in a clown suit. 1122 Like 
much else at McDonald's, image ranked above reality. 
The real flesh and blood men who portrayed Ronald--f or 
obvious reasons, a female Ronald would destroy the charade--
did bring to the role, however, a genuine affection for 
children. While professional clowns were hired to play the 
Ronald that children saw on television, local Ronalds 
included police officers, talk show hosts, and even a 
2111 Ronald McDonald & How!" McDonald's Corporation 
Archives, 1974, S3/C3. 
22 rbid., 86 /CL 
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McDonald's licensee. 23 Fun with the role as well as 
working with children were primary reasons for taking the 
job. In an open letter to McDonald's Corporation by Bobby 
Brandon, Boston's local Ronald McDonald, Brandon mused: 
Perhaps this is the reason God gave me these talents. 
I was part of their lives [the children's] for those 
few moments .... I sincerely thank you for creating 
me, and making me your symbol to all kids. . . . I would 
like to tell you, those of you who have created me, what 
joy and happiness you have brought to me this past 
year. 24 
A similar sentiment was expressed by Aye Jaye, the National 
Field Ronald McDonald Consultant, in 1974. "We're [the 
people who portray Ronald McDonald] the kind of person who 
can make people smile. That makes us--and McDonald's--
different. You're not selling hamburgers--you're sharing 
happiness." 25 
Jaye's romanticizing aside, McDonald's was indeed 
selling hamburgers, by the millions, to an equal number of 
young children. Ronald McDonald created a uniquely personal 
brand image for McDonald's, an image lacking in the 
competition and rare even among other corporate mascots for 
23 
"McDonald's Newsletter" (February 19 7 2) , McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. 
24
"McDonald's Newsletter" (February 1968), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. 
25
"Ronald McDonald & How!" 4. As the National Field 
Ronald, it was Jaye's task to inspect and insure the 
uniformity of the local Ronald McDonalds, just as McDonald's 
employed inspectors to guarantee the consistency of product 
preparation and distribution. Again, McDonald's considered 
consistency, whether operational or marketing, to be crucial 
to its success. 
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children. Burger King's and Burger Chef's attempts to copy 
Ronald resulted in weak characters (a king and a chef, 
respectively) which never transcended their obvious and 
immediate advertising functions. Taco Bell's "Taco Pete" 
was little more than a logo, apparently always in the midst 
of a siesta with head bowed down. Kentucky Fried Chicken 
never targeted children directly; their product was packaged 
to parents relying upon the grandfatherly image of Harlan 
Sanders. Ironically, Sanders, a real person who had 
attracted national renown for his homemade chicken recipe in 
the 1940s, had less of a public persona than did the 
fictional Ronald McDonald. 26 All of McDonald's 
competition missed the children's market in the 1950s and 
1960s, which is surprising since corporate mascots like 
Buster Brown and Mickey Mouse had been extremely popular 
with children earlier in the century. 
Buster Brown, created by Richard Outcault, first 
appeared in May, 1902, as a comic strip character in the New 
York Herald. Rather unisex in appearance, Buster Brown wore 
a bobbed hairstyle, sailor outfit, and was trailed by his 
companion dog, Tige. The character's almost immediate 
popularity convinced the Brown Shoe Company of St. Louis to 
adopt the conveniently named lad as its corporate mascot in 
1905. While the original comic strip "Buster Brown" waned 
2 6stan Luxenberg, =R=o;...:a=d=s=1=· d=e=--__,E=m=p=i=r""e=s::....::'---=H=oo...:.w'---=t=h=e::;...___,C=h=a=1=· =n=s 
Franchised America (New York: Viking/Penguin, 1985), 31-
32. 
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in popularity by the 1930s, a comic book Buster retained its 
following until the 1960s. The Brown Shoe Company initially 
used the comic books as premiums to promote their "Buster 
Brown Blue Ribbon Shoes," but continued the advertising 
theme through a series of Buster Brown books which were sold 
at newsstands. 27 Like Ronald McDonald, Buster Brown was 
anthropomorphized, but into the character of a small boy. 
In the introduction to the 1st Buster Brown Book 
(1903), creator Outcault explained, 
Buster is not a bad or naughty boy as the thousands of 
parents know. He is an industrious person, full of 
energy and ingenuity •••. Buster is a kind little chap 
and his faithful dog finds in him a gentle but busy 
companion. He is not an invention. 28 
To create the reality of Buster Brown, the Brown Shoe 
Company underwrote a series of comic books reinforcing its 
mascot's persona. Buster Brown's Autobiography was issued 
in 1907, an ongoing series of Buster Brown's Amusing Capers 
began in 1908, and, interestingly, even Buster Brown's dog, 
Tige, had his own biography published in Tige: His Story 
(1908). McDonald's efforts to fully humanize Ronald 
McDonald hearken back to the Brown Shoe Company's success at 
humanizing Buster Brown and giving him a personal history 
through the autobiography issue. 
27Denis Gifford, American Comic Strip 
1884-1939: The Evolution of an Era (Boston: 
1990)' 11-12. 
Collections, 
G. K. Hall, 
28Quoted in Gifford, American Comic Strip Collections, 
9. Emphasis is mine. 
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A second and culturally more significant precursor to 
Ronald McDonald, of course, was Mickey Mouse. Although 
Mickey's general contribution to the consumer socialization 
of children has been previously noted, specific examples of 
overt consumer socialization merit further attention. 
During the 1934 Christmas season, Mickey and girlfriend 
Minnie appeared in a promotional comic book entitled Mickey 
Mouse and Minnie at Macy's. The book, reissued annually by 
Macy's Department Stores' "Toyland, 11 introduced children to 
Macy's Christmas collection and was an explicit attempt at 
encouraging an active consumer role by children. 29 The 
Mickey Mouse Magazine debuted in 1933 as a free promotional 
give-away by theaters, stores, dairy companies, gas 
companies, and even by toothpaste manufacturers. Like 
Ronald McDonald, Mickey Mouse existed in a tenuous realm 
between reality and fantasy. Addressing parents, Mickey 
Mouse wrote in the mid-1930s, 
It [the Mickey Mouse Magazine] will be delivered to your 
home monthly by your milkman and with my compliments. 
We hope your children will enjoy it. If your little 
ones are too young to read it themselves please read it 
to them. And do give them my love. 
Mickey Mouse30 
Given that the letter was addressed to parents, it may 
seem somewhat surprising that Mickey Mouse, rather than Walt 
Disney, authored the letter. But Mickey's specific request 
29Gifford, American Comic Strip Collections, 105, 114. 
30Ibid., 94. 
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to "give them my love" is significant on two counts. First, 
Mickey's personal tone revealed the level of brand awareness 
and loyalty he already enjoyed among children, to the point 
that he and children had an emotional relationship of sorts. 
Second, Disney's marketing strategy was nothing less than 
brilliant. If Walt Disney had asked parents to convey "his 
love," it would have meant little to children and could have 
seemed crass, but for parents to say "and Mickey sends his 
love," implied parental approval of the relationship and 
solidified Mickey's image as a real person in the minds of 
children. Given the precedents set by Buster Brown and 
Mickey Mouse, the surprising thing was not that McDonald's 
relied so extensively upon Ronald McDonald as a marketing 
tool, but that other companies failed to do the same. 
Ronald McDonald, however, entered the child's world two 
steps ahead of either Buster or Mickey. Unlike his 
predecessors, Ronald was authentically real, that is, a 
human being. Although Mickey Mouse wandered through 
Disneyland shaking children's hands, he was still outwardly 
a mouse masking the man or woman operating inside the 
costume. Mickey could never become quite human and this 
handicap, along with the obvious fantasy overtones of 
animation, combined to limit his effectiveness as a personal 
friend or a surrogate sibling. 
Equally advantageous to Ronald as his humanity was his 
clown persona. In his introductory essay to the anthology 
176 
Ronald Revisited: The World of Ronald McDonald, popular 
culture chronicler Marshall Fishwick credited the rich 
history of clowning with giving Ronald a running head start 
as a child marketer. 
Ronald McDonald is a descendant of the zanni . . . or 
comic servants of the commedia, such as the sly and 
witty Harlequin and the awkward Pedrolino, whose costume 
of baggy trousers, loose-fitting blouse, and wide 
brimmed or peaked hat is still worn by many clowns. 31 
Although Ronald lacked the zanni's characteristic hat, 
McDonald's quickly realized the benefits of appealing to the 
traditional clown persona. 
McDonald's released Willard Scott and hired 
professional clowns Coco and King Moody, respectively, to 
represent Ronald on network television and in national 
appearances. Ronald's own distinctive clown persona 
achieved further legitimation when Ronald, carrying a 
platter of hamburgers, marched in the Parade of Clowns in 
Ringling Brothers, Barnum & Bailey's 1967 circus. Ronald 
shared center ring with the ringmaster in the Philadelphia 
and Boston performances and appeared in a two-page spread in 
the circus' souvenir book. Overall, Ronald's circus stint 
reached 7 million Americans. 32 This, combined with his 
31Marshall Fishwick, "Introduction" in Ronald 
Revisited: The World of Ronald McDonald, 2d ed. (Bowling 
Green, OH: Bowling Green University Popular Press, 1983), 
2. 
32 Because Coco was also a Ringling Brothers, Barnum & 
Bailey clown, another actor was hired to portray Ronald for 
this circus tour. "McDonald's Newsletter" (April 1967), 
McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
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numerous visits to schools, hospitals, and local carnivals, 
ameliorated his external commercial image and enhanced his 
persona as friend and mentor. 
"Ronald McDonald truly is one of our most valuable 
marketing tools in what no TV spot, radio spot or newspaper 
ad can do," stated McDonald's in 1980, "that is, share a 
personal, one-on-one experience with a child. 1133 Ronald 
McDonald was unique. He was simultaneously corporate 
spokesman, mascot, logo, philanthropist, advertising 
gimmick, and friend. The ease and subtlety with which he 
combined the roles attested to McDonald's savvy success at 
reading cultural cues. In the early 1960s, there were few 
cultural prohibitions against advertising to children; 
indeed, as early as the Depression, marketing to children 
was perceived as a form of necessary, even desirable, 
economic education. Companies that ignored the child market 
were deemed shortsighted if they failed to educate "the 
consumer of tomorrow." McDonald's enjoyed virtual autonomy 
in how it used Ronald in the 1960s and it relied on the 
clown's hard-sell approach to further Ray Kroc's goals of 
rapid expansion and increased brand recognition. 
By the mid-1970s, however, the cultural climate had 
changed. McDonald's was increasingly under attack for 
subverting children's diets, masking commercialism with 
3311 Ronald McDonald Seminar Booklet," 28 July 1980, 
McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
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philanthropy, and creating unnecessary domestic tension 
between children who whined for McDonald's and parents who 
refused. McDonald's marketing blitz of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s would prove an unqualified success; by 1976, 
McDonald's was victorious in the "burger wars" and boasted a 
19.6% share of the fast-food market, more than triple that 
of its nearest hamburger rival, Burger King. 34 Its 
advertising saturation produced impressive increases in 
sales--from $161 million in 1965 to $1.8 billion in 1974--
but also attracted public scrutiny. 35 McDonald's 
perceived Ronald's explicit commercialism as increasingly 
too direct amidst a pervasive anti-corporate public 
sentiment. Ronald's re-characterization from salesman to 
teammate and friend mitigated his adversarial relationship 
with parents and encouraged children to more deeply identify 
with the clown. 
Pivotal to creating brand identity is keeping the 
product's name in front of its target audience. McDonald's 
34
"The Fast-Food Stars: Three Strategies for Fast 
Growth," BusinessWeek, 11 July 1977, 56 (table). McDonald's 
closest market share competitor was actually Kentucky Fried 
Chicken which boasted an 8.4% share of the fast food market 
in 1976. Colonel Sanders' restaurants, however, stayed out 
of the "burger wars" and, for the most part, never directly 
competed with McDonald's. McDonald's main competition in 
the 1970s consisted of Burger King, Burger Chef, Hardee's, 
Jack-in-the-Box, and newcomer Wendy's. 
35Joseph J. Doyle, "McDonald's Corporation," 15 July 
1975 (New York: Smith, Barney & Company), table VIII, 22. 
Unlike most private investment analysts' reports, the above 
report is publicly available through Northwestern University 
Library, Evanston, Illinois. 
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initially accomplished this through a host of Ronald 
McDonald tie-in products. In addition to in-store premiums, 
McDonald's licensed a Hasbro Ronald McDonald doll, 
Fieldcrest juvenile McDonald's bedding, a Sears-distributed 
line of McDonald's-labelled children's clothes, a Playskool 
mock-up of a McDonald's restaurant, a Milton Bradley 
McDonald's board game, and a Fisher-Price line of McDonald's 
play food. McDonald's licensed Ronald's trademarked 
appearance to complement its in-store promotions and network 
advertising and, most importantly, to "extend our marketing 
programs into the home. 1136 The use of established and 
respected manufacturers implied quality products and 
encouraged parents to accede to McDonald's "home marketing" 
strategy. McDonald's complemented this subtle strategy with 
a more deliberate attempt to broaden Ronald's persona, 
specifically to increase his realism. To minimize Ronald's 
salesman overtones and to give Ronald McDonald a "family," 
McDonald's introduced "McDonaldland" in 1970. 
An early concern expressed by Max Cooper of 
Cooper/Golin was that Ronald McDonald's popularity would 
wane from overexposure. Without careful regulation, Cooper 
feared that "Ronald's popularity could peak too soon, the 
market could be overloaded and Ronald could go the way of 
Davy Crockett and his coonskin cap. We can't permit Ronald 
3611McDonald's Newsletter" (April 1976), 9; (June 1977), 
14-15; (March 1979); (July 1980); (October 1983), 3. 
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McDonald to become an overnight fad. 1137 One way to avoid 
overexposure was to broaden Ronald's character, to make him 
more multidimensional, thus interesting. "McDonaldland" did 
this and more. The pseudo-real setting of McDonaldland 
detached Ronald from explicit association with McDonald's 
commercial function and introduced a "family" of characters 
with which Ronald could interact. 
"Mayor McCheese," whose voice and characterization were 
patterned after vaudevillian Ed Wynn, was the nominal civic 
leader in McDonaldland. "Big Mac" tapped into the Keystone 
Cops' antics; "Captain Crook" was designed as a cross 
between John Barrymore and Errol Flynn; the shake-thirsty 
"Grimace" resembled the voice of Edgar Bergen's Mortimer 
Snerd; and the "Hamburglar, 11 whose mumbling personality is 
not clearly attributable, rounded out the major cast of 
characters in McDonaldland. 38 Each character visually 
represented a specific product or served as antagonist to 
Ronald. Commercials set in McDonaldland ran like 60-second 
morality plays with Ronald consistently assuming the role of 
hero. Hamburglar and Grimace proved the chief antagonists 
whose respective attempts to "borrow" McDonald's hamburgers 
3711McDonald's Newsletter" 
Corporation Archives. 
(May 1967), McDonald's 
38
" Star Manual" ( 19 7 6) , McDonald's Corporation 
Archives, F-7. Other characters gradually added included 
the "French Fry Gobblins" (later the "French Fry Kids"), the 
"Chicken McNugget Girls," and "The Professor," whose failure 
as an inventor was mitigated by a visit to McDonald's. 
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and shakes "without any thought of repayment" were met with 
gentle admonitions from Ronald. While Hamburglar and 
Grimace euphemistically "borrowed" rather than "stole" 
McDonald's food, the reward for their eventual conversion to 
honesty was always the same: a hamburger, shake, and 
fries. 39 
Although McDonaldland itself was imaginary, each 
episodic commercial culminated in a visit to a real-world 
McDonald's. By creating a host of complementary characters, 
McDonaldland furthered the tenuous reality of Ronald 
himself. Importantly, Ronald frequently welcomed real 
children into McDonaldland and suggested at the end of each 
commercial adventure that the group adjourn to McDonald's 
for lunch. The inverse of what was happening to Ronald also 
happened to children. Fictional Ronald walked freely in the 
real world and, after the creation of McDonaldland, real 
children strolled the paths of the fantasy McDonaldland. 
What was real and what was fantasy was becoming 
indistinguishable to the preschooler watching at home. 
Second, McDonaldland reinforced the reality and 
personhood of Ronald by providing him with a family, of 
sorts. Ronald played the role of the big brother, who 
offered guidance and protection without the authoritative 
overtones of a parent. It was Ronald who reformed the 
3911 Managing a Funny Business: 
the Ronald McDonald Program" 
Corporation Archives. 
A Guide to Management of 
(June 1984), Mcbonald's 
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wayward Grimace, Ronald who aided the bumbling mayor and 
helped Big Mac police McDonaldland, and Ronald who escorted 
children deftly between two worlds. With Mayor McCheese, 
Big Mac, Hamburglar, and even real-life children as a 
surrogate family, Ronald's character took on more depth and 
seriousness. 40 
By the mid-1970s, the appeal of McDonaldland ebbed. 
McDonald's redirected Ronald's seriousness into clown antics 
and silliness, hearkening back to Ronald's persona in the 
1960s. But there was a distinct difference. Ronald in the 
late 1970s and 1980s was a self-aware and self-controlled 
clown. McDonald's did not revert to the bumbling antics of 
Scott or Coco; rather the corporation relied on Ronald's new 
gift of magic. 
Ronald's increasing reality, even in the fantasy world 
of McDonaldland, restrained what Ronald could and could not 
do. A real Ronald could not fly, but a magical one could. 
A magical Ronald could do the impossible, become a hero, and 
did. "He would never let kids down," Ronald's confidential 
biography read. "Ronald would always save his friends from 
disaster. He was magical and imaginative, yet he had 
very real emotions and concerns for his friends. Ronald had 
transcended his previous role as a star circus clown and 
became a paradox: he was everything that a fantasy 
4011 Brief History of Ronald McDonald," 29 June 1990, 2-
3. 
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character/world offered, yet he was very real." 41 
But Ronald was not quite fully planted in the real 
world. Although each commercial ended with a trip to 
McDonald's, Ronald never stood in line for his food or paid 
for it. Rarely, in fact, was he ever seen near the front 
counter, the cash register, or even McDonald's own 
crewpersons. By the mid-1980s, McDonald's had de-
commercialized both Ronald McDonald and the entire 
"McDonald's Experience" so thoroughly that young children 
did not need to understand their consumer role in order to 
fulfill it. 
Although radio advertisers had initiated the consumer 
socialization of young children in the period from 1910 to 
1950, it was still teenagers who attracted the bulk of 
marketers' attention even in the 1960s. Periodicals such 
as Time and BusinessWeek reported widely on the new "youth 
market," but invariably delineated the market as a teen one 
by emphasizing automobile purchases, the use of teen slang 
in advertising, and back-to-school purchases for high school 
and college students. 42 Only a handful of industries--
4111 Brief History of Ronald McDonald, " 2. Ronald's 
biography was written by the corporation's archivist for 
internal use by McDonald's licensees, managers, and 
marketing representatives. Its analytical tone reflected 
McDonald's awareness of how changes in Ronald's persona 
affected children. 
4211 Bring in the Kids; They Bring the Family," 
Businessweek, 5 September 1964, 32-34; "Appeal to _Youth," 
Time, 3 January 1964, 74-75; "For Those Who Sell Young," 
Time, 1 July 1966, 73A. 
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comic books, toys, and the cinema--produced goods easily 
marketed directly to younger children. And only Disney's 
characters proved consistently successful at nurturing a 
personal relationship with children. Even then, however, 
the limits of animation interfered in fully personalizing 
the consumer relationship with children. 
Ronald McDonald was unlimited in how he could interact 
with children. In restaurant appearances, hospital or 
school visits, circus stints, or in the fantasy world of 
McDonaldland, Ronald's primary objective was to have 
children love him and, subsequently, transfer that love to 
McDonald's. What made McDonald's marketing strategy unique 
in the 1960s was that children did not have to be 
acculturated consumers in order to fulfill a consumer role. 
They merely needed to love and follow Ronald. As studies by 
James McNeal and Scott Ward have shown, brand awareness is a 
vague concept to a three-year-old; not until age seven is 
the differentiation of brand-name products fully 
grasped. 43 Yet, McDonald's did not need to wait until age 
seven to begin its marketing barrage; with Ronald's help, 
children as young as two or three could unknowingly make 
brand choices. By the time children were seven or ten, 
43scott Ward, Daniel B. Wackman, and Ellen Wartella, 
How Children Learn to Buy: The Development of Consumer 
Information-Processing Skills (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage 
Publications, 1977), 23, 178; James Utah McNeal, "The 
Development of Consumer Behavior Patterns in Childhood" 
(Ph.D. diss., University of Texas-Austin, 1964), 8, 61, 86. 
then, recognition of the McDonald's brand and eating at 
McDonald's were routine. 
McDonald's frequently boasted that Ronald McDonald 
enjoyed a cultural popularity second only to Santa Claus. 
In 1967, Cooper and Golin's "Ronald McDonald Awareness 
Study" concluded that Ronald had a recognition factor of 
77%. In 1973, after Ronald and McDonaldland had worked 
their consumer magic, the percentage rose to 97%, second 
only to Santa Claus who presumably merited 100%. 44 These 
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surveys became somewhat legendary, even at McDonald's, with 
little other information to substantiate their claims. But 
McDonald's continued to cite them as proof that Ronald 
McDonald had transcended his original advertising function 
and had become a cultural icon. Unlike most cultural 
symbols, however, Ronald was a jealously guarded trademark, 
who could not help but be a walking advertisement for 
McDonald's. 
At times, the complexity of Ronald's persona has 
backfired on the corporation. In December, 1991, Ronald 
McDonald personally hosted a McDonald's-sponsored program, 
"The Wish That Changed Christmas." Immediately after the 
broadcast, parents and child advocacy groups demanded an 
investigation into McDonald's alleged violation of host 
4411McDonald's Marketing Manual, 1969-1973," McDonald's 
Corporation Archives, 1; "McDonald's Chronological History 
Report," 31. The latter listed the 1973 awareness 
percentage as 96%, rather than 97%; either way, it was 
impressive. 
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selling laws, contending that Ronald's mere presence 
constituted one long commercial for McDonald's. McDonald's 
countered with surprise, claiming that Ronald was acting in 
his role as friend to children, not as corporate spokesman. 
In reality, he is inextricably and simultaneously both. 
By 1985, it was Ronald, not McDonald's hamburgers and 
fries, that made a sad child happy or a bored one animated. 
Of course, Ronald's friendship originated in commercials, 
but it also found parallels in real life. It was Ronald 
after all, not Ray Kroc or Fred Turner, who appeared with 
stricken youngsters on the annual Muscular Dystrophy 
Telethons, visited children in hospitals, celebrated with 
them at parades and carnivals, and visited them at their 
schools. McDonald's has circuitously returned to its 
initial Ronald marketing strategy, that of nurturing 
personal loyalty first, and, with vastly more subtlety than 
in 1965, using Ronald to gently draw the children in. The 
forced attempts at parental coercion and the crass 
commercialism of product plugging of the late 1960s and 
early 1970s were so successful, that by 1985, the 
corporation no longer needed to "sell" either itself or 
Ronald. "If you believe in magic and I hope you do " 
sings Ronald in one of his more recent commercials, "you'll 
always have a friend wearing big red shoes ... 1145 
45As of January, 1994, this commercial is currently 
running daily on network television. 
CHAPTER 7 
PRESS ON: THE 1970s AND 1980s 
We know what we are going to say, what will 
be said to us, what we will eat, how it will 
taste, how much it will cost. Ronald, what 
have you done to us? 1 
Marshall Fishwick, Ronald Revisited 
What Ronald did, of course, was to turn a parochial 
Southern California drive-in restaurant into an 
internationally respected feeding machine that served 22 
million people daily in 51 countries. 2 McDonald's was a 
concept born and bred from the postwar's obsession with 
efficiency, convenience, and domesticity. It succeeded, in 
large part, because the Baby Boom had created both a 
demographic market and a cultural need for the assembly line 
food McDonald's offered. By the early 1970s, however, the 
birth rate had levelled off, the Boomers were maturing into 
adults, and a cultural "back to basics" thrust challenged 
McDonald's menu and its influence over children. Most 
1Marshall Fishwick, "Introduction," Ronald Revisited: 
The World of Ronald McDonald, ed. Marshall Fishwick, 2d ed., 
(Bowling Green, OH: Bowling Green University Popular Press, 
1983), 4. 
211McDonald's Chronological History Report," 12 December 
1990, 61. Figures are for 1989. 
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threatening to McDonald's, however, the 1970s repudiated the 
child-centered society of two decades earlier, leaving in 
its wake not only a diminished children's market, but a 
diminished children's culture as well. All these factors 
forced McDonald's, in the words of Ray Kroc, to "press on" 
in the 1970s and early 1980s. 3 
An anomaly in American cultural history, the idyllic 
homogeneity of the 1950s and early 1960s could not be 
sustained. Cracks in the consensus were already apparent in 
1955 when Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat on a 
Montgomery, Alabama, city bus. Or when John Kenneth 
Galbraith, David Riesman, and Vance Packard published their 
respective critiques of Americans' consumer obsessions. And 
in 1963, free-lance writer Betty Friedan gave name to the 
suffocating domestic ideal in The Feminine Mystigue. 4 If 
Americans in the 1950s could not maintain the cultural 
charade; by the 1970s, few even tried. The cultural 
3Kroc was referring to a favorite quote by Calvin 
Coolidge: 
Press On 
Nothing in the world can take the place of persistence. 
Talent will not; nothing is more common than unsuccessful 
men with talent. Genius will not; unrewarded genius is 
almost a proverb. Education will not; the world is full of 
educated derelicts. Persistence and determination alone are 
omnipotent. 
4Betty Friedan, The Feminine Mystique (New York: W.W. 
Norton, 1963; reprint, New York: Laurel/Dell, 1983). 
Although published first in 1963, Friedan's book 
historically dates to a 1957 census she undertook of her 
fellow graduates from Smith College, class of 1942. 
reorientation that defined the 1970s had obvious roots in 
the civil rights, feminist, and anti-war movements of a 
decade earlier, but the 1970s added another blow to the 
postwar consensus: detente. 
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Postwar America was invigorated by the Cold War. It 
provided not only jobs, but the overriding mentality that 
defined the age. It was the Cold War that redefined the 
home as the last bastion against communism, impelling 
parents to dote on their children, not only out of parental 
love, but also civic duty. If children were to be the 
democratic torchbearers of the future, it was a necessary 
and valued lesson in capitalism to spend their childhoods 
basking in the consumption of the consumer goods that 
defined "the American Dream." But the Vietnam War betrayed 
America's moral ambiguity against communism and President 
Nixon prided himself on "opening up" Communist China to the 
West in 1972 and in initiating Strategic Arms Limitation 
Talks (SALT) to reduce Soviet-American nuclear arsenals. 
While the U.S. reacted with fierce rhetorical blows 
following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December, 
1979 and covertly funneled funds to struggling anti-
communist "freedom fighters," the overt hostility between 
the United States and the Soviet Union gradually gave way to 
a tenuous alliance between superpowers. Without the Cold 
War rhetoric to bolster the domestic prerogative, children's 
role in the family changed. The first change was a 
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quantitative one. 
In 1972, the birth rate hit a century low of 15.6 
births per thousand. The rate continued to decline after 
the Supreme Court legalized abortion in Roe vs. Wade in 
1973, bottoming out at 14.6 in 1976. 5 In practical terms, 
the demographic fluctuations meant that youth, variously 
defined as up to ages twenty-five or thirty, took cultural 
precedence over young children. In contrast to the more 
than 60 million Americans in 1970 aged fifteen to thirty-
four, stood the not quite 17 million youngsters aged five or 
younger. 6 Their decreasing numerical significance heralded 
their decreasing cultural clout. 
While bureaucracies stereotypically react slowly to 
social change, the 1970 White House Conference on Children 
and Youth quickly sensed the increasing disinterest in 
children's issues and addressed it head on. The 
longstanding Conference, which had always addressed children 
and youth as a joint topic, convened a separate children's 
5u.s. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, 1992 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1992), table 80, p. 64. While Roe vs. Wade 
undoubtedly impacted birth rate figures, it is presumptuous 
to causally attribute the entire reduction in births to the 
availability of legal abortions. Other cultural trends, 
such as later marriages, extended educations, and an overall 
de-emphasis on child rearing contributed to the reduced 
rate. 
6u. s. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics of 
the United States, Colonial Times to 1970 (Washington, DC: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), Series A 29-42, p. 
10. 
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conference exclusively devoted to youngsters under fourteen 
years old. "We were determined," Conference Chairman 
Stephen Hess wrote President Nixon, "not to let this 
important children's world become secondary because of the 
greater attention currently being paid to youth. 117 
Children's culture, and the economic market it spawned, had 
shown much promise in the 1950s and 1960s; by 1970, they 
were both prematurely threatened by the maturation of the 
very children who had given them life. 
McDonald's was at the forefront in the 1950s in 
appealing to Baby Boom children. By the mid-1970s, the 
logical impetus was to follow the maturing Boomers into 
adulthood, targeting products to an adult, rather than 
juvenile, market. Although competitor Wendy's, for example, 
had an anachronistically pig-tailed, freckle-faced girl as 
its corporate logo, the new chain's appeal was nearly 
exclusively adult. Even McDonald's, while it premiered its 
McDonaldland commercials, was simultaneously upgrading the 
7Letter from Stephen Hess, National Chairman of White 
House Conference on Children, to President Richard Nixon, in 
Report to the President: White House Conference on Children 
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), 5. 
The White House Conferences date back to 1909 when President 
Theodore Roosevelt convened a symposium of educators, 
doctors, sociologists, and business leaders to provide the 
administration with information and recommendations on 
children's issues. The first Conference led to the creation 
of the Children's Bureau in 1912 and to the organizing of 
the Child Welfare League of America. Conference Proceedings: 
Golden Anniversary White House Conference on Children and 
Youth (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing· Office, 
1960), 2. 
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exterior architecture and interior decor of many of its 
units to de-emphasize juvenile themes. Threatened with 
saturation in the suburbs, McDonald's also aggressively 
targeted urban markets with units typically geared to adult 
or commuter, rather than family, traffic. 
Still, McDonald's remained committed to its children's 
market. It had no choice. As late as 1977, children still 
constituted more than a third of its market. 8 And by the 
late 1970s, despite pessimistic birth rate forecasts, 
McDonald's took a leap of faith, firmly and ineluctably re-
committing itself to the children's market. In the process, 
it endured the jeers of the competition much as it had in 
1948 when Mac and Dick McDonald first turned away their 
teenage patrons. But children's decreasing demographic size 
actually made them a more moldable and impressionable cohort 
and McDonald's realized that children held the key to 
achieving Ray Kroc's goal of making McDonald's a social 
institution. By appealing to the upcoming generation of 
children, rather than to the Baby Boom youngsters per se, 
McDonald's both distinguished itself from its competitors 
and tightened its hold on the children's consumer market. 
It also made McDonald's the obvious choice when Baby 
Boomers, now parents, took their own children out to eat. 
The McDonald's that the Boomers knew as children, 
8BusinessWeek, "The Fast-Food Stars: 
for Fast Growth," 11 July 1977, 60. 
Three Strategies 
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however, was changing. In January, 1967, McDonald's ended 
an era: it raised the prices on its hamburgers from fifteen 
to eighteen cents. Although in concrete terms the increase 
had only a temporary effect on sales, the symbolism of the 
move went much deeper. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, 
McDonald's was a constant in American society, a symbol of 
successful capitalist growth and consumer confidence. By 
the early 1970s, however, consumer confidence was plunging 
as Americans re-evaluated their equation of consumerism with 
the American Dream. 
In September, 1970, U.S. News & World Report ran an 
article entitled "Why People Aren't Spending." Although the 
article primarily addressed the practical reasons for the 
consumer slowdown--abnormally high savings deposits combined 
with inflationary prices and high installment interest 
rates--it questioned whether there were more serious reasons 
behind consumers' reluctance to purchase both big-ticket 
items and routine ones. 9 The worry was well-founded. From 
1971 to 1975, the major news magazines all ran a constant 
stream of articles wondering how to foster consumerism 
amidst a decidedly anti-consumerist backlash. 10 
9u. S. News & World Report, 
Spending," 28 September 1970, 38-40. 
"Why People Aren't 
10Time and U.S. News & World Report did the most 
thorough job of the general interest magazines in reporting 
the fluctuations in consumer attitudes. Although the 
business trade journals such as Fortune, Forbes, and 
Nation's Business reported the same trends, the more 
mainstream periodicals examined them within the broader 
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While inflation was an obvious culprit, higher prices 
alone did not deter purchasing. After all, hamburger sales 
rebounded at McDonald's within a fiscal quarter, after the 
initial shock of McDonald's price increase subsided. 11 
And although inflation negated part of the gains, retail 
sales did jump 12% from May 1972 to May 1973. 12 The 
answer lay in a new attitude toward consumerism, a "new 
breed of consumers.nl3 
Reflecting the lower birth rate, consumers in the 1970s 
concentrated on adult purchases. overall, they preferred 
more casual or simplistic designs and materials, and 
increasingly evaluated the environmental impact of their 
purchasing apart from the products' inherent uses. 
Conditioned by affluent childhoods, they tended to expect 
immediate gratification, were skeptical about commercial 
advertisers' product claims, and preferred individually 
oriented do-it-yourself projects to commercially 
standardized products and services. 14 
parameters of American society and culture. 
11Ray Kroc with Robert Anderson, Grinding It Out: The 
Making of McDonald's (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1977; 
reprint, Chicago: St. Martin's Paperbacks, 1987), 158-59. 
Page references are to the reprint edition. 
12u. S. News & World Report, "Buying Spree By Shoppers 
is Slowing Down," 25 June 1973, 60. 
13u. S. News & World Report, "A New Breed of Consumers 
Will Be Calling the Turn," 14 July 1975, 19-20. 
14 rbid. 
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Increasingly freed from the Cold War imperatives of 
consumerism, Americans in the 1970s groped toward a "new 
functionalism" in their purchasing. The stalwart 
advertising themes of the 1950s, characterized by words like 
"new, improved, modern, young, fresh, bold, and pace-setter" 
were hackneyed and suspect by the 1970s. 15 Americans no 
longer equated their personal consumption with the modernity 
of their nation. The sleek designs of the pre- and postwar 
industrial designers seemed unnatural and ostentatious three 
decades later. Although the products of the 1950s were 
heralded as the peak of efficiency in their own heyday, 
efficiency in the 1970s was redefined along simplistic and 
casual, rather than formal, lines of design and use. 16 
McDonald's fared surprisingly well under the new 
constraints of 1970s consumerism. The negative connotations 
of standardization were offset by several positive values 
that McDonald's offered. Its limited menu promised 
simplicity; its new interior seating provided casual dining; 
its longstanding emphasis on cleanliness and service was 
still equated with efficiency; and its gradual reorientation 
away from suburbs to urban areas produced more adult-
oriented decor and demeanor. But McDonald's also needed to 
change to keep pace with the expectations of its 
increasingly sophisticated adult customer base. The garish 
15Ibid., 19. 
16 Ibid. 
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red and white tiled buildings gave way to wooden shingled 
roofs and the menu, while still limited, increasingly 
offered adult sandwiches such as the Big Mac, Filet o' Fish, 
and McChicken entrees. Noticeably absent from the new 
definitions of consumerism, however, were children. 
Children had provided the practical thrust for the 
massive consumer spending in the two decades following World 
War II. Children's needs and desires created or 
reinvigorated scores of products and industries, from 
diapers to toys, housing to automobiles. Purchases made by 
the children themselves enriched motion picture studios and 
pioneer radio and television sponsors, and were widely 
analyzed and predicted by a dozen different child marketing 
firms. But the consumer market changes between 1950 and 
1970 were so pronounced that the wealth of articles on child 
and youth consumerism that flooded periodicals in the 1950s 
and 1960s became a trickle of essays by the mid-1970s. 17 
Children as a dynamic force in the economy were rediscovered 
only after the baby boomlet in the mid-to-late 1980s, when 
the young children's market was myopically hailed as a new 
17A look at the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature 
confirms this. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, periodicals 
from mainstream general interest ones to business trade 
publications examined the burgeoning children's market and 
how meeting the needs of children had redefined American 
consumerism. As early as 1970, however, and throughout the 
1970s, few articles appeared on child consumerism, per se. 
The bulk of the new child articles revolved around 
television viewing habits and cereal consumption's 
relationship to poor nutrition. 
and previously untapped market. In reality, it was the 
resurgence and expansion of the earlier market that had 
flourished after World War II. 
197 
While children's demographic strength directly affected 
their economic clout (and level of interest by magazine 
editors), children were not wholly disenfranchised from the 
economy. While the culture no longer revolved around their 
consumer whims, marketers were anxious to secure whatever 
remained of the children's market. McDonald's was in an 
especially good position to do this. It already had a 
marketing advocate in Ronald McDonald, who enjoyed a 97% 
recognition factor among American youngsters. And the 
steady diet of McDonald's commercials combined with the 1970 
introduction of the McDonaldland storyline and setting gave 
McDonald's an enviable lead in the children's market. 
Competitor Wendy's only nominally tried to reach 
children. Named after founder Dave Thomas' daughter, 
Wendy's never anthropomorphized its little girl logo, and 
did not offer a "fun experience" to young patrons. While 
the standardization of McDonald's made ordering easy for 
young children--all hamburgers came with pickles, onions, 
ketchup, and mustard--the element of choice at Wendy's made 
it difficult for youngsters to place their own food orders. 
Burger King, who had always competed with McDonald's for the 
family market but had fallen short in the efficiency, 
consistency, and quality it offered, belatedly followed 
Ronald McDonald into the children's market with "Burger 
King." But Burger King was beset by a host of internal 
problems in the 1970s caused by a decentralized structure 
that allowed franchisees unchecked and nearly unlimited 
power over the corporation. 18 Concentration on internal 
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restructuring while simultaneously protecting its number two 
spot from the aggressive onslaughts of Wendy's, prevented 
Burger King the mascot f rorn being a serious challenger to 
Ronald McDonald. The ongoing efforts of Burger King and 
Wendy's to unseat McDonald's, however, coalesced into a 
series of "Burger Wars" in the early 1970s that reshaped the 
entire fast-food industry. 
By 1969, the hundreds of independent drive-in and dine-
in restaurants serving fast-food in America had coalesced 
into conglomerates of primarily local and regional chains. 
While true "Morn and Pop" drive-in restaurants still dotted 
the highways, especially in smaller towns or older 
neighborhoods, even their combined economic impact had 
become negligible when compared to the franchised chains. 
Further, the Darwinian nature of America's market economy 
made it inevitable that the national companies strongest in 
exposure, sales, and access to expansion capital would 
overtake the lesser-known or thinly capitalized local and 
regional chains. It was not a good time to be an small-
1811 Burger King Corporation," International Directory of 
Company Histories: Food Services and Retailers, ed. Lisa 
Mirabile (Chicago: St. James Press, 1990), 613-15. 
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scale, independent player in the fast-food business. 
Combined with ongoing fears of market saturation and 
recession, "the fast-food market [by 1970] collapsed like a 
soggy, overloaded paper cup. 1119 Chain expansion and stock 
offerings "came to a near-total halt during the 1969-1970 
bear market," with the first hints of recovery in the summer 
of 1972. 20 
Problems endemic to the fast-food industry did not 
totally account for the slowdown. Franchising, which for 
two decades had provided the panacea both for expansion-
seeking companies and opportunistic entrepreneurs, had 
fallen flat by 1970. A March, 1970 Fortune article reported 
on the growing disillusionment of licensees, attracted by 
the franchisors' promises of instant wealth and the carnival 
hoopla of the franchise shows, who "sign up often without 
knowing quite what they've gotten into.112 1 Lack of full 
disclosure laws and the power of franchisors to cut off 
licensees indiscriminately left franchisees vulnerable, 
d . . . d l t. 22 isappointed, and clamoring for in ustry regu a ion. 
McDonald's fared much better than its competitors in 
19J. Anthony Lukas, "As American as a McDonald's 
Hamburger on the Fourth of July," New York Times Magazine, 4 
July 1971, sec. 6, pp. 4-5. 
2011 Fast-Food Companies are Hot Again," BusinessWeek, 30 
September 1972, 54-55. 
21Charles G. Burck, "Franchising' s Troubled Dream 
World," Fortune (March 1970): 117-18. 
22 rbid. I 148 f 150 • 
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the burger shakeout. It had a solid and respected 
reputation for its dealings with licensees and, unlike many 
other franchisors, could honestly point to dozens of 
owner/operators who had become millionaires working their 
franchises. Ray Kroc's well-publicized fanaticism for 
quality and consistency, as well as ongoing training through 
the 1961 creation of Hamburger University, also reassured 
prospective licensees. Finally, McDonald's real estate 
ownership of franchised units combined with its increasing 
number of corporate-owned stores provided it with tangible 
assets to access capital markets, a financing route often 
denied its competitors. Bolstered by tables of impressive 
sales growth and anecdotes of millionaire franchisees, 
Kroc's publicity campaign in the 1960s continued to bear 
fruit a decade later. 23 
A second round of intense national exposure in the 
early 1970s solidified McDonald's leadership role in the 
fast-food market. In addition to occasional articles in 
Fortune, Newsweek, and BusinessWeek, McDonald's benefitted 
from major stories in Forbes, Time, and the New York Times 
Magazine. The earliest of these, "As American as a 
McDonald's Hamburger on the Fourth of July," ran as the 
cover story in the July 4, 1971 issue of the New York Times 
Magazine. The article, not inconsequentially run on 
2311McDonald's Makes Franchising Sizzle," BusinessWeek, 
15 June 1968, 102. 
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Independence Day, lauded Kroc as a "superpatriot" and 
canonized McDonald's as the "updated version of the American 
dream. 1124 The magazine reiterated and legitimized the 
cultural myth of McDonald's as a wholesome, family-centered 
American restaurant. It contributed to McDonald's social 
legitimacy by reprinting a letter from an infantry soldier 
in Vietnam who claimed that "when we get back to the world, 
that will be our first act--going to McDonald's for a burger 
and a shake. 1125 The tenor of the article equated 
McDonald's with Americanism and the symbolism of McDonald's 
as "home" was strong. While competitors' chains were 
failing under the weight of franchising disillusionment, 
inadequate financing, and uneven quality, Kroc was hailed as 
America's "Burger Mogul" by one of the most prestigious and 
influential newspapers in the country. 26 
In January, 1973, Forbes contributed to the publicity 
blitz with a cover story on Ray Kroc. In "For Ray Kroc, 
Life Began at 50, Or was it 60?" Forbes squarely placed 
McDonald's success on Kroc's personal perseverance and 
"fanatical attention to detail. 1127 And, in September, 
1973, Time ran its own testimonial to McDonald's in "The 
24Lukas, "American as a McDonald's Hamburger," 4-5. 
25 Ibid. 
26Ibid. 
27Forbes, "For Ray Kroc, Life Began at 50, or· was it 
60?" 15 January 1973, 30. 
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blanket the state of Illinois, or form thirteen rings around 
the earth. The ketchup and mustard together metaphorically 
filled the Mississippi River as McDonald's became a national 
food purveyor in the league of the U.S. Army and Navy. 31 
The strategic sleight of hand worked. While dozens of 
competitors were failing and McDonald's itself raised prices 
several times, American children (and adults as well) were 
loyally humming the infamous "Twoallbeefpatties • • • I II Big 
Mac tongue-twister of 1975. 
McDonald's strategy also impressed Wall Street. A 1975 
Smith, Barney analysis cited McDonald's sales performance 
since 1969 as "extraordinary" and "dynamic." "In a real 
sense," Smith, Barney analyst Joseph Doyle asserted, "there 
is only one company that scores the highest in each of [the] 
characteristics for success--McDonald's. 1132 McDonald's, 
Doyle continued, was unique in that, overall, it was 
unaffected by much of the economic troubles of the early 
1970s. Although wholesale beef prices nearly doubled from 
1972 to 1973--from $.65 per pound in 1972 to $1.15 in 
August, 1973--hamburger sales had increased, even in the 
wake of successive price hikes. 33 Gasoline shortages and 
rationing, which plagued highway-based hotel and hamburger 
31 Ibid. 
32 Joseph J. Doyle, 
Report #32-75 (New York: 
33Ibid., 37. 
McDonald's Corporation, 
Smith, Barney, 1975), 6. 
Company 
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chains such as Howard Johnson's and Hardee's, barely touched 
McDonald's, whose stronghold in the early 1970s was still 
suburban residential neighborhoods. 34 New minimum wage 
increases to $2.00 in 1975 also did not affect McDonald's 
which, a year earlier, was already paying its crew $2.05 
hourly. 35 
Doyle did caution, however, against expecting 
McDonald's to continue its double-digit annual growth trend. 
The 1950s and 1960s smiled upon upstart entrepreneurs, but 
the consumer restraint of the 1970s, fueled by inflationary 
prices and fears of recession and job loss, required 
companies and investors to lower their growth expectations. 
Still, McDonald's ten-year growth curve topped that of Coca-
Cola, IBM, Sears, Roebuck, or Walt Disney Productions. 36 
Although Smith, Barney rated McDonald's favorably, other 
analysts warily predicted the saturation of the fast-food 
34rbid., 17. 
35 Ibid. 37. 
36rbid., 1, 25, table XVII, p. 54. The growth analysis 
was based on annual earnings per share from 1964 through 
1974 for the twenty-five largest "growth companies" in the 
U.S. One reason for McDonald's dominance, of course, was 
that McDonald's in the 1960s was intently focused on 
expanding its operations, as are all younger companies. As 
more mature companies, Sears, IBM, et al. underwent their 
initial bursts of expansion earlier in the century. An even 
younger company than McDonald's, Wendy's expanded from its 
first outlet in 1969 to 100 in 1975, to 2000 by 1980, an 
expansion rate that paralleled, if not exceeded, McDonald's. 
Stan Luxenberg, Roadside Empires: How the Chains Franchised 
America (New York: Viking/Penguin, 1985), 4; BusinessWeek, 
"The Fast-Food Stars," 60. 
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market. Even Doyle was somewhat concerned that McDonald's 
would have to substantially diversify its product line or 
spawn off subsidiary industries to combat what was seen as 
an inevitable oversupply of fast-food outlets. 37 
The twin concerns of inflation and recession, combined 
with saturation uncertainty, forced McDonald's to "press on" 
in the 1970s. But the 1970s also presented a more 
fundamental threat to McDonald's. McDonald's built its 
success upon catering to the needs of the postwar nuclear 
family. By the 1970s, however, McDonald's was faced with a 
dwindling number of families to which to market its 
products. Demographic shifts affected not only the number 
of children comprising the children's and family markets, 
but fundamental changes in the structure of family life 
struck at the core of McDonald's two parent, suburban, 
white, middle-class, child-centered market. 
As late as 1971, America's mainstream magazines 
predicted a continuation, even expansion of the Baby Boom. 
Although the birth rate had steadily decreased throughout 
the late 1960s--the 1969 birth rate of 17.8 contrasted with 
the 19.4 figure for 1965--analysts were buoyed by the rate's 
1970 rise to 18.4, matching the figure for 1966. 38 The 
rate seemed to be on the rise as Boomers reached adulthood. 
37Doyle, "McDonald's Corporation," 19. 
38u.s. Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics, 
vol. 1, Series B 5-10, p. 49; U.S. Bureau of the ·Census, 
Statistical Abstract, 1992, table 80, p. 64. 
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Raised in larger families, the Boomers, it was assumed, 
would begin to raise families of their own. While "zero 
population growth" was cited as a theoretical goal, a 
healthy, or at least stable, population growth was important 
economically to sustain the market expansion of the previous 
decades. 39 But the new families that the Boomers created 
in the 1970s and early 1980s were both qualitatively and 
quantitatively different than their own families had been in 
the 1950s and 1960s. 
In 1970, journalist and free-lance social critic Alvin 
Toffler published his paean to the twentieth century, Future 
Shock. Toffler had defined "future shock" in 1965 "to 
describe the shattering stress and disorientation that we 
[as a society] induce in individuals by subjecting them to 
too much change in too short a time .... It is the disease 
of change. 114° Families, in their role as social buffers, 
were inordinately vulnerable to the rapidity of change. Not 
only did the family absorb the impact of social change, a 
function it had long before the 1970s, but it was expected 
to do so as it, itself, underwent rapid and unprecedented 
change. 41 
Toffler was not alone in his concern. Although his 
39u.s. News & World Report, "Ahead for America--Biggest 
'Baby Boom,'" 14 June 1971, 37. 
40Alvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Random House, 
1970), 4. 
41 Ibid., 211-12. 
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predictions that children would be reared by "professional," 
rather than biological, parents or that sanctioned, short-
term, "serial" marriages would replace the idealized life-
long union, never materialized, Toffler's critique was among 
the first to declare the ideal family of the 1950s to be 
dead. 42 While most generations lament changes in family 
structure--James Gilbert has shown that juvenile delinquency 
has been continually "rediscovered" by successive 
generations of parents--the family in the 1970s was 
popularly perceived to be on the verge of "a turbulent era 
of experimentation and change.n 43 
Gloria Steinem preached female independence and 
initiative in Ms. magazine, Paul and Anne Ehrlich in The End 
of Affluence encouraged families to limit childbearing to 
preserve scarce environmental resources, and even renowned 
anthropologist Margaret Mead lamented that Baby Boomers were 
a culturally isolated generation, disinherited from the 
value structure of their parents by rapidly changing 
technology. 44 Lower marriage and birth rates, and 
42 rbid., 215-17, 222-24. 
43James Gilbert, A Cycle of Outrage: America's 
Reaction to the Juvenile Delinquent in the 1950s (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1986), 3-4; U.S. News & World 
Report, "The American Family: Can It Survive Today's 
Shocks," 27 October 1975, 30-43. 
44 rn addition to founding and editing Ms. , Steinem's 
feminist writings included numerous essays from the late 
1960s to early 1970s in New York magazine, and a compilation 
of essays in Outrageous Acts and Everyday Rebellions (New 
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1983); Paul R. and Anne 
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escalating divorce rates were symptomatic of broader 
cultural trends, the critics maintained. And the changes 
were as much attitudinal as numerical. 
The popular image of the 1970s and 1980s was of an 
America in which many refused to grow up, defined--following 
a 1950s template--as marrying, starting a family, holding a 
steady job, and taking an interest in the community. The 
permissive child-rearing practices, born of the middle-class 
affluence of the 1950s and 1960s, came back to haunt 
Americans as even Dr. Benjamin Spock was criticized for 
helping to create a generation of youth accustomed to 
immediate gratification devoid of individual initiative and 
responsibility. 
No doubt the critics glamorized and romanticized the 
1950s family, holding American families in the 1970s and 
early 1980s to a cultural standard that was more myth than 
reality. In The Way We Never Were: American Families and 
the Nostalgia Trap, Stephanie Coontz shattered the rosy 
picture of family life in the 1950s, and dethroned its use 
as a normative reference point. Coontz wrote, 
Beneath the polished facades of many "ideal" families, 
suburban as well as urban, was violence, terror, or 
simply grinding misery that only occasionally came to 
H. Ehrlich, The End of Affluence (New York: Ballantine 
Books, 19 7 4) ; Margaret Mead, Culture and Commitment: A 
Studv of the Generation Gap (Garden City, NY: ·Natural 
History Press/Doubleday & Company, 1970), 78-85. 
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light. 45 
Child abuse, chronic alcoholism, denial of ethnic and racial 
diversity, and subjugation of women's rights to a masculine-
defined cultural imperative betray the romanticized "Ozzie 
and Harriet" image of the 1950s family. Although Coontz 
conceded that many Americans had happy memories of their 
1950s families, the cultural contradictions of the era 
nonetheless rendered the myth inadequate for gauging more 
recent patterns of family life. 46 "Contrary to popular 
opinion," Coontz concluded, "'Leave It to Beaver' was not a 
documentary. 1147 
Even without the rose-colored blinders, it was obvious 
to McDonald's that their traditional family market had 
shifted out of cultural focus. The suburban sprawl that had 
spawned McDonald's growth throughout the 1950s and 1960s was 
not only economically, but culturally challenged in the 
1970s. Environmental and zoning restrictions on large tract 
developments, shortages of natural gas and petroleum for 
home heating and car fuels, and local ordinances that 
required developers to provide community infrastructure in 
the vein of William Levitt's earlier successes, all combined 
45stephanie Coontz, The Way We Never Were: American 
Families and the Nostalgia Trap (New York: Basic Books, 
1992), 35. 
46Ibid., 29-38. 
47 Ibid. I 29. 
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to impede new subdivision development. 48 
More troublesome to McDonald's, which had relied upon 
skyrocketing suburban growth for its own double-digit annual 
growth rate, was a cultural disenchantment, even 
disillusionment, with suburbia. Parochial anti-growth 
sentiment lobbied for suburban containment at the same time 
as more Americans began to question the core value of living 
in culturally isolated communities that failed to represent 
the diversity of the real world. 49 In A Sort of Utopia: 
Scarsdale, 1891-1981, Carol A. O'Connor showed how the 
idealized and envied middle-class suburb of Scarsdale, New 
York, became perceived by the 1970s as a haven for the 
economically intolerant and culturally impotent. Herself a 
product of a Scarsdale upbringing, O'Connor claimed that, by 
the 1970s, "instead of a symbol of American achievement, 
Scarsdale had become a symbol of America's faults. 1150 
48u. s. News & World Report, "Home-Building Boom Hits 
Snags in Suburbs," 16 October 1972, 39-41. 
49Historian Bennett Berger pointed out that American 
suburbanization was never as homogeneous as critics 
maintained. Working class suburbs, often supported by a 
large hometown manufacturing plant, as well as once 
independent towns that were eventually co-opted by aspiring 
suburbanites also played a substantial role in American 
suburbanization. Bennett Berger, Working Class Suburb: A 
Study of Auto Workers in Suburbia (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1960), 4-11. Urban renewal 
in the 1970s, however, challenged more the homogeneity of 
the post-World War II, WASP, middle-class suburb than it did 
these earlier and inherently more diverse suburban forms. 
50carol A. o 'Connor, A Sort of Utopia: Scarsdale, 
1891-1981 (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 
1983), 213. 
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Correlative to suburban redefinition in the 1970s was a new 
attitude toward America's cities. 
Urban renewal was belatedly rediscovered in the late 
1960s and 1970s, empowered by an organizational ethos that 
sought to localize urban political power in individual 
neighborhoods, rather than in state or federal 
legislatures. 51 Not a novel idea--organized community 
development dated to the late nineteenth century--
neighborhood activism in the 1970s and 1980s became 
mainstreamed and provided urbanites with an alternative to 
suburban flight. Zoning, block grants, and gentrification 
had refurbished the tarnished image of the city, making it a 
viable alternative to suburbia. With an escalating emphasis 
on adult living patterns, large backyards, four-bedroom 
homes, and garage space for two or three cars were not only 
unnecessary, but squandered valuable time, money, and 
energy. In a decade of environmental sensitivity and gas 
rationing, living closer, rather than farther, from work was 
preferred. And the social diversity of the city became, in 
itself, a draw, much as the homogeneous isolation of the 
51A good analysis of the neighborhood movement is 
Robert Fisher, Let the People Decide: Neighborhood 
Organizing in America (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1984). 
Although Fisher questionably included the Vietnam era 
groups, Students for a Democratic Society ( SDS) and the 
Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee ( SNCC), as 
neighborhood organizations, his insight that neighborhood 
activism was shaped by the socio-economic needs of its 
residents, and thus can be either conservative or-radical 
depending on time and place, is noteworthy. 
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suburbs were two decades earlier. 
As children and suburbia fell out of focus, McDonald's 
broadened its target audience to include not only families, 
but commuters, older adults, and, reaching farther back into 
its history, teenagers. Kroc had counted church steeples, 
schools, and station wagons in the 1950s for his upcoming 
units, but the importance of those institutional markers 
waned as the myth of the 1950s was increasingly scrutinized 
and found lacking. Integrally tied to the culture of the 
1950s, McDonald's and its own myths became similarly 
vulnerable. 
Although McDonald's benefitted from The New York Times 
Magazine and Time articles, as well as popular sentiment 
surrounding its sponsorship of the Ronald McDonald Houses 
and corporate philanthropy programs, the very core of the 
"McDonald's Experience" became suspect by the early 1980s. 
As McDonald's units saturated the American landscape, the 
cultural legitimacy of McDonald's was questioned, a novel 
problem for the corporation, but foreseeable given Kroc's 
expectations of McDonald's institutional role in American 
society. The sheer existence of the issue attested to 
McDonald's success, much as it had for Sears, Roebuck and 
Howard Johnson's. As McDonald's became a recognizable 
cultural landmark, it endured a social and cultural scrutiny 
spared Burger King, Wendy's, or Kentucky Fried Chicken. 
McDonald's became the archetype for a host of cultural 
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issues: standardization, domestic consumerism, convenience, 
and efficiency among them. Indeed, while hypothetically 
dissecting the cultural impact of a Wendy's seemed trivial, 
a similar assessment of a McDonald's yields unexpected 
understanding of how children and families organized their 
daily lives. McDonald's was that distinct among its 
competition. 
Theodore Levitt's well-known study of McDonald's as an 
example of the brilliant integration of automation and human 
technologies defined the original parameters for analyzing 
McDonald's role in American life. The parameters, however, 
were quickly breached as McDonald's influence became as 
obviously cultural as technical. While the broader 
implications of the "McDonaldization" of American life were 
still more than a decade distant, concrete contradictions in 
McDonald's marketing message were already evident by the 
1970s and early 1980s. 52 
In its transformation from a regional California chain 
to national dominance, McDonald's inevitably made 
concessions of individuality, nutrition, cultural 
heterogeneity, and consumer innocence. That realization is 
neither surprising nor necessarily pernicious for a 
corporation obsessed with rapid expansion. But McDonald's 
52George Ritzer, The McDonaldization of Society 
(Newbury Park, CA: Pine Forge Press/Sage, 1993). Ritzer's 
comprehensive study of the United States as a "McDonaldized" 
society, expanded from an article written in 1983; gets a 
full hearing in the last chapter. 
214 
case was different. McDonald's consciously, even self-
consciously--the refinement reflects McDonald's acute 
awareness of its actions--created an image of itself as 
wholesome, echoing the idealized image of the 1950s. And, 
overall, McDonald's has fared quite well at sustaining the 
myth, provided it was not scrutinized too closely. 
On the inside, McDonald's frequently lamented the 
"reality gap," that is, the difference between the public 
perception of McDonald's and the reality of actually eating 
a meal there. This perceptual distortion was especially 
egregious for children, who were told that McDonald's was 
Ronald's "house," with all the attendant connotations, yet 
arrived to find only a harried teenager impatient to take 
their money, end the shift, and go home. The "McDonald's 
Experience," widely touted in both its juvenile and adult 
advertising, was miniaturized into a hectic scramble to find 
seating, feed the children, and rush out. Whatever 
"Experience" remained had to be compressed into the average 
twenty-minute stay, barely long enough for children to 
finish fidgeting with their food and eat. McDonald's 
inability to deliver what it really peddled--social 
stroking--pointed to a fundamental flaw in its myth and 
created the reality gap so distressful to McDonald's 
insiders. 
In the 1970s, the gap was merely a crack, uncovered 
only after the cultural debris of the 1950s had been 
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stripped away and analyzed. Its existence, however, only 
made McDonald's more adamant in perpetuating the myth, using 
the cultural arsenal of saturation advertising and image 
enhancement. At stake was a vibrant, though numerically 
weakened, children's market that had ignited McDonald's 
growth and without which McDonald's risked becoming just 
another fast-food restaurant, void of wider loyalties or 
significance. Despite demographic and social fluctuations, 
children and families formed the core principle of 
McDonald's existence, a passionate belief 
uncharacteristically shared by both Ray Kroc and the 
McDonald brothers. To recapture the myth, McDonald's called 
upon one of the most popular child institutions of the 
1950s: the Boy Scouts. 
CHAPTER 8 
ADVERTISING BLITZ 
Each McDonald's TV commercial should strive 
to capture the "magic moment" ... that 
little moment that tugs at your emotions, and 
makes you laugh, or feel a warm empathy 
towards the commercial. It's the moment that 
separates McDonald's advertising from all the 
others. 1 
Ray Bergold, McDonald's Corporation 
McDonald's profitability, success, and long term 
cultural significance rested upon the continued 
reinforcement of its wholesome family image. In 1967, 
McDonald's sponsored the World Boy Scout Jamboree telecast, 
hosted by cinema icon Jimmy Stewart. Stewart's own boyish 
image combined with the obvious value overtones of the Boy 
Scouts made sponsorship a "natural . . . [which] created 
unique local public relations opportunities. 112 While 
McDonald's no doubt benefitted directly from the commercial 
spots aired during the Jamboree, it more importantly 
1Ray Bergold, McDonald's Assistant Vice President for 
Advertising and Promotion, to Advertising Managers, 
Owner /Operators, and Operators' National Advertising Fund 
(OPNAD) members, 1978, in "Golden Arches Code," McDonald's 
Corporation Archives, 7. 
2McDonald's Corporation Annual Report, 1967, McDonald's 
Corporation Archives, 5. 
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parlayed the sheer fact of sponsorship into public relations 
currency among hundreds of local troops across America. 3 
It was McDonald's marketing at its best: a generous, but 
efficient use of advertising dollars that paid double, even 
triple, dividends. And, in 1967, it merely foreshadowed 
what was to come. 
In 1967, McDonald's spent $3.5 million on network 
television advertising; five years later, the amount 
skyrocketed to $40 million; and by 1985, it reached an 
ethereal $1.1 billion, reflecting a full 6.3% of systemwide 
sales. 4 Ironically, the rate of increases were not 
uncharacteristically impressive, since throughout the 1980s 
McDonald's had historically spent over 6% of sales annually 
on advertising. What the advertising figures really 
testified to was the phenomenal financial and physical 
growth of McDonald's during the 1980s, a growth directly 
attributable to television advertising. 5 
Television matured McDonald's. It gave it a national 
presence and reinforced the crucial importance of menu and 
image standardization. Through the 1967 creation of the 
Operators' National Advertising Fund (OPNAD), McDonald's 
3
"McDonald's Newsletter" 
Corporation Archives. 
(May 1967), McDonald's 
4=M=c=D~o:..:n=a=l=d=-'=s'------=C~o=r~p~o=r=a==t=i-=o~n.__ __ A=n=n=u=a=l~-R~e-p~o~r~t~,~~1=9~6~7, 5; 
=M=c=D:..::o=n=a=l=d'"""'-=s'---C=o=r..i;;:p=o=r=a=t=1=· o=n=---=A=n:.:.:n:.:.u=a=l---=R=e=p .... o=r-=t'-',-=l=-9-=-7-=2 , np; McDonald ' s 
Corporation Annual Report, 1989, 30. 
5McDonald' s Corporation Annual Report, 1984, 29; 
McDonald's Corporation Annual Report, 1989, 30. 
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operators cooperatively pooled advertising dollars within a 
formalized structure unmatched by the competition. The 
result was a unilateral victory for McDonald's in the 
recurring wave of "burger wars" throughout the 1970s and 
1980s and a growing realization that McDonald's was 
culturally something more than a fast-food restaurant. 
McDonald's commitment to television had other 
ramifications. It cemented Ronald McDonald's relationship 
with his young audience, though at a cost. In its focused 
targeting of children, McDonald's was swept into the barrage 
of rhetoric between commercial sponsors and anti-television 
lobbyists best exemplified by Peggy Charren's Action for 
Children's Television (ACT). With young children watching 
over three hours per day, the distinction between reality 
and fantasy could easily become challenged or compromised. 6 
And the fantasy world of McDonaldland included not only real 
children, but a continually expanding ensemble of menu-
identifiable characters such as the "Fry Kids," the "Happy 
Meal Guys," and the "McNugget Buddies. 117 
Distressing to McDonald's, the combined expansion and 
intensity of its child marketing triggered a national outcry 
against the nutritional deficiencies of McDonald's menu. 
6Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report on Television 
Advertising to Children (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1978), 27-29. 
7McDonald's Customer Relations Packet (Oak Brook, IL: 
McDonald's Corporation, 1990), 9. 
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While the "All-American Meal" was unquestionably convenient 
and debatably tasty, it threatened to produce a generation 
of obese and nutritionally compromised children. And 
environmentalists' discomfort over McDonald's profligate use 
of paper and polystyrene packaging--exacerbated by the 
superfluous outer packaging of the children's "Happy Meal"--
put McDonald's further on the offensive to maintain its 
wholesome image. It was McDonald's intensified exposure on 
television that made it a target for nutritionists, 
environmentalists, and anti-television lobbyists, yet it was 
ironically through television advertising that McDonald's 
daily recreated its images of wholesomeness and quality to 
combat the critics. That it could do the latter in the face 
of such determined opposition spoke both of the power of the 
medium and the savvy of McDonald's marketing message. 
Beyond McDonald's, television advertising overall in 
the 1970s and 1980s heralded the magnification and 
sophistication of the children's consumer market. In 1955, 
direct purchases by children under 13 years old added a 
negligible blip to the American economy. In 1990, the 
children's consumer market approached $75 billion, nearly 2% 
of the entire U.S. economy. 8 Obviously, much of this newer 
"kiddie market" was fueled by zealous parents eager to 
purchase the latest toy or videogame for their children, as 
8Peter Newcomb, "Hey, Dude, Let's Consume," Forbes, 11 
June 1990, 126. 
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were earlier children's markets from the 1940s through the 
1960s. But unlike those former incarnations, a healthy and 
respectable percentage reflected children's own independent 
purchases and increased direct economic influence over their 
families' discretionary incomes. 9 Television in the 1970s 
and 1980s opened up consumer options for children, expanded 
their range of economic choices and outlets, and helped to 
routinize both direct child purchasing and children's 
purchasing influence. Combined with a baby boomlet in the 
late 1980s, the proliferation of dual career households and 
the commensurate rise of increased childhood independence, 
the advertising saturation on children's television 
programming thrust the children's consumer market from its 
1970s malaise into full throttle during the later 1980s. 
For McDonald's, which had firmly recommitted itself to the 
children's market despite its demographic downturn of the 
1970s, the decided uptick in 1980s child consumerism both 
validated its corporate strategy and ensured its unqualified 
lead in capturing a new generation of American consumers. 
The beginnings of McDonald's intensified exposure to 
children coincided, and directly benefitted from, the 1967 
creation of OPNAD. Through membership in OPNAD, individual 
licensees could collectively pool advertising dollars--
initially set at 1% of gross sales--and purchase television 
9 Ibid., 126-28. 
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air time independent of the parent corporation. 10 While 
McDonald's continued to orchestrate the actual production of 
its commercials, OPNAD dollars were spent on local, 
regional, and national buys to increase overall exposure of 
the McDonald's name. It was a cooperative rather than 
competitive effort, made possible first by the lucrative 
revenues that individual units were producing by the late 
1960s and then by the corporation's standardization ethos, 
which allowed for undifferentiated advertising. Burger 
King, which as late as 1972, still only produced two-thirds 
the "sales-per-store" figures as McDonald's, was plagued by 
maverick operators, inconsistent quality, and internal chaos 
in the late 1960s and was thus unable to match OPNAD's 
advertising clout. 11 
The roster of OPNAD members swelled to over 90% of all 
McDonald's owner/operators by May, 1967. 12 The focus 
quickly centered on network advertising, with OPNAD 
regularly purchasing time for nationally run or syndicated 
10
"McDonald's Newsletter" (February 1967), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. While financially independent of the 
corporation, OPNAD still operated within guidelines 
established in Oak Brook. 
11Daryl D. Wyckoff and w. Earl Sasser, The Chain-
Restaurant Industry (Lexington, MA: D. C. Heath, 19 7 8) , 
table I-21, p. 52. A typical barometer of overall chain 
profitability is "sales per store" for units opened at least 
one year. McDonald's has historically led its fast-food 
competitors under this standard, primarily because 
McDonald's initial training programs jumpstart new units. 
12
"McDonald's Newsletter" 
Corporation Archives. 
(May 1967), McDonald's 
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shows that appealed to McDonald's targeted family audience. 
Examples of these shows throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
included "The Brady Bunch," "Little House on the Prairie," 
the "Waltons, 11 and, unsurprisingly, "The Wonderful World of 
Disney. 1113 In effect, OPNAD doubled, though not 
duplicated, the corporation's own advertising, which was 
increasingly refocused to sponsoring major telecasts, 
holiday sporting events and parades, and comedy and dramatic 
"specials." 
McDonald's emphasis on advertising was not novel to the 
late 1960s. A clause in Ray Kroc's original franchising 
agreement with Dick and Mac McDonald mandated that Kroc 
expend a minimum of $10,000 annually on advertising. In his 
own contract with licensees, Kroc required operators to set 
aside 2 1/2% of gross sales for advertising, a modest amount 
compared against the 4% of gross that the most successful 
licensees spent. 14 The February, 1960 edition of 
"McDonald's Newsletter" hyped the value of advertising, 
calculating that licensees who spent $300 per month per unit 
could realize a quick and impressive 30% increase in 
1311McDonald's Newsletter" (June 1973); (February 1976); 
(September 1980), McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
1411 Franchise Agreement Between Richard and Maurice 
McDonald and Ray Kroc," 19 August 1954, McDonald's 
Corporation Archives; "McDonald's Newsletter" (February 
1960), McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
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business. 15 Although convenience and quality were 
undoubtedly factors, what kept McDonald's name, rather than 
rivals White Castle, Burger King, or Burger Chef, in front 
of parents and youngsters was McDonald's dogged pursuit of 
radio and television air time. 16 Licensees pledged 
advertising money to OPNAD, above and beyond the 2 1/2% 
contractually required by Kroc, because the air buys 
produced quick and tangible results, especially in the venue 
of children's programming. 
One of the first purchases made by OPNAD was on 
Saturday morning children's cartoons. Bought in eight week 
increments, OPNAD purchased air time on the three major 
networks--CBS, NBC, and ABC--and sponsored their respective 
hits, "Underdog," "The Flintstones," and "Bugs Bunny," among 
many others. 17 OPNAD took over cartoon sponsorship from 
the corporation, which had ventured into Saturday morning 
1511McDonald's Newsletter" (February 1960), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. 
16understandable given the state of television 
technology and use, McDonald's, in the early 1960s, stressed 
and encouraged radio, not television, spot buys as the most 
efficient use of advertising dollars. In 1965, McDonald's 
purchased its first network buy in co-sponsoring the Macy's 
Thanksgiving Day Parade and formally unveiling Ronald 
McDonald. Although individual units still frequently 
purchased radio time for local ads, and the corporation 
continued to issue guidelines and sample scripts for radio 
messages, all nostalgia for corporate radio advertising was 
quickly dropped in favor of television. "McDonald's 
Newsletter" (April 1962); "McDonald's Marketing Manual, 
1971-1973," sample spot scripts. 
1711McDonald's Newsletter" (February 1967), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. 
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commercials in the summer of 1966 after its success at co-
sponsoring the Macy's Thanksgiving Day Parade the previous 
autwnn. 18 Advertising time was competitive, thus 
expensive, and pitted McDonald's as the newcomer against 
veteran toy and cereal manufacturers which led in Saturday 
morning sponsorship. 19 With one-third of their sales 
influenced by children, McDonald's predominant advertising 
goal in the late 1960s and early 1970s was to create an 
image and a presence in the children's market. Thus, it was 
willing to compete for the airtime. This is underscored by 
the fact that the bulk of McDonald's corporate network 
advertising was committed to the children's conswner market, 
leaving local units to pierce the adult fast-food 
segment. 20 In a six-week period from January to March, 
1968, OPNAD sponsored 44 spots on Saturday morning cartoons, 
1811McDonald's Newsletter" (August 1966); "McDonald's 
Chronological Report," 12 December 1990, McDonald's 
Corporation Archives, 23. McDonald's purchased one-quarter 
sponsorship of the parade, a risky investment given 
McDonald's corporate inexperience at network advertising. 
1911Advertising, Marketing Reports on the 100 Top 
National Advertisers," Advertising Age, 18 August 1975, XX. 
Citing 1973 and 1974 figures, Advertising Age ranked 
McDonald's as the 39th largest national advertiser, behind 
food giants Kraft, General Mills, General Foods, Nabisco, 
and Ralston Purina. In terms of television spot 
advertising, however, McDonald's ranked 6th, ahead of 
General Mills and Coca-Cola. 
2011 McDonald's Newsletter" (August 1966), Mcbonald's 
Corporation Archives. 
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compared with only 22 prime-time, or evening, spots. 21 
And in the autumn of 1968, McDonald's estimated that 183 
million viewers saw the 52 minutes of McDonald's commercials 
aired in a typical four-week period. Echoing their current 
advertising jingle, the McDonald's Newsletter boasted in 
December, 1968, "Just about everyone who watches T.V. will 
get the point that 'McDonald's is your kind of place. 11122 
And the point was especially directed at children. 
Part of the reason that McDonald's so intensely 
targeted the children's market was elementary economics. 
Saturday morning airtime, while competitive, was still 
significantly less expensive than prime-time advertising. 
It simply delivered a greater return on investment. In its 
Spring buys for 1969, OPNAD purchased 29 minutes of prime-
time spots on CBS and ABC for a total cost of $1 million. 
McDonald's estimated that the spots would reach an adult 
audience of 832,000 over several weeks. But for $838,000, 
OPNAD purchased a full fifty-two weeks of children's 
advertising, reaching over one million ongoing viewers 
through a total of 175 minutes of advertising spots. 23 
For Ray Kroc, who firmly believed that advertising and 
2111 McDonald' s Newsletter•: (January 1968), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. 
2211 McDonald's Newsletter" (December 1968), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. 
2311McDonald's Newsletter" (March 1969), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. 
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promotion equalled an investment, rather than an expense, 
the children's market yielded impressive dividends, 
especially when saturated with Ronald McDonald commercials. 
Ronald spearheaded McDonald's television marketing to 
children. In 1983 alone, the clown starred in 55 different 
commercials aimed at youngsters aged two to nine. That same 
year, he made more than 5,700 personal appearances and, 
according to McDonald's calculations, was recognized by more 
than 25 million children. 24 Throughout the 1970s, Ronald 
appeared in football, baseball, and basketball uniforms and 
told children "This is the place to go after the game . 
or whenever you play up a big appetite. 1125 He was a 
magician, an artist, a bandleader, and a moon explorer. He 
told children that "Everybody's heading for McDonaldland," 
and that "Nobody can resist these delicious McDonald's 
hamburgers," and, again and again, "Come on over to my 
house. 1126 Most of the commercials ended with Ronald and 
friends adjourning to McDonald's for a meal, yet, 
ironically, the commercials never showed Ronald explicitly 
purchasing any food. Like everything else about the clown, 
2411McDonald's Newsletter" (October 1983), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. 
2511McDonald' s Marketing Manual, 1969-1973," Children's 
Television Advertising, 1969, Commercial #220-MCD-60R. 
2611McDonald' s Marketing Manual, 1969-1973," Children's 
Television Advertising, 1969, Commercial #274-McD-60; 
"McDonald's Commercials," tape 1, Counter 800, 1643, 
McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
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the appearance of the food was magical. 
The basic facts of consumerism never made it into 
McDonald's commercials for children. Though Ronald consumed 
hamburgers, he was not a consumer in the economic sense of 
exchanging dollars for products. Although many McDonald's 
units had a stool for youngsters to stand on in order to 
reach the counter and order their own meals, McDonald's 
commercials never showed children actually placing an order. 
While McDonald's obvious underlying goal was to produce a 
nation of hamburger-hungry preschoolers, its overt strategy 
de-emphasized explicit consumerism in favor of nurturing a 
personal loyalty between the children and Ronald McDonald. 
McDonald's goal was to create brand recognition not so 
much for themselves as for their mascot, Ronald McDonald. 
In a late 1970s commercial, McDonald's boasted, "Nobody can 
do it like Ronald can," quietly substituting "Ronald" for 
the word "McDonald's," which is how the advertisement ran 
for adult viewers. 27 Ronald was billed as children's 
"McFavorite Clown, 11 --perpetuating the "McLanguage" gimmick 
originally created by McDonald's public relations firm, 
Cooper and Golin--who was the "McFriendliest, McFunniest and 
McWackiest. 1128 The entire advertising campaign seemed 
predicated on nurturing children's love for Ronald; the 
presence of hamburger, shake, or french fry products in the 
2711McDonald's Commercials," Counter 1690. 
28 Ibid. 
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commercials were incidental. 
Beyond friendship, Ronald McDonald offered children a 
host of product-based and character-related premiums to 
further entice children to choose McDonald's. A premium, 
claimed McDonald's "Marketing Manual," "rewards [customers] 
for buying a product they normally wouldn't purchase. 1129 
Premiums have traditionally kept the advertiser's name in 
front of the customer and, understandably, the most common 
premium McDonald's used with children was toys. Ronald 
McDonald's banks, puppets, dolls, autographed pictures 
(again, reinforcing the reality of Ronald), window decals, 
pencil cases, clocks, folders, and so on were all either 
complimentary premiums or nominally priced products designed 
to attract children. 30 McDonald's most obvious premium 
gimmick, of course, was the Happy Meal, targeted at children 
aged two through nine and billed as "Food and Fun in a 
Box. 1131 Composed of a hamburger, fries, soft drink, and 
toy premium, the Happy Meal was a simple to order, 
prepackaged meal for children. 32 
2911 McDonald' s Marketing Manual, 1969-1973," McDonald's 
Corporation Archives, 1. 
30Ibid., 1-3. 
3111McDonald's Newsletter" 
Corporation Archives. 
(April 1979), McDonald's 
3211McDonald's Newsletter" (May 1979), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives, 10. Initially, the Happy Meal also 
included several complimentary cookies -- a practice later 
discontinued. While the original meals were limited to 
hamburgers and fries, more recent versions offer Chicken 
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McDonald's first tested the Happy Meal in the summer of 
1979, with the goal of increasing customer counts by 2% and 
product sales by an aggressive 10%. Citing research that 
children were a "major influence" on where to eat 50% of the 
time and of ''some influence" 75% of the time, McDonald's 
justified the Happy Meal's net cost per meal of five cents. 
For an expenditure of a nickel, due to the additional costs 
of the Happy Meal's exterior paper packaging and premium, 
McDonald's was able to manipulate the children's market to 
fuel an anticipated 10% rise in sales. 33 
While McDonald's figures on the tangible influence of 
child consumers were obviously imprecise--the percentages 
that the corporation cited varied from 20% to 50% or more, 
as the above illustrates--McDonald's was forcefully 
committed to targeting and encouraging child consumer 
behavior in children as young as two years old. While many 
major toy manufacturers offered toddler or preschool lines 
of products, the items were primarily marketed to parents 
and grandparents, not the youngsters themselves. Not only 
did children that young lack a weekly allowance, considered 
a prerequisite to independent child consumer behavior, but 
they were deemed incapable of distinguishing either between 
differing products or between television shows and the 
McNuggets, carrot sticks, applesauce, corn-on-the-cob, and 
junior sized milkshakes. 
33 Ibid. 
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commercials which sponsored them. McDonald's, however, 
risked presenting the incomprehensible to its very young 
viewers and, in the process, proved that even among children 
who can barely talk, brand recognition can be created and 
manipulated. Parents and child advocates quickly realized 
it, too. 
Although the debate between sponsors and child 
advocates currently centers around fast-food and child 
marketing, this was not always the case. Indeed, it was the 
cereal manufacturers, which plugged their sugar-laden brands 
Saturday mornings and weekday afternoons, that bore the 
brunt of the assault. But with the exception of Kellogg's 
"Tony the Tiger" and "Toucan Sam," most cereals did not rely 
heavily upon the advertising draw of a personified mascot. 
And although the tiger and pelican were anthropomorphized, 
they lacked the empathy, playfulness, and camaraderie of 
Ronald McDonald. They also rarely made it off their 
respective commercials or cereal boxes, while Ronald 
frequently scampered down hospital corridors, performed in 
magic shows and circuses, and entertained children in 
schools or scout troops. But parents did not necessarily 
object to Ronald's influence over their children, at least 
not immediately. The more pressing, and more tangible, 
problem was the nutritionally questionable products that 
Ronald peddled. 
In June, 1990, the Washington Post conducted a 
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telephone survey of one thousand randomly selected adults 
nationwide. Of the sample, 48% consumed fast-food meals at 
least once per week. Speed and convenience were cited as 
the most determining factors in selecting fast-food, with 
less than 1% of respondents choosing fast-food for its 
nutritional value. Rather, 47% had actually curtailed their 
consumption of fast-food specifically because of nutritional 
concerns. 34 When asked specifically about McDonald's, 76% 
of respondents verified that they had eaten there within the 
last six months, with less than half believing that all 
fast-food was of similar nutritional quality. Twenty-eight 
percent actually believed that McDonald's menu was less 
nutritious than its competitors' proctucts.35 
The results were disheartening to McDonald's. Since 
the early 1970s, when McDonald's first became sensitive to 
the nutritional criticisms of its products, the corporation 
had launched extensive public relations campaigns and 
expedited internal new product development to convince 
34Richard Morin, "Poll Shows Convenience is What 
Counts, " Washington Post, 2 7 June 19 9 O, sec. E, 1. The 
survey was conducted between June 8-12, 1990 by the !CR 
Survey Research Group, Media, Pennsylvania. The 47% who 
claimed to have stopped eating at fast-food restaurants also 
included a surprisingly high 8% who claimed to have never 
eaten fast-food. 
35 rbid. To the question, "Is McDonald's more or less 
nutritious [than other fast-food restaurants], the 
respondents replied: 
More - 14% 
Less - 28% 
There does not appear 
Same - 45% 
Don't Know - 13% 
to be a clear consensus on this point. 
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customers of its nutritional sincerity and worth. It had no 
choice. Like many other food retailers, especially those 
which heavily advertised and promoted products to children, 
McDonald's was the target of extensive investigation into 
how its products were allegedly polluting children's eating 
habits and health. 
In 1978, Action for Children's Television (ACT) 
commissioned a study analyzing food advertising messages 
specifically directed at children and aired during 
children's prime viewing hours. Of 293 commercials 
analyzed over a one week period in June, 1978, authors F. 
Earle Barcus and Lucille McLaughlin singled out 59 
individual spots advertising fast-food, for a total of 20% 
of all ads directed at children for the test period. 36 
While the percentage may seem small, only two companies 
sponsored those advertisements: McDonald's and arch-rival, 
Burger King. McDonald's aired 36 commercial messages in 
that week, for a total of 23.5 minutes of actual airtime. 
Burger King had 23 spots for a significantly fewer 14.5 
total minutes of exposure. 37 Nutritionists did not 
36F. Earle Barcus and Lucille 
Advertising on Children's Television: 
Appeals and Nutritional Content (Boston, 
Children's Television, 1978), 62. 
McLaughlin, Food 
An Analysis of 
MA: Action for 
37 Ibid. The difference in airtime reflected both the 
fewer commercials that Burger King aired as well as the 
shorter length of its spots. In the test period, Burger 
King ran only six 60 second spots, compared to McDonald's 
eleven. Additionally, Burger King aired seventeen 30 second 
ads, compared to McDonald's twenty-five 30 second spots. 
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necessarily disagree with the number of commercials aired; 
rather, they were alarmed at the high calorie, high fat diet 
that the advertised food represented. 
In 1978, a McDonald's hamburger, small order of french 
fries, and junior sized milkshake equalled 791 calories with 
28 grams of fat. Of the 791 calories, 33% represented 
calories derived from the fat content of the meal. Burger 
King fared equally poorly, with 36% of the calories of its 
standard children's meal derived from fat. This was high 
compared to a 30% ceiling set by the U.S. Senate Select 
Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs. 38 While the 
overages were not excessive, Barcus and McLaughlin 
continued, the figures did not represent the equally 
excessive sugar content of the products (especially the 
milkshakes) as well as the high ratio of cholesterol-
producing saturated fats used to prepare the hamburgers and 
french fries. While both fast-food giants warranted 
significant improvement in those areas, the report concluded 
on a hopeful note, citing each corporation's product testing 
of salads, soups, and alternative frying practices. 39 
Beyond the nutritional merits of the food itself, 
critics faulted the sponsors' marketing the food as fun, 
thereby diluting the issue of nutrition. In a 1980 study, 
Harvard Business School professor Scott Ward, one of the 
38Ibid., 64, 66. 
39 b'd I l.. • , 65. 
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leading researchers on children's advertising and children's 
consumer patterns, co-authored a study citing "fun" as the 
primary advertising lure to encourage fast-food brand 
loyalty. Not an egregious marketing message in itself, but 
in the absence of mitigating nutritional education at home 
or at school, positioning fast-food as "fun," Ward 
concluded, created unrealistic or distorted 
expectations. 40 And children were constantly deluged with 
the message. A 1988 University of Delaware study concluded 
that 71% of the commercials aired on one Saturday morning 
were for food items of excessively deficient nutritional 
quality. 41 
The various nutritional analyses, combined with the 
public exposure and acceptance they received, convinced 
McDonald's to attack the issue of nutrition promptly and 
directly. Ray Kroc hired former Kraft dairy researcher Ed 
Traisman to conduct an independent nutritional analysis of 
McDonald's food. Careful to avoid hints of impropriety, 
Traisman, who himself owned five McDonald's franchises in 
40Richard P. Adler, Gerald S. Lesser, Laurence Krasny 
Meringoff, Thomas S. Robertson, John R. Rossiter, and Scott 
Ward, The Effects of Advertising on Children (Lexington, MA: 
Lexington Books/D.C. Heath, 1980), 16, 126, 132, 213. 
41Nancy Cotunga, Department of Nutrition and Dietetics, 
University of Delaware-Newark, "TV Ads on Saturday Morning 
Children's Programming--What 's New?" Journal of Nutrition 
Education 20, no. 3 (June 1988): 125-26. Cotunga 
videotaped four successive hours of Saturday morning 
cartoons on January 24, 1987, simultaneously on ABC, CBS, 
and NBC. The 71% figure that Cotunga cited included·cereal, 
candy, and fast-food sponsors. 
235 
Madison, Wisconsin, sold his units prior to accepting Kroc's 
offer. Kroc trusted Traisman, who was among the batch of 
early entrepreneurs who had given McDonald's its successful 
head start in the 1950s. Traisman's research essentially 
concurred with other, and more legitimately independent, 
analyses. 42 Kroc acted quickly. In October, 1976, he 
hired Luxembourg-trained chef Renee Arend, formerly of 
Chicago's Whitehall Club, as McDonald's Executive Chef. 
"His job," Kroc stated in his autobiography, "[was) to study 
ways to make our menu more nutritious [and] get more fiber 
into it. 1143 Arend was obviously successful. After 
exhaustive testing, McDonald's premiered its line of 
prepackaged salads in 1987. Currently, McDonald's has a 
complete low-fat menu, including yogurt shakes, fat-free 
muffins, 1% milk, reduced calorie salad dressings, and, the 
most important changes to the menu, the addition of a 91% 
fat-free "McLean" hamburger and the preparation of french 
fries in 100% vegetable, rather than animal, oil. 44 
McDonald's also attacked the nutrition issue by 
launching an extensive lobbying and public education 
42Max Boas and Steve Chain, Big Mac: The Unauthorized 
Story of McDonald's (New York: E.P. Dutton, 1976), 86. 
43Ray Kroc with Robert Anderson, Grinding It Out: The 
Making of McDonald's (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co. , 19 7 7; 
reprint, Chicago: St. Martin's Paperbacks, 1987), 203. 
Page references are to the reprint edition. 
4411McDonald' s Food: The Facts," 
brochure, McDonald's Corporation, 1990; 
Chronological History Report," 43. 
informational 
"McDonald's 
236 
campaign. Prohibited by Food and Drug Administration 
regulations from offering brochures outlining its products' 
nutritional values, McDonald's lobbied the Senate 
Subcommittee on Nutrition to hold hearings in 1978 in 
anticipation of overturning the FDA's ruling. Hoping to 
score points with the farm lobby by emphasizing the quality 
of American home-grown beef and dairy products, subcommittee 
chair Senator George McGovern expedited the reversal that 
enabled fast-food restaurants to present their case to the 
public. 45 And true to McDonald's style, the corporation 
premiered a lively, but short term, advertising campaign 
featuring Ronald and "The Nutrients." Using a rock band 
dressed as vitamins, McDonald's hoped to reach older 
children and teenagers who typically consumed excessive 
quantities of fast-food. 46 While this initial effort 
proved too "gimmicky," later efforts included sponsoring 
nutritional mini-curricula for schools and the 1992 
introduction of the clay-animation character "Willie 
Munchright." Public service announcements geared to 
children aged two through eleven, Willie Munchright 
encouraged children to stress "everyday" foods such as 
45John F. Love, McDonald's: Behind the Arches (New 
York: Bantam Books, 1986), 369-70. McGovern and McDonald's 
were unlikely allies in this cause, especially in light of a 
well-publicized $250,000 campaign donation that Ray Kroc had 
made to President Nixon's re-election effort in 1972. 
46Boas and Chain, Big Mac, 87; Alix M. Freedman, "Fast-
Food Chains Play Central Role in Diet of the Inner-City 
Poor," Wall Street Journal, 19 December 1990, sec. A, 1. 
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fruits and vegetables over "sometimes" products like, 
presumably, McDonald's own fare. The spots received kudos 
even from ACT's Peggy Charren, a longstanding opponent of 
any children's advertising. 47 
Although McDonald's was a leader in expanding 
customers' nutritional options, the industry, and McDonald's 
particularly, remained under attack. In 1990, Phil Sokolof, 
an Omaha industrialist turned nutrition crusader, purchased 
full page advertisements in twenty major U.S. newspapers 
indicting the fast-food industry for "poisoning" the nation 
and, mocking a famous McDonald's slogan, asked "McDonald's 
to give our kids a break today. 1148 Although McDonald's 
labelled Sokolof 's accusations, "sensational, reckless and 
ridiculous," they had the net effect of sensitizing the 
industry to the enormity of the nutrition issue. 49 While 
Sokolof exacerbated the emotionalism of the debate, more 
mainstream organizations such as the American Academy of 
Pediatrics has more recently called for a "wholesale ban on 
4 7Laura Bird, "McDonald's Slates Nutrition-Advice 
Spots," Wall Street Journal, 23 September 1992, sec. B, 8. 
48Dan Sperling, "McDonald's Tries a New Way to Fry," 
USA Today, 5 April 1990, 1. 
49 Ibid.; Charles Bernstein, "The French-Fry Cooking 
War: 'Healthier' Foods Emerge as Critical," Nation's 
Restaurant News, 13 August 1990, 23. The emerging belief, 
cited by Bernstein's editorial, that Sokolof was taking 
credit for the industry's nutritional innovations, did not 
ring true. McDonald's, for example, had hired Chef Arend in 
1976, specifically to create healthy menu items· for the 
chain. And salad-based alternatives were in extensive 
testing at least from 1979. 
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food ads aimed at kids." 50 
Looming beyond the nutrition question, the larger issue 
of tackling the fundamental ethics of children's advertising 
remained equally unresolved. In 1970, Action for Children's 
Television and consumer activist Robert Choate, later 
chairman of the Council on Children, Merchandising and 
Media, jointly petitioned the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) to unilaterally prohibit all commercial 
advertising from children's television shows. The self-
regulatory arm of the industry, the National Association of 
Broadcaster's Review Board, responded by eliminating vitamin 
and medicine sponsorship from children's programming, 
discontinuing host selling, and gradually reducing overall 
commercial exposure from 16 to 9.5 minutes per hour on 
weekdays. 51 But self-regulation was erratic, with many 
stations casually exceeding the limit on commercial 
minutes. 52 
While the FCC's own "Notice of Inquiry" report in 
January, 1971, admitted children's vulnerability to 
commercial advertising, it was not prepared to mandate the 
50Laura Bird, 
Spots," sec. B, 8. 
"McDonald's Slates Nutrition-Advice 
51F. Earle Barcus and Rachel Welkin, Children's 
Advertising: An Analysis of Programming and Advertising 
(New York: Praeger, 1977), xxi; Scott Ward, "Kids' TV--
Marketers on Hot Seat," Harvard Business Review (July-August 
1972): 17. The reduction in advertising minutes was phased 
in from a drop to 12 minutes in 1972 to 9.5 minutes in 1976. 
52ward, "Kids' TV--Marketers on Hot Seat," 22. 
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wholesale ban that ACT advocated.s 3 The history of 
children's commercial sponsorship had been one of self-
regulation, with varying degrees of success. By the early 
1950s, the children's viewing slots of Saturday mornings and 
weekday afternoons were being solidified.s4 In response, 
NBC in 1954 created a children's programming review 
committee to censor inappropriate material. But NBC's 
authority was limited. From 1953 to 1959, sponsors, not the 
networks, controlled the production of children's 
programming, following the precedents of radio advertising. 
Blamed for many of the quiz show scandals of the late 1950s, 
however, sponsors gradually relinquished production control 
for their current role of merely purchasing airtime.ss 
After the FCC declined the petition, opting for further 
industry self-regulation, ACT and Choate similarly 
petitioned the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) in 1977. In 
its internal staff report, the FTC concluded that television 
advertising to children younger than eight years old 
violated the spirit of Section 5 of the Federal Trade 
s3William Melody, Children's Television: The Economics 
of Exploitation (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 
1973), 1. 
54Ibid., 1, 38. Ironic given children's earlier 
consumer response to radio advertising, sponsors and 
networks remained unconvinced that younger children 
constituted a viable advertising market. Like radio, 
television relegated to children the medium's "dead" time, 
when presumably few adults were watching. 
55 Ibid., 45-47. 
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Commission Act on unfair advertising. 56 Children that 
young, the report continued, lacked the discrimination 
skills to distinguish commercials from the programming they 
sponsored as well as the concepts of size, volume, and price 
essential to consumer choice. Finally, the report concluded 
that children's advertising undermined the parent/child 
relationship by overemphasizing the commercial aspects of 
it. 57 
In spite of its own staff report, the FTC, like the 
FCC, supported the self-regulation efforts of the National 
Association of Broadcasters. While the FTC intervened in 
specific cases--it ordered Wonder Bread to stop claiming its 
product helped "build strong bodies 12 ways 11 --it stopped far 
short of the extensive regulation sought by ACT and 
Choate. 58 Their inaction was influenced, in part, by the 
conflicting research on the topic. 
All sides uniformly agreed that children watched 
56Federal Trade Commission, Staff Report on Television 
Advertising to Children (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1978), 27-29. 
57 Ibid., 17, 83. 
58scott Ward, "Compromise in Commercials for Children," 
Harvard Business Review, 12 November 1978, 130, 135. Ward 
offered a thorough and balanced summary of the entire 
debate, citing each side's respective evidence, conclusions, 
and bargaining positions. As a centrist on the issue, he 
suggested that educating school-age children on the function 
and role of commercials would ameliorate many parental 
concerns. He admitted, however, that his solution did not 
apply to preschool children, most of whom were cognitively 
incapable of consistently differentiating and evaluating 
commercial messages. 
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substantial hours of television; the 1978 FTC staff report 
recorded that children aged 2-11 watched an average of 3 2/3 
hours per day, one hour more than in 1955. In addition, 
these children viewed more than 20,000 commercials per 
year. 59 Rather, the dispute centered around whether 
children were being unfairly manipulated into prematurely 
assuming consumer roles. A 1956 study by youth marketing 
research firm, Eugene Gilbert & Company, cited that 94% of 
mothers sampled responded that their children specifically 
requested products advertised on television. 60 A 1971 
survey by Scott Ward posted almost identical results, with 
95% of mothers responding that children requested products 
based on television commercials. 61 
Alternately, a 1975 study by Myrna Carol Morris found 
that only 49.5% of children aged three through five were 
influenced by commercials to the point of requesting 
59FTC, Staff Report, 13. 
60cited in Grace w. Weinstein, Children and Money: A 
Guide for Parents (New York: Schocken Books, 1975), 107. 
Unfortunately, Weinstein did not detail the demographics or 
size of the Gilbert & Company sample. 
61ward, "Kids' TV,'' 20. Surprisingly, Ward discovered 
that children less frequently request specific brands as 
they grow older. Only 77% of mothers felt their eleven-
through twelve-years-olds were frequently influenced by 
commercials. This contradicted the common perception that 
brand awareness increased with age and served as an· example 
of the contradictory nature of the various analyses. 
242 
specific brands. 62 When the surveys were limited to 
restaurants, the percentages were decidedly lower. The 1990 
Washington Post poll, confined to fast-food, found that 
children were a factor in where to eat only a small 6% of 
the time. 63 And a 1974 poll by the National Restaurant 
Association did not even record children's preferences on 
its list of the sixteen most popular reasons for eating 
out. 64 
Like the debate over nutrition, a proposed ban on all 
children's advertising contradicted historical attitudes on 
the subject. Thirty years earlier, advertising to children 
had been hailed as informative, entertaining, and 
educational; it was deemed both necessary and desirable in 
acculturating children to their future economic roles as 
adults. Dorothy Gordon of the New York Times Youth Forum 
had affirmed that in 1948. 65 But radio advertisers had 
62Myrna Carol Morris, "Consumer Socialization of 
Preschool Children: The Parental View" (Ph.D. diss., 
University of Georgia-Athens, 1975), 61. Morris used a mail 
questionnaire to interview 214 mothers of preschool children 
in Clarke County, Georgia. Her results were typical of the 
studies that refuted that preschoolers were uniformly mature 
enough to request specific brands. 
63Morin, "Poll Shows Convenience is What Counts," 
sec. E, 1. 
64D. Daryl Wyckoff and w. 
Restaurant Industry (Lexington, 
table I-13, p. 41. 
Earl 
MA: 
Sasser, ~T~h~e~~C~h~a~i=· n~­
D. C. Heath, 1978), 
65Albert N. Williams, Listening: A Collection of 
Critical Articles on Radio (Freeport, NY: Books for 
Libraries Press, 1948; reprint, 1968), 100-101. References 
are to the reprint edition. 
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not saturated the children's market to the same degree as 
did television sponsors and, for the most part, children as 
young as three and four remained on the fringe of this 
earlier market. 
McDonald's kept a low profile while the debate raged, 
especially since the initial rhetoric centered around the 
cereal and toy manufacturers whose combined advertising 
still dominated children's programming. When McDonald's did 
speak out, it was to offer an alternative, its own "Golden 
Arches Code," which it held up as a model of the self-
regulation officially advocated by both the FCC and FTC. 66 
Formally presented to McDonald's advertising managers, 
owner/operators, and OPNAD in 1978, the "Golden Arches Code" 
defined McDonald's position in "respecting the intelligence 
and rights of our customers." 67 The Code's articles on 
children's advertising specifically forbade the promotion of 
adult-sized sandwiches (too large for children to 
comfortably consume) and the depiction of bad manners, 
destructive behavior, or unsafe practices. If seated in a 
car, children had to wear seatbelts. And if shown entering 
a restaurant, they had to be accompanied by an adult 
66
"McDonald's Newsletter" (February 1974), McDonald's 
Corporation Archives. 
67Roy Bergold, McDonald's Assistant Vice 
Advertising and Promotion, to Advertising 
Owner/Operators, and OPNAD, 1978, McDonald's 
Archives, 1. The Code was updated in 1987; no 
changes were made. 
President, 
Managers, 
Corporation 
substantive 
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(presumably a parent). Responding to the common criticism 
that young children had no concept of money, McDonald's 
forbade ads that mentioned price or discounting. 68 
Ironically, however, that practice could have the unwanted 
side effect of children believing the products were free. 
Ronald McDonald, especially, was constrained by the 
Code. In addition to exhibiting wholesome behavior, Ronald 
could not promote a premium nor could he any longer directly 
instruct children to purchase a product. This was a 
threshold decision for McDonald's. "Ronald McDonald is not 
a pitchman," the 1978 Golden Arches Code stated. Rather, 
Ronald stood for "good citizenship," or as later put by 
Peter Nelson, McDonald's Senior Vice President of Marketing, 
Ronald became "more the McDonald's spirit. 1169 With the 
loss of his original function as overt salesman, Ronald 
developed more the friend persona with which he is now 
identified. That does not mean, of course, that his 
marketing impact has been diluted; rather, that it has 
become more subtle and, thus, perhaps, more invasive. 
McDonald's applied similar strict standards to its 
68Ibid., 9-10; Paul D. Schrage, "McDonald's Corporation 
Policy Toward the Television Environment," Appendix to 
Golden Arches Code, 21 February 1978, McDonald's Corporation 
Archives, 1. In addition, the Code prohibited sponsorship 
of programs depicting "excessive or gratuitous violence, 
drug abuse, [or] controversial sexual themes. " Licensees 
were encouraged to prescreen shows and to ref rain from 
advertising on programs prefixed by a "child disclaimer." 
69 Ibid., 13; Lisa Bertagnoli, "Inside McDonald's," 
Restaurant and Institutions, 21 August 1989, 64. 
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children's premiums. They were tested for flammability, 
toxicity, topical irritants, sharp edges, color permanency, 
and fragility. If they could pass down a narrow tester 
chute, they risked being swallowed by small children, and 
were discarded. Still, licensees were ordered to maintain a 
supply of coloring books or similar items, in lieu of 
smaller Happy Meal premiums, for children younger than 
three. 70 
The "Golden Arches Code" held McDonald's to a high 
standard of children's advertising, incorporating many of 
the reforms long advocated by ACT. The termination of host 
selling, long an objectionable tactic, scored extra public 
relations points for McDonald's, but proved equally 
necessary to creating the image of Ronald as "friend." 
While McDonald's may have been progressive in its 
advertising restraints, it merely was responding to changing 
social beliefs on the role of children and television. The 
Ronald McDonald that in 1965 directly and forcefully pitched 
hamburgers and fries to children was no longer socially 
tolerated a decade later. Not only were parents and 
advocates cringing at the increasingly obsessive consumerism 
of young children, but, more ominous for McDonald's, were 
rallying against the nutritional deficits of a meal which, a 
few years earlier, had been unquestioningly accepted as all-
7011 Premium Purchasing Standards," 
McDonald's Corporation Archives, pt. I I, 
Newsletter" (April 1983), 5. 
February 1980, 
7-8; "McDonald's 
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American. 
Still, the commercials that McDonald's aired from 1967, 
its big media push financed by OPNAD, to the mid-1980s, 
reflected a McDonald's that increasingly relied upon the 
consumer initiatives of young children to realize the 
corporation's expectation of double-digit growth. Even in 
the demographically disappointing 1970s, children still 
accounted for roughly 30% of McDonald's sales and McDonald's 
kept children's advertising its highest priority as rivals 
Burger King and Wendy's looked to the adult market. This 
strategy, questionable at the time, put McDonald's 
comfortably ahead of the competition when the birth rate 
rebounded in the late 1980s. Although McDonald's hedged its 
decision by increasingly opening units in non-traditional, 
non-residential sites such as shopping malls, tollways, 
naval bases, hospitals, and in downtowns nationwide, the 
majority of new openings continued to be in child-oriented 
communities, much as it was in 1955. 71 And while 
McDonald's television exposure lagged behind the combined 
airtime of cereal and toy manufacturers, McDonald's and its 
rival Burger King virtually dominated children's commercial 
airtime for fast-food advertising, a strategy that backfired 
when McDonald's became a rallying point of the pro-
nutritionists. 
71McDonald's Corporation Annual Report, 
McDonald's Corporation, 6. 
1992, 
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From 1967 to the 1980s, McDonald's advertising pointed 
to and nourished the maturation and increasing 
sophistication of the children's market. Amidst the 
continuing theoretical debate of how and at what age young 
children developed the cognition necessary for consumer 
agency, McDonald's was practically proving that children as 
young as two and three could ask for a Happy Meal. And 
McDonald's intentionally pushed that age demarcation down, 
to toddlers, by positioning Ronald McDonald as a child's 
friend and role model. It is noteworthy that while its 
competitors were looking to the demographically strong adult 
market to sustain corporate growth, McDonald's focused on 
the exact opposite spectrum, consciously educating two-year-
olds in consumerism and creating for themselves, a new 
generation of fast-food hungry Americans. 
CHAPTER 9 
"MCKIDS" 
When it comes to marketing to kids, earlier 
is better. Until age two, a child is a 
virtual blank slate just waiting to be filled 
up with advertising stimuli. By age six the 
child has formed many of the buying habits 
that will stay with him for life. 1 
Newsweek 
In 1986, Newsweek heralded the tot market as new. 
"Until recently," Newsweek wrote, "toys and candy were about 
the only products marketed directly to the under-six set. 112 
It was a myopic view. The observation was true enough in 
that nickel and dime toys and penny candy were long a staple 
of children's consumerism, beginning in the 1930s. But 
since 1955, McDonald's has proven that toddlers and 
preschoolers, even if lacking full cognitive volition, can 
parrot both television commercials and the entreaties of a 
red-haired clown and become active consumer agents. 
While other advertisers marketed their toys and candies 
as treats or presents, McDonald's positioned itself as the 
natural and logical extension of everyday routines: 
1Annetta Miller, "Targeting the Tiny Tots," Newsweek, 
14 April 1986, 45. 
2 Ibid. 
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shopping, a Boy Scout meeting, band practice, a baseball 
game, and even after school. The young children's market 
was not new in 1986. McDonald's, which could have smugly 
chuckled at Newsweek's naivete, had already been exploiting 
it for nearly two decades. 
McDonald's loudly professed that it was, first, 
foremost, and always, a hamburger company. Ray Kroc wove 
that belief throughout the corporation's cultural fabric, 
partly to defend McDonald's against the charge that it was 
forsaking hamburgers for real estate acquisition. 3 But in 
order to promote its hamburger identity, McDonald's became 
much more. McDonald's entered the toy industry full force 
in the 1970s. Between 1974 and 1976, McDonald's National 
Retail Marketing Program had joined with Playskool to offer 
a scaled down version of a McDonald's restaurant and a 
McDonald's game developed by Milton Bradley. 4 McDonald's 
goal was to "offer carefully selected quality items which 
3Ray Kroc with Robert Anderson, Grinding It Out: The 
Making of McDonald's (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1977; 
reprint, Chicago: St. Martin's Paperbacks, 1987), 152-55. 
This charge was frequently levelled internally, within the 
ranks of McDonald's corporate managers who questioned 
whether McDonald's was more acutely interested in selling 
hamburgers or in managing the real estate empire they 
amassed. The concern was legitimate and reflected a serious 
rift between Kroc, whose primary emphasis had always been 
hamburgers, and McDonald's Vice-President and financier 
Harry Sonneborn, who "sold" investors on the McDonald's 
concept by marketing the corporation as a real estate 
holding company that only incidentally sold hamburgers. 
4
"McDonald's Newsletter" 
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extend our marketing programs into the home. These toys are 
designed to complement our total children's marketing 
program. 115 By 1985, McDonald's had licensed products 
ranging from children's bedding, school supplies, bandages, 
story books, and videotapes to what visually identifies a 
child as a McDonald's aficionado, McDonald's clothing. 6 
Originally launched as "McDonaldland Fashions," 
parroting the successful children's ad campaign, the 
clothing line was redesigned and redubbed "McKids" in 1988. 
McDonald's chose Sears, Roebuck to distribute the line, 
dovetailing McDonald's own family image with that of the 
longstanding middle-class retailer. In conjunction, Sears 
opened a chain of freestanding "McKids" clothing stores 
offering customers a mix of clothing and educational toys. 
The clothing itself was unimpressive: basic rugby, polo, 
and t-shirt designs awash in bright primary colors 
coordinated with standard jean and overall bottoms. And 
while the in-store McKids line is still promoted, the 
freestanding McKids stores were closed after a short few 
years' trial. More significant than the specific success or 
failure of the clothing line, however, was McDonald's 
strategy of targeting children in all their daily 
activities, even including the clothing they wore. 
5 Ibid. I 9. 
611McDonald' s Newsletter" (June 1977); (January 1980), 
McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
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A four-year-old could sleep underneath Ronald McDonald 
sheets and comforter, hugging a Ronald McDonald doll, 
babbling to Grandma and Grandpa on a Ronald McDonald 
telephone, attend daycare or preschool with a Ronald 
McDonald lunch box, have an injury nursed with a Ronald 
McDonald bandage, pretend that he or she worked at 
McDonald's at playtime, eat supper off Ronald McDonald 
tableware, take a bath with a Ronald McDonald towel, slip 
into Ronald McDonald slippers, read a Ronald McDonald 
"Golden Book," and drift off to sleep protected by a Ronald 
McDonald nightlight. Through licensing, McDonald's 
reinforced its brand among youngsters without them ever 
having to watch a McDonald's commercial on television and at 
every important point in a child's day--everyday. 
McDonald's was by no means alone in aggressively 
marketing its brand name to young children through licensed 
products. Disney teamed up with Mattel in 1988 to 
distribute its own line of "Disney Babies" toys and linens 
to toddlers and preschoolers. 7 Even non-commercial 
programs such as Sesame Street and the phenomenally popular 
Barney used the exact same approach, making them both heir 
and competitor to Ronald McDonald and Mickey Mouse. Indeed, 
public television has learned much from commercial 
7 
"Mattel Toys Information Release: Company Profile," 
13 March 1990, Northwestern University, Kellogg Graduate 
School of Management, Placement Center Library, Evanston, 
Illinois, 3. The Disney line helped fuel a 25% increase in 
Mattel's net sales in its first year. 
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licensing, even using the lure of children's premiums to 
encourage children to press their parents to donate to 
public television. Licensed characters such as the Teenage 
Mutant Ninja Turtles, Cabbage Patch Babies, Batman, Trolls, 
and Barbie have all successfully followed the same pattern 
of advertising to children. McDonald's was not unique in 
this advertising, per se, though it was unquestionably among 
the earliest to target these products at toddlers and 
preschoolers in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 
McDonald's did not invent child consumerism. As early 
as 1900, cereal manufacturers were touting print 
advertisements directly to children, bypassing the scrutiny 
of parents. Nickelodeons and radio both reinforced and 
nourished the fledgling children's market in its formative 
years. But these earlier marketers handily dismissed and 
never seriously explored the possibility of substantive 
consumerism by children younger than eight or nine. 
Literacy was an assumed prerequisite to comic book 
advertisers and the sometimes complicated and episodic plots 
of cinema and radio entertainment required a broader 
attention span than most four- or five-year-olds could 
muster. But McDonald's saw the possibilities. Richard and 
Maurice McDonald realized them as early as 1948 when they 
risked their already successful operation on a hunch. Even 
Ray Kroc did not see it immediately, vetoing most of the 
child promotions suggested by the McDonald brothers. 
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By the late 1950s, however, the brothers' hunch had 
been validated. The birth rate soared amid a postwar 
population freed from the restraints of Depression and war. 
The child-centered culture of the 1950s and early 1960s 
fueled and reinvigorated dozens of industries stagnated by 
the 1930s fears and 1940s rationing. Still, while the 
culture became "child-centered," consumer agency remained 
with parents and was just beginning to substantially filter 
down to high school students, who were then nationally 
touted as the "new market." 
Younger children had not been completely overlooked, 
however, as Bozo the Clown, Kukla, Fran and Ollie, and 
Captain Kangaroo's popularity attested. Sponsors put out 
feelers to the young children's market, primarily through 
host selling, but even in the 1960s, the market did not 
descend below five- or six-year-olds. It was Ronald 
McDonald who made concerted and organized marketing to 
toddlers and preschoolers a viable strategy. But McDonald's 
course was a risky one, since it encouraged loyalty to 
Ronald McDonald rather than loyalty to the products that 
Ronald pitched. But as long as children flocked to 
McDonald's because it was "Ronald's place," McDonald's used 
Ronald as its Pied Piper to keep them coming back. 
Ronald's popularity took off in the late 1960s, much as 
he himself took off in the flying hamburger in commercials 
for the 1965 Macy's Thanksgiving Day Parade. He has 
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appeared in hundreds of parades since then, has become a 
spokesman for children's causes that reach far beyond his 
original role as marketing gimmick, and has become a 
iconographic representation of contemporary American 
society. His own popularity with children as well as the 
increasing public lobbying against host selling and poor 
nutrition, has forced Ronald into shedding his commercial 
shell to reveal what McDonald's considers his "true" 
identity, that of friend and goodwill ambassador. But does 
that make him less of a marketing gimmick? 
Ronald McDonald is still the primary marketing tool to 
children under eleven years old; it is his face and his 
antics that youngsters see every weekday afternoon and every 
Saturday morning on television. McDonald's claims he is not 
a salesman; yet, if he were not a salesman, he would not be 
in dozens of commercials annually. If he were not a 
salesman, McDonald's would not be spending millions of 
dollars annually to promote him. Though he no longer hawks 
products directly, there is no confusion as to whom he 
represents, where his "house" is, and where fun-loving 
children should go. Ironically, although the explicit 
commercialism of Ronald has been diluted, partly through the 
Golden Arches Code and partly in adherence to changing 
FCC/FTC rules on children's advertising, Ronald's commercial 
presence is stronger than ever and, perhaps, more ethically 
ambiguous. 
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The Golden Arches Code, an attempt at industry self-
regulation, reinforced Ronald's transformation from crass 
salesman to friend; yet, in the process, it made Ronald less 
honest. When he clearly pitched hamburgers, he was offering 
tangible product for tangible payment, hamburgers for money. 
But as McDonald's soft-peddled its marketing to avoid public 
criticism, the marketing became more ambiguous. Ronald no 
longer promoted hamburgers, but friendship, fun, and a sense 
of the magical, psychological needs that have little to do 
with purchasing and eating a hamburger. Even preteens, too 
wise for Ronald, were told that McDonald's was "the" place 
to go after school, to meet friends, to giggle over growing 
up, or to be popular. McDonald's is not alone in forsaking 
the marketing message for the marketing form, that is, for 
trying to sell happiness instead of hamburgers. What of 
Mickey Mouse, for instance, who has become little more than 
the doorman to Disney's own consumer paradises? 
Even in the 1970s, when McDonald's was faced with the 
demographic reality that its core market was dwindling, its 
emphasis solidly remained on children. Expansion into 
children's advertising with the McDonaldland concept, a 
commitment to child philanthropy through the Ronald McDonald 
Houses, and the unveiling of its premiere children's 
product, the Happy Meal, all reinforced the fun and 
wholesome family image of McDonald's. But it was the 
Playlands that bridged the gap between image and reality, a 
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thorny problem that had long plagued McDonald's. 
McDonald's promised children fun and often promoted it 
more vigorously than it promoted its hamburgers and fries. 
But fun is difficult to deliver and a disappointed child 
might turn to the competition. First tested in 1971, the 
Playlands delivered on McDonald's promise of fun. With over 
2,000 Playlands nationwide by 1983, McDonald's offered 
slides, climbing towers, and merry-go-rounds for children, 
miniature amusement parks geared to the under ten-year-old 
set. 8 Unlike other McDonald's products, Playlands varied 
from unit to unit. Some were indoors; some were outside. 
Many boasted a grandiose, carnival-like atmosphere, while 
some McDonald's units did not have one at all. Indoors or 
outdoors, all Playlands prominently displayed life-sized 
statues of Ronald, Mayor McCheese, and the rest of the 
McDonaldland family and offered child-sized seating tailored 
to toddlers and preschoolers. 
McDonald's promised fun and if the commercials could 
not deliver it, if the Happy Meals could not deliver it, 
then the Playlands would fulfill the promise. Since the 
Playlands were accessible only through the restaurants, 
McDonald's counted on the fact that most families ordered a 
meal, too. But the meal itself was relegated to being 
hastily gulped down or ignored while the Playland--the fun, 
8
"McDonald's Chronological 
McDonald's Corporation Annual 
Corporation Archives. 
History Report," 31; 
Report, 1983, McDonald's 
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not the food--became the overriding reason for the visit. 
The Playlands beckon a larger question. Burger King 
now also has play areas and pizza chain Chuck E. Cheese's 
playgrounds target preteens as well as tots. What are the 
long term ramifications of pre-packaging our children's fun 
for them? Has fun become so consumerized that, even to a 
three-year-old, "having a good time" necessitates the 
purchase of a commercial product? And is using fun as the 
primary advertising lure exploiting preschoolers' innocence 
and making a "bad guy" out of the parent who says "no"? The 
image of fun is just one critical component to McDonald's 
child marketing; another is promoting the image of 
McDonald's as wholesome to parents. 
It was one of the few things that Ray Kroc and the 
brothers ever agreed upon, the need to maintain McDonald's 
wholesome facade. In the 1950s, McDonald's was equated with 
Americanism as the chain positioned itself as a "safe" 
alternative to the teen infested drive-ins that dotted the 
nation's thoroughfares. Disney took like advantage of that 
same psychological need for safety, offering a morally 
simple alternative to the often gloomy and ambiguous films 
of the Cold War era. But is it wholesome to fill children's 
diets with hamburgers and fries and is it in children's best 
interests to acquiesce to their demands to visit Ronald's 
house? Perhaps what was wholesome in 1950 is now viewed 
differently. 
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The definition of wholesomeness in the 1950s and 1960s 
was inextricably tied to fears of Cold War weapons and 
juvenile delinquency. McDonald's "All-American Meal" was 
wholesome because it reflected efficiency and quality of 
production, convenience of use, and value for the dollar. 
With its limited menu, sleek architecture, and clean 
kitchens, McDonald's promised an unambiguous "what you see 
is what you get." Further, McDonald's was the friendly 
neighbor, always ready with a plate of free hamburgers for 
Red Cross workers, with a tour for kindergartners, with a 
donation to Olympic hopefuls, or with a visit from Ronald 
McDonald to sick children. But McDonald's philanthropy, in 
many ways sincere, cannot be extricated from its obvious 
marketing functions. Although it is a common corporate 
dilemma, the stakes are higher for McDonald's which promises 
sincerity. McDonald's offered a mercifully easy choice to 
Cold War Americans who daily witnessed America's grappling 
with harder questions on the evening news. And although 
McDonald's, like most Americans, now defines "wholesomeness" 
primarily in terms of nutrition, McDonald's continues to 
hearken back to its 1950s image in promoting itself abroad. 
It was Americanism understood as efficiency that 
McDonald's started exporting in the late 1960s. In 1967, 
the same threshold year that OPNAD took root, McDonald's 
opened its first international units in Canada and Puerto 
Rico. McDonald's reach remained modestly close to home 
until 1971, when Japan, Holland, Germany, and Australia, 
among others, joined the ranks of McDonald's affiliates. 9 
As of December, 1992, McDonald's was located in 65 
countries, with nearly a third of its total 13,093 units 
overseas. 10 Even the former Soviet Union, whose 
historical enmity towards the West was moderated under 
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perestroika, welcomed McDonald's into Moscow into 1990. The 
four story unit, serving 50,000 customers daily, took on an 
unexpected political and cultural significance, however, 
when it became a refuge for Muscovites during the aborted 
coup attempt in August, 1991. 11 Especially to Muscovites 
in their teens and twenties, McDonald's was a "symbol of 
what life could be like." Or in the words of one young man, 
"People here are happy. 1112 That is the essence of the 
McDonald's image and promise. 
Ronald McDonald, too, has ventured abroad, sometimes 
with a slight name shift, as in "Donald McDonald" in Japan. 
911McDonald's Chronological History Report," 31. 
McDonald's uses the term "affiliates" rather than licensees 
to denote its international owner/operators. Unlike its 
domestic licenses, McDonald's grants extensive territorial 
contracts to a local entrepreneur (or government agency, in 
the case of Communist countries) to open its foreign units. 
10McDonald's Corporatiom Annual Report, 1992, 
McDonald's Corporation Archives, 11. 
1111McDonald's Chronological History Report," 62; Laurie 
Hays, "A Soviet Generation, Eating Big Macs, Still Clings to 
Hope," Wall Street Journal, 20 August 1991, sec. A, 1. 
12Hays, "A Soviet Generation, " sec. A, 1. 
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Delivering the McDonald's message in nearly two dozen 
different languages, Ronald has brought to the world the 
idea that eating at McDonald's is fun. But the world has 
not unilaterally accepted the message. A Finnish consumer 
affairs court banned a McDonald's advertisement that showed 
a visibly depressed youngster whose melancholy subsided 
after eating a McDonald's hamburger. The court ruled "that 
the advertisement could convey the impression that eating at 
a McDonald's unit could end depression or serve as a 
substitute for a friend. 1113 Clearly, that is the message 
that McDonald's intended. More frequently, however, the 
foreign criticism over McDonald's centers around exporting 
standardized American mass culture to an unsuspecting world. 
In 1972, Harvard University business professor Theodore 
Levitt applauded McDonald's for its "manufacturing and 
technological brilliance. 1114 McDonald's, Levitt wrote, 
is a machine that produces, with the help of totally 
unskilled machine tenders, a highly polished product. 
Through painstaking attention to total design and 
facilities planning, everything is built integrally into 
the machine itself, into the technology of the system. 
The only choice available to the attendant is to operate 
it exactly as the designers intended. 15 
But the very things that impressed Theodore Levitt about 
13Nation' s 
Miscellaneous 
Archives. 
Restaurant 
Clippings 
News, 
File, 
16 July 1990 f 
McDonald's 
McDonald's 
Corporation 
14Theodore Levitt, "Production-line Approach to 
Service," Harvard Business Review (September-October 1972): 
45. 
15 Ibid. 1 46. 
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McDonald's in 1972, indeed, the very elements that made 
McDonald's a success, have since become suspect. 
Standardization, rationalization, and efficiency, defined by 
Alfred Chandler as the hallmarks of American commerce, have 
been recast as undermining Americans' free will and cultural 
options. In a scathing attack on the culture that 
McDonald's sows at home and exports worldwide, sociologist 
George Ritzer decries the "McDonaldization" of American 
society, defined as "the process by which the principles of 
the fast-food restaurant are coming to dominate more and 
more sectors of American society as well as of the rest of 
the world. 1116 
McDonald's prides itself on predictability, that a 
hamburger eaten in Chile is identical to one consumed in 
Hong Kong or Milwaukee; yet, that very predictability, 
Ritzer claims, limits our ability to function as autonomous 
individuals, free to choose or to be creative. McDonald's, 
in effect, constrains individuals, from the counter people 
who are ordered to smile eight hours a day to the young 
children who are taught, through McDonald's commercials, 
that their fun is pre-packaged and waiting for them in a 
Happy Meal or a Playland visit. 17 
Ritzer's critique of American homogeneity is not new. 
16George 
(Newbury Park, 
Ritzer, The McDonaldization of Society 
CA: Pine Forge Press/Sage, 1993), 1. 
17 rbid., 13. 
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In 1951, C. Wright Mill's White Collar: The American Middle 
Classes defined the new middle-class as being composed of 
culturally cloned automatons, vulnerable to "synthetic 
molding at the hands of popular culture. 1118 And in 1956, 
William H. Whyte, Jr.'s The Organization Man examined 
America's increasing social and cultural tepidity caused, he 
believed, by the rise of static corporate and social 
bureaucracies. 19 But William Whyte and Ray Kroc saw the 
same world differently. Whyte lamented Americans' exodus to 
ranch house suburbia, complete with smiling children, 
station wagon, and the family dog. But to Ray Kroc, this 
was America at its best. It was Kroc's image of America 
that McDonald's promoted, but it was an image that, by the 
early 1970s, was wearing thin. America was never the 
homogeneously white, middle-class, suburban society that 
Kroc envisioned and McDonald's, like most other corporate 
advertisers, had disenfranchised millions of urban, ethnic, 
working-class, or poor Americans whose own lives were 
inadequately represented in the advertising. 
Stereotyped, by Ritzer among many others, for its rigid 
conformity, McDonald's was actually quite flexible in 
response to these realizations. After Ray Kroc's death, 
many of McDonald's "sacred cows" were sacrificed to customer 
18c. Wright Mills, White Collar: The American Middle 
Classes (New York: Oxford University Press, 1951), xvi. 
19william H. Whyte, Jr., The Organization Man· (Garden 
City, NY: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1956), 3, 313-16. 
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demands. Telephones, uniformly banned by the McDonald 
brothers and Ray Kroc, have become a practical addition to 
McDonald's units, especially those along highways or in 
tollway oases. The 1950s teen culture, which both the 
brothers and Kroc disdained, have been resurrected in 
various "Rock 'n Roll" units, one even ironically hosting a 
"Friday-Nite Cruise-In" with hot rodding automobiles. 20 
And in the ultimate reversal of its history, one can even 
find hot dogs on a McDonald's menu. 21 
But McDonald's impact is felt far beyond eating. The 
same homogeneity and rationalization originally typified by 
a McDonald's has filtered to newspapers, medical care, 
cinemas, education, and sports. USA TODAY, known for its 
short, often shallow news snippets, has been derided as a 
"McPaper." Drive-in health clinics have become "McDoctors" 
and "McDentists." 22 The ubiquitous prefix "Mc," which 
Cooper and Golin had coined to create instant brand 
recognition for McDonald's, continues to accomplish its 
original aim, but now in an unexpectedly negative light. 
The "Mc" prefix denotes disdain and derision, even 
20
"Presenting 'Nostalgia' McDonald's," promotional 
flyer for Gurnee Mills McDonald's, Gurnee, Illinois, April, 
1993; Jeff Cole, "You Deserve to Rock Today; McDonald's to 
be 'Solid Gold,'" Milwaukee Sentinel, 12 March 1992, sec. D, 
1. One of the most notable McDonald's using the 1950s theme 
is in downtown Chicago. 
21one of the larger units offering hot dogs is in 
Woodfield Mall, Schaumburg, Illinois. 
22Ritzer, McDonaldization of Society, 4. 
bemusement, yet it is that same prefix that McDonald's 
itself has applied to children, "McKids." 
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McDonald's, as an archetype of corporate America's 
influence on society, has claimed American children as its 
own. Numerous critics, most notably Action for Children's 
Television, have decried this trend as pernicious and have 
lobbied to ban all television advertising directed at 
children. They are wrong. Although well-intentioned, these 
advocates miss the fact that children still save over forty 
cents out of every dollar they earn (see Figure 4). And the 
critics ignore an even more important reality. Child 
consumerism is an unavoidable and legitimate outgrowth of 
American capitalism. All children are socialized into the 
dominant ideology of their culture; for twentieth century 
American children, this means consumerism. One hundred 
years ago, the most common way of participating in the 
American economy was as a producer, and children were no 
exception. Since then, the development of mass production 
has introduced consumer goods into every economic stratum. 
Beginning with radio, then television, and ultimately, with 
Disney and McDonald's, children have fulfilled the 
capitalist promise. Consumption has filtered down from 
teenagers, to preteens, and now, to preschoolers and 
toddlers. In both the 1930s and the 1950s, this process of 
creating the "consumer of tomorrow" was seen as a source of 
American strength. That it is being questioned now implies 
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Fig. 4. 1991 Spending, Children Aged 4-12. In 1991, 
children saved 40 cents of every dollar they earned, 
compared to an adult savings rate of only 5.2 cents per 
dollar. Valerie Reitman, "Those Little Kids Have Big 
Pockets," Wall Street Journal, 26 August 1992, sec. B, 1; 
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the 
United States, 1992 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1992), table 682, p. 434. 
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ambivalence towards the capitalist legacy and its future 
course. 
McDonald's, however, seems undisturbed by the broader 
ambiguity of its relationship to children. Heeding the 
capitalist imperative to sell more hamburgers, McDonald's 
continues to rely upon children for a third of its sales, 
and has recently broadened its children's fare to include a 
breakfast Happy Meal, changing yet another family eating 
pattern. Ronald McDonald continues to learn new languages, 
open more Ronald McDonald Houses, and star in new 
commercials. And children continue to flock to Ronald's 
"house" as McDonald's, and American capitalism, plots its 
next conquest, "McWorld. 1123 
2311 McWorld" is the tagline that McDonald's is using in 
its most recent children's advertising campaign (October 
1993). 
APPENDIX 
GIVING SOMETHING BACK: A SAMPLING OF MCDONALD'S 
CORPORATE PHILANTHROPY24 
Goal: "To extend McDonald's leadership position and enhance 
its quality image by creative, newsworthy execution 
of programs and activities that demonstrate community 
commitment and involvement. 1125 
PROGRAM DESCRIPTION 
DIRECT SPONSORSHIP: 
Ronald McDonald House 
Ray A. Kroc Youth Achievement 
Award 
All-American High School Band 
All-American Jazz Band 
All-American Basketball Team 
residential facility for 
families with seriously 
ill children 
awarded to junior- and 
high school students 
who exemplify Ray 
Kroc's principles 
elite marching and jazz 
bands composed of 
students from all fifty 
states and the District 
of Columbia 
showcases high school 
athletes 
24This Appendix only reflects McDonald's corporate 
philanthropy and does not include the donations or sponsored 
programs initiated by individual owner/operators. 
25 
"McDonald's Public Relations Department," publicity 
brochure (1987), McDonald's Corporation Archives. 
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Draw America 
Hispanic Heritage Art Contest 
Congressional Hispanic Caucus 
Institute/High School Internship 
Program 
Literary Achievement Award 
Gospel Fest 
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a creative arts program 
for ages three through 
eight, in conjunction 
with Crayola, Inc. 
aimed at grades 1-6 
sponsors students 
as Congressional aides 
recognizes African-
American writers 
sponsors African-American 
choral competition 
Academic, Cultural, Technological, scholastic competition 
and Scientific Olympics for African-American 
students 
"His Light Still Shines" 
McDonald's American Cup 
Hispanic Artists' Exhibit 
McDonald's Sidekick Soccer 
What's in a Name: Young 
Astronaut Program 
ON-GOING CONTRIBUTOR: 
American Council for the Arts 
American Dental Association 
American Dietetic Association 
Big Brothers/Big Sisters 
Boy Scouts/Girl Scouts 
Boys Club/Girls Club 
travelling exhibit on 
Martin Luther King 
gymnastics competition 
highlights Hispanic 
artists 
ages seven through 
sixteen 
science program/co-
sponsored with Young 
Astronaut Council 
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Citizens for a Better Environment 
Day Care Council of America 
Junior Olympics 
Muscular Dystrophy Association 
Museum of Science and Industry (Chicago) 
NAACP 
National 4-H 
National Future Homemaker's Association 
National Hispanic Scholarship Fund 
National Parents Teachers Association (PTA) 
National Urban League 
Operation PUSH 
Special Olympics 
United Negro College Fund 
World Gymnastic Championships 
World Youth Soccer Championships 
YMCA 
CURRICULUM MATERIALS: 
Title 
Moving/Learning Action Pack 
Nutrition Action Pack 
Ecology Action Pack 
Career Action Pack 
Learn to Study/Learn to Read 
Description 
primary grades/physical 
education 
grades 1-4 
grades 4-6 
grades 6-9 
grades 6-9/reading skills 
watch Out for the Other Guy 
Fit and Fun: Fitness Fun 
with Ronald McDonald 
Wecology 
Mecology 
Lif etrack 
Get It Straight 
Plan to Get Out Alive 
Home Safe Home 
Bicycles R Beautiful 
Star Reader Kit 
bicycle/water safety 
grades K-4/physical 
education 
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recycling/ co-sponsored 
with World Wildlife 
Fund 
ages 6-12/ecology 
grades 4-12/physical 
education and nutrition 
drug awareness program 
emphasizes home fire 
safety 
emphasizes home fire 
safety 
emphasizes bike safety 
reading skills 
Sources: "McDonald's Public Relations Department," brochure 
(1987); "McDonald's Contributions Report, 1977," 
21-24; "McDonald' Community Service and Social 
Investment Report, 1981-1982," 8-12; "Presence 
Builds Preference: Communications Department," 
brochure (May 1986), 11-12; "Growing Up Together: 
McDonald's and Children," in "McDonald's Giving: 
A Commitment to Our Communities" (June 1988), 11-
16; "McDonald's 1985 Catalog of Educational 
Resources" (1985). McDonald's Corporation 
Archives. 
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